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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis is an examination of certain weaknesses in the corporate governance
at UK and US banks which constituted an underlying cause of the crisis.  It considers the
regulatory responses to these identified weaknesses and assesses to what extent these have
led  to  improvements  in  corporate  governance  at  banks.   This  research  is  based  on  an
examination of all the failures at UK and US banks during and after the crisis, and of its
related responses.  In addition to UK and US responses, several solutions to the weaknesses
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identified at UK and US banks are addressed through EU legislation.  The conclusions are
that board effectiveness was low due to a lack of knowledge and of challenging of senior
management;  there  was  a  culture  placing  growth  and profit  over  risk  management;  and
remuneration was structured leading to unacceptable risk taking resulting in scandals.  It is
concluded that the mechanisms to limit the impact of a failure of a bank on its stakeholders
were inadequate.  A case study of the financial crisis in US during the 1990s is undertaken to
consider whether the US regulatory response offers lessons to UK regulators and legislators.
The finding is that analysis of regulation and corporate governance at banks is problematic.
There were similarities between the two financial crises, the organisation and culture of the
UK and US banks is so different that different regulatory responses follow.  
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The structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  The structure of the chapters is as follows:
Chapter 1 provides an overview of corporate governance.  The discussion begins with the
meaning and implications of corporate governance, the duties of directors and the care and
skill  of  the  directors.   Then it  moves to  remedies  for  breach of  duty.   The meaning of
‘corporate governance’ is considered to be good corporate governance.  Following the initial
background  information,  it  is  necessary  to  shed  some light  on  difference  between legal
systems.  Finally, the business judgment rule will enter the discussion, as it was also one of
the most important rules in corporate governance.
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Chapter 2 focuses on the issue of the corporate governance crisis in the banking and finance
sector.   Financial  scandals  are  explored  and  rogue  trader  are  discussed  as  well.   The
responsibilities of the directors and insider trading are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 discusses the UK and US regulatory response which took place in UK and in US.
It provides a detailed discussion of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, one of the most sweeping and, at
the same time, controversial reforms in US legal history.  A brief examination of executive
pay and corporate  integrity  and corporate  governance  reforms give  us  a  more  complete
picture of the corporate governance reforms, before discussing with Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
Chapter 4 discusses the role of financial regulation, the corporate governance regulations and
guidelines and the role of stakeholders in corporate governance.  The examination starts with
corporate  governance  and  excessive  regulation,  public  policy,  regulation  and  incentive
structures.  It is enlightening to go through the regulation in order to avoid repeating the
same mistakes. 
Finally, chapter 5 will conclude the thesis, by summarizing the most important points of the
discussion and highlighting the role of ethics in the modern corporate governance.   It  is
essential to assess the impact of regulations and supervision of corporate governance and re-
define the modus operandi of changing the culture of financial regulations through a changed
corporate governance approach. 
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Chapter One
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of corporate governance.  The discussion begins with the
meaning and implications of corporate governance, the duties of directors and the care and
skill of the directors.  It moves to remedies for breach of duty.  The meaning of ‘corporate
governance’  is  considered  to  be  good  corporate  governance.   Following  the  initial
background  information,  it  is  necessary  to  shed  some light  on  difference  between  legal
systems.  The business judgment rule will enter the discussion, as it was the most important
rule  in  corporate  governance.   This  study  seeks  to  research  to  uncover  the  corporate
governance factors in the banking sector, especially a number of banking case studies in the
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US and the UK.  Corporate governance gives attention to power struggle issues between the
directors, management, and shareholders.  Back in the 1930s this arose because of the shift
of power from owners to management  especially  for corporations in the capital  markets.
Governance  involves  the  alignment  of  interests  among  the  stakeholders.  Corporate
governance  covers  a  large  number  of  issues;  its  inherent  processes  have  not  been  fully
identified and analyzed.1  
Research Issues  
Shareholders regained more influence in the 1980s and 1990s in both the UK and the US
with  the  emergence  of  more  institutional  shareholders.   We  rely  on  UK’s  enlightened
shareholder approach to look at both US and UK contexts because we have reason to believe
that UK is one of a larger economies in the world and its influence cannot be neglected.  A
number of legal controls strived to ensure that management act within their authority and for
the primary interests of the company as whole.  
Despite  the presence of legislation  corporate  governance  problems continue  to  haunt  the
capital markets.  This is not something new, as many of the same core problems of lack of
transparency  and  controls,  faulty  management  compensation  schemes,  and  conflicts  of
interest.  This suggests that a further study could be useful to generate expanded insights on
how and why such corporate governance issues continue to trouble the corporate sector, and
what  policy  measures  can  be  taken  to  alleviate  the  adverse  impact  of  these  problems.
Understanding  the  issues  raised  by  corporate  governance  requires  familiarity  with  the
concepts, assumptions and terminology of each of these fields.2  This thesis seeks answers
and explanations on how and why the banking and finance sector is continuously troubled by
core corporate governance issues despite the controls provided by both soft and hard laws.  It
will focus on banking and finance institutions in the capital market.  Further justification for
the study is made on the grounds that the banking and finance sector is important to the
workings of national economies as it provides the fuel for growth. 
Research Approach
The  doctrinal  approach  is  adopted  for  this  thesis,  primarily  because  of  good  access  to
adequate data sources.  It depends on secondary data drawn from related academic books,
journal articles, and reliable internet sources and uncover corporate governance insights in
the banking sector.   Banking case studies include those in the US and the UK.  This is
complemented by primary data drawn from applicable statutes and soft laws.  Triangulation
of  data  is  achieved  through  the  appropriate  use  of  different  perspectives  derived  from
insights generated by the related disciplines of economics, finance, sociology, and politics.
1
Ali, P. and Gregoriou, G., International corporate governance after Sarbanes-Oxley, John Wiley and Sons, New Jersey, 2006, p 66.
2
 B. Minoru Makihara, Chief Executive of Mitsubishi Corporation, cited in Deakin, S. and Hughes, A., “Comparative Corporate
Governance: An interdisciplinary Agenda”, (1997), Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 24. No.1, p 8.
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In this thesis, primary and secondary research will both be used.  This research will proceed
to collect primary data from statutes and regulations.  Secondary research can come from
either internal or external sources.  The proliferation of web search engines has increased
opportunities  to  conduct  secondary research.   In this  thesis,  the study is  confined to  the
banking and finance sector in the capital markets to render the examination feasible within
the scope of a PhD.  The study focuses on corporate governance issues in the banking sector.
The study will  limit  to  the  scope to  particular  governance  matters  including  internal  or
external governance in the banking sector. 
Meaning and implications  
The  corporate  form of  business  allows  firms  that  need  capital  to  obtain  it  and expand,
thereby help the economy.3  We define corporate governance as the collection of control
mechanisms that  an organization  adopts  to  prevent  or  dissuade potentially  self-interested
managers  from  engaging  in  activities  detrimental  to  the  welfare  of  shareholders  and
stakeholders.4  We suggested that corporate governance is concerned with the exercise of
power  over  corporate  entities.5  Corporate  governance  is  an  expression  that  was  once
confined  in  usage  to  a  rather  narrow  group  of  academics,  lawyers  and  boardroom
participants.  A modern corporation must be able to effectively perform their role as national
productivity-enhancing economic actors.6  The structure of the governance system depends
on the fundamental orientation of the firm and the role that the firm plays in society.7  The
structures and laws by which corporations are governed and in some cases misgoverned are
matters that have moved into the public arena in a way that almost begins to approach the
discourse on civic governance, that is, the government of the state.  Corporations make every
effort to avoid such regulation, while they steadily become more powerful.8  This came after
a long silence since the publication of the seminal works by Berle and Means and Coase in
1932 and 1937 respectively.
3
 Kenneth A. Kim, John R. Nofsinger & Derek J. Mohr, Corporate Governance, third edition, Pearson, 2010, P 10
4
 David Larcker, Brian Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters (A closer look at organizational choices and their consequences),
second edition, Pearson Education, Inc, 2016, p 7
5
 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance, Principles, Policies, and Practices, third edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, pg. 30.
6
 Fratianni, M., Sarona, P. and Kirton, J., (eds), Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 contribution, Global Finance
Series, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, UK and USA, 2007, p 4
7
 David Larcker, Brian Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters (A closer look at organizational choices and their consequences),
second edition, Pearson Education, Inc, 2016, p 8
8
 Berle, A. and Means, G., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillan, New York, 1939, p 357
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Berle  adopted  a  classic  shareholder-centered  model  of  fiduciary  duties,  in  which  profit
maximization for shareholders was to be the guiding principle  for directors.9  Under this
model of the corporation, employees had little or no formal role in the corporate governance
framework.  This has led to modern forms of governance which focus fairly exclusively on
the relationship between management and shareholders and on profit maximization for the
shareholders.  It is based on a tripartite system of directors, shareholders, and auditors.10  The
majority  of  the corporate  governance  literature  is  concerned with the  analysis  of control
structures designed to protect and advance the interest not only of the stakeholders, but of the
management as well.11  
The managers decided upon the running of the corporation whilst the shareholders, though
they were the owners, were entitled to receive cash flows.  This leads to conflicts between
the interests of the shareholders and those of the management.12  In exercising its limited
powers  of  management,  the  general  meeting  is  under  a  similar  obligation  to  company
directors  in  so  far  as  the  general  meeting  must  apply  its  powers  for  the  benefit  of  the
company as a whole.  However, the general meeting may not tell board what to do in terms
of everyday management decisions.  The test to determine whether the general meeting acted
for  the  benefit  of  the  company as  whole  may be  said  to  be dominated  by  an  objective
consideration  of  whether  or  not  the  general  meetings’  powers  were  exercised.   The
justification  for  the  UK  approach  is  that  problems  had  arisen  in  the  UK  due  to  over
centralized boards with over powerful Chief Executives, e.g., RBS and Northern Rock.  The
Higgs  proposals  do  not  take  the  form  of  regulatory  legislation  but  merely  add  a  new
dimension to a UK system of governance based around a voluntary code of compliance.
However, these codes are followed because of the fear that legislation would be employed in
response by the state and the possible denial of support from the financial  community in
general.  To comply with future EU directives, it is possible that future corporate governance
reforms would take the form of legislation.  
Financial development seems tied to corporate governance, with more developed financial
systems associated with more professional management, more diffuse shareholders, and less
ubiquitous  family  controls.   Politicians  bent  on interventionism may value  being able  to
9
 Hill J, ‘Corporate governance and the role of the employee’ in Gollan P & Patmore G (eds), Partnership at Work: The Challenge of
Employee Democracy: Labor Essays 2003 (Pluto Press Melbourne 2003) 114.
10
 Kendall,  N & Kendall,  A,  Real-World  Corporate  Governance:  A  Programme for  Profit-Enhancing  Stewardship  (FT Pitman
Publishing London 1998) 16.
11
 Mumford, M., “Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: When structures have to change”, (2003), Corporate Governance,
Vol. 11, No.1, p 53
12
 Jian Chen, Corporate Governance in China (Routledge Curzon Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2005) p10
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influence the whole corporate sector with phone calls to a handful of patriarchs.13  The idea is
to  see  whether  they  have  the  resilience  to  take  on  financial  upheavals  or  in  another
perspective whether some inherent weaknesses in these models helps contribute to the crisis
in the banking sector.  The corporate form of organization of economic activity is a powerful
force for growth.  The regulatory and legal environment within which corporations operate is
of key importance to overall economic outcomes.  
Policy makers have a responsibility to put in place a framework that is flexible enough to
meet  the  needs  of  corporations  operating  in  different  circumstances,  facilitating  their
development  of  new  opportunities  to  create  value  and  to  determine  the  most  efficient
deployment of resources.  Corporate governance requirements and practices are influenced
by an array of legal domains, such as company law, securities regulation, accounting and
auditing standards, insolvency law, contract law, labor law, tax law and in the case of banks
the capital requirements on which the applicable rules are set out in Basel II which in turn are
being replaced by Basel III.  There is a risk that the variety of legal influences may cause
unintentional  overlaps  and even conflicts,  which  may frustrate  the  ability  to  pursue key
corporate governance objectives.14 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.  Boards
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies.  The shareholders’ role in
governance is  to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that  an
appropriate governance structure is in place.  Within that overall framework, the financial
aspects of corporate governance are the way in which boards set financial policy and oversee
its implementation,  including the use of financial  controls, and the process whereby they
report  on  the  activities  and  progress  of  the  company  to  the  shareholders.15  Corporate
governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders.  Corporate governance provides the structure through
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined.  Good corporate governance should provide proper
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the
company  and its  shareholders  and should  facilitate  effective  monitoring.   Definitions  of
corporate  governance  on  the  broader  side  emphasize  that  stakeholders  and  shareholders
should share a larger amount of responsibility.  
13
 Randall K. Morck. A History of Corporate Governance around the World (The University of Chicago Press, 2005) p58.
14
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘OECD  Principles  of  Corporate   Governance’,  2004,  Preamble,  pg.
31, available in the website: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf 
15
 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance - Cadbury Code (December 1992), section 2.5 & 2.6.
Available at: http://www.cg.org.cn/theory/zlyz/cadbury.pdf.
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This is likely to be due to its allusion to government, which brings a public element into a
domain that is considered private.16  The precise term ‘corporate governance’ seems to have
been used first by Richard Eells, to denote the structure and functioning of the corporate
polity.17  Since corporate  governance has been a dominant policy issue in the developed
market economies.  In the transition economies it took some time for corporate governance
to climb the ladder of policy priorities, but since the mid-90s it has been one of the most
hotly contested issues.  In the wake of the Asian Crisis, corporate governance has become a
catchword in the development debate.18  It is a complicated task to define such a wide term as
corporate  governance,  because  it  covers  a  large  number  of  distinct  legal  and  economic
phenomena.  Each adopted definition reflects the special interest of its creator in the field of
corporate governance, because every rigorous analysis needs a good definition as a starting
point.  The absence of any real consensus19 on the definition is indicative of the complexity
of the subject matter.  These definitional reveals that the notion of corporate governance is
perceived  differently  from one  country  to  another.   The  priorities  in  the  debate  on  the
management  and  control  of  corporations  vary,  and  its  intensity  and  nature  are  different
depending on the country in which it is taking place.20  
Apart from a geographical and historical relativity, the discussion is relative to the academic
discipline in which it is studied.  The literature of law focuses on the powers and duties of
several actors involved in the corporate governance system.  Economists examine how to
minimize the conflicts of interest between these actors, so that a company can be financed
and run in the most efficient way.21  It is important to ensure that the suppliers of finance to
corporations will get a return on their investment.  A widely used definition, is that corporate
governance  is  a  system  of  rules,  which  determine  how  companies  are  directed  and
controlled22, as it organizes the structures and the mechanisms that are responsible for the
16
 Lannoo, K., “A European perspective on Corporate Governance”, (1999), Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No.2, pg.
271. 
17
 Eells,  R.,  The  Meaning  of  Modern  Business:  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Large  Corporate  Enterprise,  Columbia
University Press, New York, 1960, pg. 106. 
18
 Berglöf, E. and von Thadden E.L., “The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing
Countries”, (1999), Working Paper No 263, pg. 5, available in the website: http://eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/wp263.pdf. 
19
 Keasey,  K.,  Thompson,  S.  and  Wright,  M.,  Corporate  Governance:  Economic,  Management  and  Financial  Issues,  Oxford
University Press, Oxford and New York, 1997, pg. 7. 
20
 Center for European Policy Studies, “Corporate Governance in Europe: Report of a CEPS Working Party”, (1995), CEPS Working





running of  a  company.   Corporate  governance  provides  the  structure  through which  the
objectives  of  the  company  are  set,  and  the  means  of  attaining  those  objectives  and
monitoring performance are determined.23  
Globalization and market integration in combination with new ownership structures create
new challenges  for  regulators.   The  underpinnings  and objectives  of  regulation  seem to
change  rapidly,  so  regulatory  coordination  needs  constant  enhancement  and  regulatory
practice  further  strengthening.24  Companies  are  forced  to  focus  on  maximizing  asset
efficiency  and  shareholder  value  in  an  attempt  to  access  funds  and  increase  their
opportunities.  Corporate governance has been highlighted as one of the most burning issues
both in a legal and financial context.  
Corporate  governance  is  a  dynamic  field  of  study  with  wide  social  and  economic
implications.  It should become a priority for every country to minimize the risk of having
more and more companies on the verge of collapse due to bad governance.  The recognition
that good and ethical corporate governance should become a priority will initiative a process
of  constant  improvement,  as  it  will  help  in  raising  the  standards  and  making  existing
structures  more  effective.   Modern  corporate  governance  is  about  promoting  corporate
fairness,  transparency  and  accountability.   The  words  of  Shleifer  and Vishny,  corporate
governance does not deal only with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves  of getting a return on their  investment  or just  with how the corporate
owners  can  be  confident  that  the  corporate  managers  will  deliver  a  competitive  rate  of
return.25  The focus is on the enhancement of shareholder value and responsiveness to the
needs of stakeholders.  
The implications for the corporate governance in this thesis are focus on US and UK banking
sector.  We will examine the banking context and directors’ duties as this is important in this
thesis  and  the  corporate  objective  are  well  mentioned  below.   Despite  there  are  some
difference between the US and UK institutions failure, their failure is due to some similar
reasons  namely  poor  management,  no  sufficient  regulations  and  no  regulators  who  can
execute the regulations in a proper way.
Defining the Company 
What is a Company 
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A company is defined as activities that take place under an entrepreneur, which is less costly
than relying on outside markets.26  This person has the control to direct the employees what
to do and it  is this existence of control which creates the company.  This approach was
criticised because it may not be the authority of this person but the contractual relations that
bring people together.27  This criticism led to the development of the theory.28  There is the
real-world entity and there is the legal entity, which is an abstract thing.29  Consider a group
of people that decide to go through the application process to form a company.  The legal
entity is created, however in the real world little has changed.  This observation impacts the
following sections, which describe different theories of the existence of companies.  All of
these theories are in some way problematic once the question is asked what a company is and
these theories must be approached with care.30  There are different theories of existence of
the company, including contractual, communitarian and concessionary theories.31  
Contractual Theory 
The contractual theory32 forms the basis of corporate law.  If one takes the company as a
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, corporate law can enable the participants to
select an optimal arrangement of risks and opportunities that are available.33  Corporate law
would play a more important role than for example regulation.  There have been many critics
of the theory.  One line of criticism is that these contracts do not exist, or sometimes only
partially.34  In contractual theory, the company is regarded as an association or aggregation
26
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of individuals, brought together through contractual relations between its members.35  The
conception can be useful to examine the relationship between the board and directors or
other internal relationships.   It does limit  the model to company internal  relationships as
external parties or regulators are not part of the contracts that make up the company.  The
company is placed in the sphere of private law and it is regarded as a legal entity.36  In
economic contractual  theory, the view is that the individuals inside the company seek to
operate with maximum efficiency and to minimise any transaction costs.  The concepts are
that  an  individual  in  the  company  acts  rationally  to  gain  efficiency.37  The  concept  of
individualism is linked with liberal thought38 making the working of the company rely on
self-correction instead of any regulatory interference.  The risk of theory is that it has the
potential  to  create  bad  companies,  by  creating  companies  without  morals  or  social
responsibility, with a preference for as little regulation as possible.39  
Viewing the company as a nexus of contracts allows for different groups to contribute what
they are good at whilst reducing overall costs.  Shareholders provide capital whilst leaving
the management to professional managers and entrepreneurs, providing managers with the
objective  of  maximizing  shareholder  value  to  align  interests;  to  manage  divergence  of
interests,  fiduciary  duties  should approximate  the bargain  investors  and managers  would
reach if there were zero transaction costs.  Efficient profit making companies provide many
jobs and products or services that consumers want to buy whilst companies in difficulty are
more  likely  to  cut  corners  and  provide  unsafe  working  conditions.40  Corporate  social
responsibility  defined as accountability  of management  to not only shareholders but also
society is problematic, for the company, cannot have social or moral obligations.41  Managers
do  not  have  a  contract  with  society,  but  with  shareholders,  their  objectives  are  defined
accordingly.   This  means  that  recognition  of  the  interests  of  stakeholders  outside  the
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company cannot take place because they are not part of the nexus of contracts.42  The theory
together with the dominance of shareholder value to which it is linked, resulted in a social
corporation  and,  by  influencing  legislation,  promoted  what  can  be  termed  deregulatory
globalisation.  In the post-crisis UK financial sector there is a shift in the debate: regulation
is becoming more intrusive and defining social functions of the banks is becoming more
important.  The categorisation of theories of existence of the firm 43 can be used in an ante-
crisis world, the behaviour of financial institutes and the environment in which they operated
can be brought back to the contractual theory.  Then, we will discuss the concession and
communitarian theory.
Concession and Communitarian Theory 
The concession theory is not the same as communitarian theory.   The concession theory
views the existence of a company as a concession by the state.44  The term concession hints
at a long history and comes from the time of the rise of the national state when it was at
conflict with religious congregations and organisations of feudal origin.45  The company can
exist as a legal entity once granted power by the state.  A point of departure is found in
Dartmouth College v Woodward,46 in which it was said that a company is an artificial being,
possessing those properties  which the charter  of its  creation  confers on it.   This can be
extended to the view that the state grants special advantages, including limited liability and
favourable treatment in the accumulation of assets.47  
The concession theory is that the state may have the opposite objective.  It seeks to curtail
the  company  and to  thwart  rather  than  facilitate  organisational  development.48  Another
shortcoming of this approach is that it covers the company as a legal entity, because that a
legal entity  is granted a status by the state.  The state allows companies to operate with
minimal interference except that it seeks to ensure that governance structures are good.  It
42
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does so without  imposing its  own goals upon the company as it  does in communitarian
theory.   The  communitarian  approach  is  a  basis  for  regulation.   Bottomley  introduces
constitutionalism which allows the state to regulate corporate governance.49  The German
Corporation Law 1937 changes to the influence of the management board and the board of
directors, it prescribes an objective for companies: they must operate to improve the general
welfare.50  
Corporate Governance 
The Main Theories 
The  understanding  of  why  companies  exists  will  inform  discussion  of  the  theories  of
corporate governance: the agency theory, the resource dependence and stewardship theory
and  the  stakeholder  theory.   Consider  the  control  of  the  company  and  separation  of
ownership  and  control.51  In  the  agency  theory,  the  problem  is  how  the  dispersed
shareholders,  in effect the owners, can control the board to look after their  property,  the
company.52  The shareholders need to create incentives, coined the agency costs, that align
the interests of the agent with that of the shareholders.  Agency theory was developed in a
wider  context  of  corporate  governance.53  It  could  be  extended  to  cover  employer  and
employees or company and creditors.  This theory is related to the theory as the agents are
controlled by contractual agreements.  The agency theory is related to the transaction cost
economics.54  The firm seeks  to  minimize  transactions  costs  by undertaking  transactions
internally rather than externally, thus growing in size.  Other researchers have stated that, as
49
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contracts will be incomplete and never cover for every situation.55  The stewardship theory
rejected the assumption of the agency theory5657  
The stakeholder theory has been promoted by the OECD.  The difference with the previous
theories at that it no longer assumes shareholder supremacy.  It recognises that shareholders
are the owners, the theory argues that everyone with an interest in the company should be
looked after.  The stakeholders include employees, customers and suppliers, but this can be
extended  to  the  community  and environment  in  which  the  firm operates.   It  shares  this
broader  view of  the  company sitting  within  the  company’s  wider  environment  with  the
resource dependence theory.58  
Internal and External Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is split into internal and external corporate governance or controls.59
Internal controls are internal to the company.  One could regard the board as the highest
control in the firm, exercising control over the decisions made by senior management.60  The
idea of such internal control mechanisms aligns with agency theory, as the issue of control of
the agents by the shareholders could be done by way of performance contracts.  External
corporate governance61 can be summarised as the control exerted by the markets over the
company.  It could be seen as a method of last resort, which becomes active when all the
internal control mechanisms have failed.62  The fight for management with other company’s
55
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management  can  be  a  way  to  improve  performance.   A  hostile  take-over  would  be  an
external mechanism to control management.  It ties into contractual theory if one regards the
implementation of the contracts with minimal transaction as the objective of this external
mechanism and large investors and creditors can exercise control over the company.63  
The Cadbury Report 
Although harmonised principles  do exist,  what  is  implemented  as a  system of corporate
governance is country specific.  This is focused on the UK, where possible arguments from
international  reports,  such as  OECD’s  report  on  corporate  governance,64 can  inform the
debate through comparative analysis.  Using both UK and international reports of various
time periods, this section outlines what is meant by a system of corporate governance.  The
OECD published an updated version of its principles65 in September 2015.  The Cadbury
Committee defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are controlled.66
The Cadbury report has been replaced by the UK Corporate Governance Code this definition
still stands.67  To the question Cadbury answers that the ‘Boards of directors are responsible
for  the  governance  of  their  companies’,68 whilst  the  system is  completed  by  adding  the
remaining  actors:  the  shareholders’  role  in  governance  is  to  appoint  directors  and  the
auditors.69  The Financial Reporting Council is responsible for maintaining high standards of
corporate governance in the UK.  The Cadbury Report had been folded in to the Combined
Code, together with the Greenbury report on remuneration and the Hampel report on the
implementation of Cadbury and Greenbury.  This Combined Code has been renamed as the
UK Corporate Governance Code.70  It describes the purpose of corporate governance as to
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facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-term
success of the company.71 
International Reports 
The OECD, states that employees and stakeholders play an important role in contributing to
the long-term success and performance of the corporation.72  The OECD remains neutral
towards the different approaches of corporate governance, in this statement, the contribution
of stakeholders to the long-term success of the company is recognised.  The OECD provides
examples of some important stakeholders.  The competitiveness and success of a corporation
is the result  of teamwork that  embodies  contributions  from a range of different  resource
providers.73  Other  international  reports,  which  are  the  result  of  harmonising  different
practices  across  countries,  such as  Basel  II74 and  the  Winter  Report,75 use  this  enlarged
definition.  The national differences brought together in these international reports concern
labour co-determination and whether shareholders should extend their concern from profit
maximisation to wider social and environmental issues outside the company.76  In the UK,
the  directors  do  not  have  a  fiduciary  duty  towards  the  shareholders.   However,  in  the
Companies Act 2006, s172, the directors have to promote the success of the company whilst
having  regard  for  employees,  suppliers,  customers  and  others  as  well  as  impact  on  the
community  and  environment.   Alistair  Darling,  then  Secretary  for  Trade  and  Industry,
commented that directors will be required to promote the success of the company in the
collective best interest of their shareholders, but in doing so they will have to have regard to
a wide range of factors.77  
In the Companies Act 1985, s309, which specified that directors should have regard for the
interests of the company’s employees and the interest of its members.  These sections of the
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Company Act 2006 have been branded enlightened shareholder value as it goes somewhat
further  than  merely  shareholder  value.78  Moving  away  from  shareholders  towards
stakeholders allows for corporate social responsibility, defined as the responsibility towards
the company’s stakeholders.79  Consider the difference between the UK’s single board and
the  dual  board  as  is  adopted  in  Germany.80  If  that  is  possible  to  say  at  all  given  the
difficulties in comparing the two.  The Companies Act 2006 outlines the responsibilities of
directors.  These include their fiduciary duties towards the company; although the company
can enforce these duties, the shareholders will be able to enforce them through derivatives
action.81 
Internal and External Corporate Governance at Banks 
Corporate  governance  for  banks  has  several  issues  including  extensive  regulation  and
supervision, debt-governance and a much greater emphasis on risk management.82  Because
of  several  bank failures,  international  groups such as  the  Basel  Committee  have set  out
global standards for risk management and capital requirements, such as Basel I83 and Basel
II.84  Basel I had its shortcomings for political reasons in that it represented the most that the
parties  involved  could  agree  at  the  time.   It  is  worth  highlighting  some  of  its  major
deficiencies so that the progress and changes of Basel II can be better understood.  Basel III
requires  banks  to  improve the  quality  of  capital;  in  particular  tier  1  capital,  the  highest
quality of capital,  and to increase the risk that capital  needs to cover and to increase the
capital  requirement  ratio  itself.   Basel  III  is  the  reaction  to  the  crisis  and  therefore  is
important to this thesis.  Differentiating Basel I and II to include Basel III is a reaction to
2008 global financial crisis.  The Basel Accord is a global regulatory response.  This thesis is
78
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on US and UK, but both are G20 members with global banks that generally follow this soft
law regime.
When discussing  the  theory  of  corporate  governance,  the  distinction  was  made between
internal  and  external  corporate  governance.   This  distinction  applies  for  corporate
governance at banks.  It is complicated because there are additional components to these two
areas.85  The internal corporate governance may include aspects such as a good corporate
culture and good ethics and behaviour.   The risk management function will  play a more
prominent  role  and  the  role  of  the  Chief  Risk  Officer  is  more  important.   This  has
implications for the function of the board and how it controls the bank.  External corporate
governance at banks has the important control by the markets, as is the case with any large
company.  The agent problem could be extended to include depositors and borrowers; the
regulators could play the role of ensuring that the objectives of each of the participants with
regards to risk preferences and corresponding incentives are aligned.86  The regulator needs
to balance the interests of the various stakeholders in the economy that can be affected by the
risks banks take and the social costs that arise from it.  The regulator may be concerned with
the moral hazard arising from information asymmetry between the bank and stakeholder: a
depositor may not have the same insight in the bank’s risk profile as the bank does for the
depositor.  The point is that regulators should be considered a stakeholder and can play an
active role in the agency problem: in the UK, the FCA is playing an active role in designing
internal systems at the banks to achieve protection for all stakeholders.87  
The FSA was created through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, or FSMA.  This
Act  superseded  the  Financial  Services  Act  1986,  which  had  created  the  Securities  and
Investment Board.  This regulator replaced various smaller regulating bodies and ended self-
regulation.   It  consolidated  the financial  regulation into one main body.  The name was
changed to FSA following the passing of the FSMA.  It got regulatory responsibility for
mortgage businesses in 2004 and for insurance intermediaries in 2005.  It then became the
Financial  Conduct  Authority  (“FCA”)  alongside  the  Prudential  Regulatory  Authority88
(“PRA”) set up following the Financial Services Act 2012.  Banks are subject to gatekeepers
like any company is, such as external auditors.  These bring the same concerns for banks as
they do for other companies,  as ineffective gatekeepers can contribute to failures such as
Enron.89  A category of gatekeepers are the rating agencies.  Although these agencies come
85
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with many flaws, the ratings they provide hold enormous cloud in the financial  markets.
These many flaws have contributed to the failure of rating agencies to do their job properly.
They are regarded as a contributing factor to the financial crisis and in need of reform.90  
The Financial Crisis 
Systemic risk can be defined as the risk that the failure of one financial institution can cause
or  contribute  to  the  failure  of  other  significant  financial  institutions  as  a  result  of  their
linkage to each other.  Systemic risk can be defined as to include the possibility that one
exogenous shock may cause  or  contribute  to  the failure  of  multiple  significant  financial
institutions. 91 
There  are  risks  specific  to  banking  that  can  be  addressed  by  corporate  governance  and
regulation systemic risk is far more difficult to address92.  The answer may not be to impose
higher capital requirements and to reduce the risk appetite of the banks, but in the case of
failure, to prevent a widespread crisis of confidence by planning for large external events.
Such  an  argument  goes  back  to  Cadbury  and  other  reports  on  corporate  governance,
highlighting the importance of internal communication, risk management and the education
of  senior  management  and  directors.   Hopt  discusses  a  range  of  such  improvements  to
banking corporate governance in great detail93.  He suggests that stakeholder governance and
goals should not be introduced for banks, instead promoting changes such as less opaque
structure and group-wide governance to promote risk assessment.  As a result of state aid to
failing  financial  institutions,  the  Western  world  has  seen  a  return  of  the  state-owned
enterprise.  Citigroup and AIG, have used state aid provided under the troubled asset relief
program (TARP); in the UK financial institutions such as Lloyds and the Royal Bank of
Scotland have received capital injections from the government.  To have controlling power
over financial institutions can trigger various clauses in company and security laws, as is the
case in the US, bringing with it many additional complications.94  The government becomes
a  controlling  shareholder  under  TARP  which  implies  that  it  has  liability  to  other
 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Governance and Disclosure
Regimes’ (2005) 37 Conn L Rev 725 or John Coffee Jr, ‘What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s’ (2004)
89 Cornell L Rev 269 
90
 John Coffee Jr, ‘Rating Reform: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly’ (2010) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law Number  162/2010
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650802> 
91
 Hal S Scott, ‘The Reduction of System Risk in the United States Financial System’ (2010) 33 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 671, 673 
92
 Peter O. Mülbert and Ryan D. Citlau, ‘The Uncertain Role of Banks’ Corporate Governance in Systemic Risk Regulation’ (2011)
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law Number 179/2011 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1885866> 
93
 Hopt K “Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis” (2011) ECGI Working Paper 181/2011
94
 J.W. Verret, ‘Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice’ (2010) 27 Yale J on Reg 283, 302-307 
30
shareholders.  The US is immune from suit unless it has waived this immunity, which it has
not under TARP.  Contract theory can no longer be applied in government controlled banks
and the objective for managers is no longer the generation of profit for shareholders.95  
Corporate Objectives 
The  timeliness  and  quality  of  information  is  the  focus  of  rulemaking  in  a  dynamic
framework.  The increased availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for
rulemaking  in  a  dynamic  framework  can  help  facilitate  rule  makers’  predictions  and
anticipation of otherwise unforeseeable contingencies,  making anticipatory action by rule
makers possible.96  In May 2000, the European Association of Security Dealers included in
its Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations the aspect that directors must act
in the interests of the company and its shareholders as a whole, and went one step forward by
adding that stakeholders’ rights should be respected and their concerns addressed.97  
Two years  later,  the  High Level  Group of  Company Experts  repeated  that  shareholders
should  ensure  that  management  pursues  and  remains  accountable  for  their  interests  and
mentioned creditors and made suggestions for their protection.98  After two more years it was
the OECD Corporate Governance Principles, which, after reminding that directors should act
in the best interest of the company and its shareholders, pointed out that the interests of the
stakeholders should be taken into account with particular emphasis placed upon the effective
enforcement of creditors’ rights.99  In 2005 the International Corporate Governance Network
asserted that the objective of the corporation, the overriding one, should be to optimize over
the  long  term the  returns  to  its  shareholders  and,  where  other  considerations  affect  this
objective, they should be stated and disclosed.100  As a result of this diversity and lack of
unanimity on corporate objectives, a polarization has been created.  We have countries like
95
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the United States and the United Kingdom supporting that managers should act exclusively
in the economic interests of shareholders.  The ascertainment of the corporate objective is
one of the most important theoretical and practical issues confronting us.101 
To examine the two theories, the shareholder value theory and the stakeholder value theory,
it is worth mentioning that both models have their pros and cons and the choice between the
two should not take the form of a right or wrong choice, as it is determined by numerous
factors, which can be different for every country.  
(i) Shareholder value theory 
Shareholder value theory puts weight on the long-term economic value of the banking sector.
The objective behind corporate decisions should be the promotion of shareholders’ interests.
Their protection and the enhancement of their investment should be the overriding objective,
because if  management  is  allowed or  required to  pursue  any social  purpose,  managerial
accountability to shareholders cannot be secured and shareholders’ property rights will be
damaged.102  As Blair points out, a conventional wisdom was developed among economists,
finance theorists and policymakers around the globe that shareholder value should be the
single, guiding principle of corporate governance, and that enhanced investor control and
oversight should be encouraged.103  Superiority was based on the argument that shareholders
have no entitlement to dividends or capital gains; these will be available if the board carries
out  the  company’s  business  successfully.   The  stakeholders  of  the  company  enter  into
contracts which offer substantial protection to them.  Albert Dunlap’s phrase encapsulates
the essence of shareholder value theory during the 1990s.  The most ridiculous word you
hear in boardrooms these days is  stakeholders.   Stakeholders  do not pay for their  stake.
Shareholders do.104  Perhaps Chainsaw Al’s statement was a bit of an exaggeration, but it
highlights that there was only one corporate objective and, in any case, multiple objectives
were  not  welcome.   He  had  embraced  Friedman’s  theory  that  there  is  only  one  social
responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase
its profits so long as it stays in the values of the game.105  
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Shareholder value theory created a new ethos for business and became prominent especially
during the second half of the 1990s.  In the United States, the courts affirmed the importance
of maximizing shareholder value from the early stages.  Alastair Ross Goobey, the influential
UK fund manager, was of the opinion that as soon as you set more than one benchmark by
which you will be judged, there is diffusion of effort and guaranteed disappointment, while
Matthew Bishop, Business Editor  of The Economist,  argued in 1994 that making bosses
accountable to many stakeholders might make them accountable to none, as there would be
no clear yardstick for judging their performance.106  During the dominance of this theory,
share prices reached high levels and the role of managers changed.  The agency theory107 was
developed to illustrate the relationship between shareholders and directors.  Directors are the
agents  of  the  shareholders  and  are  employed  to  run  the  company’s  business  for  the
shareholders who do not have the time or ability to do so, and it is the shareholders who are
best suited to guide and discipline directors in the carrying out of their powers and duties.108
The  agency  theory  was  criticized  and  its  conclusions  were  challenged.   There  were
reservations, concerning the ability of shareholders to discipline directors109 or the theory’s
applicability in modern companies110.  
Dodd expressed the view that managers are free from any supervision from shareholders by
reason of the difficulty which the modern shareholder has in discovering what is going on
and taking effective measures even if he has discovered it.111  This view is in line with Berle
and  Means’  assertion  that  shareholders  surrendered  a  set  of  definite  rights  for  a  set  of
indefinite expectations.112  Even if we accept that there was no consensus about shareholder
primacy, in practice managers were most times keen on protecting shareholders’ interests,
preferably large shareholders, since they were the only ones who could become a threat to
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their jobs.  Apart from the threat of replacement, directors had to consider another threat: if
shareholders’ interests were not adequately protected, they could withhold capital and refuse
to invest.113  The result was the retention by shareholders of a rather anachronistic perception
that companies, especially public ones, should be run predominantly in their interest.114  
Managers took advantage of their powers to the detriment of shareholders and stakeholders,
but instead of focusing on the fraudulent personality of these managers, it would be more
useful to continue with the examination of the shareholder value theory.  The reason is that
shareholder  value  theory  does  not  limit  the  managers’  powers  and  discretion  at  all,  it
reinforces them.  They had claimed that shareholder value theory is mistaken and leads to a
dead end.  Shareholders have lost control over their companies, because they have traded it
for liquidity and the prospects of increased profits.  Courts do not have the capacity to judge
for themselves the merit of managers’ decisions, while gatekeepers, most of the times, can
only monitor a company’s behaviour ex post and fail to guarantee the transparency of capital
markets.115  
Capital markets are unstable and can be manipulated,  so companies are vulnerable, when
their  managers show blind confidence in the markets,  not to mention when they confuse
shareholder value maximization with misappropriation of wealth.  By impeding a company’s
ability to make credible commitments not to expropriate stakeholders, the mechanisms which
bind managers to shareholder value, created an environment in which companies were less
able to establish an effective basis for long-term productive results.116  The stories of Enron,
WorldCom and Parmalat show that if everything is reduced to a matter of profit, shareholder
value tends to ignore reality because it is not only the interests of shareholders that are at
stake.117  In the USA, the biggest supporter of the shareholder value theory, none of the states
has a statute that imposes a duty on companies to maximize profits at any cost or that makes
profit-maximization  the  sole  purpose  of  the  companies.118  In  Delaware,  the  land  of
incorporations, the courts have, through their case law, have explicitly state that stockholder
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interests are not a controlling factor.  The statutes provide that the company’s management
team and directors have the duty to comply with the law, even if that means that they are
losing money or  they  may have  reduced profits.   Other  constituencies’  interests  will  be
considered  only  if,  the  protection  of  those  interests  promotes  the  interests  of  the
shareholders.119  
In listed or multinational companies, profit is a rather impersonal concept and belongs to the
corporation.120  Shareholders end up receiving only a part of the share that comes back to the
company, following the payment of salaries and all other obligations.  As Easterbrook and
Fischel pointed out, shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income and that’s
why  they  have  voting  rights  unlike  creditors  and  employees  accompanied  with  the
appropriate  incentives  to  make  discretionary  decisions.   Scholars  had  recognized  this
inequality  before  the  end  of  the  previous  millennium,  but  nobody  supported  the
groundbreaking idea of giving rights of control over the board of directors to the employees
as well as the shareholders.121  
(ii) Stakeholder value theory 
The seeds of this theory can be traced back to the 1930s in the famous Dodd – Berle debate
about the role and purpose of companies.122  Berle suggested that managerial powers are held
in trust for stockholders as sole beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise123, while Dodd was
of the opinion that the bank should be viewed as an economic institution which has a social
service as well as a profit-making function and that company directors are guardians of all
the interests which the corporation affects and not merely servants of its absentee owners.
The benchmark text for the stakeholder  approach is the study undertaken by Freeman in
1984 describing partners as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
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achievement  of  the  organization’s  objectives.124  The  vagueness  of  the  definition  of
stakeholders as groups in relationships  with an organization attracted severe criticism for
broadening  the  scope  of  stakeholders  and,  as  Sternberg  maliciously  noted,  it  included
“Everyone, everything, everywhere”125.  It is dangerous and unjustified, on the basis that it
undermines private property, denies agents duties to principals, and destroys wealth.  Despite
a  certain  degree  of  ambiguity  in  defining  the  groups  of  stakeholders,  which  can  create
significant problems in implementation126, there are several interesting aspects that need to be
considered and, most importantly, it introduced a different approach in the corporate object
discussion.127  
Stakeholder primacy supports the inclusion and broader accountability of all parties that can
affect or be affected by a bank's activities, as no group that has contributed to corporate
success should go unrecognised.128  The objective of company law should be modified to
accommodate a wider range of interests.   The bank is a constellation of cooperative and
competitive  interests  possessing  intrinsic  value.129  Stakeholder  value  theory  encourages
long-term  strategy  and  investment,  by  promoting  ethical,  social  and  environmental
responsibility.  The success of the bank is dependent on the satisfaction of the stakeholders.
Stakeholder management is seen both as an end and as a means.130  As Carroll illustrates in
his book, banks must live up to four levels of responsibility: economically, be profitable and
satisfy consumer demand; legally, obey the law; ethically, do what is fair and just and avoid
harm;  and philanthropically,  be  involved  in  charitable  giving  and community  activity.131
Strong supporters  of  the  stakeholder  model  consider  it  as  the  implementation  of  a  truly
caring type of management.  They believe that modern society is calling for an increased
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sense of community, so those in business must understand the needs all companies have and
attempt to meet those needs as much as possible.  In a changing society, managers must be
prepared to change in all areas, not just those dealing with the market.132  
Clarkson argued that the economic and social purpose of the corporation is to create and
distribute  wealth  and value  to  all  its  primary  stakeholder  groups,  without  favouring  one
group at the expense of others.133  Stakeholders’ interests do not exist in isolation.  Big and
well-established  companies  are  better  placed  to  implement  and benefit  from stakeholder
value than small  or newly formed companies.   The relevant  stakeholders  vary from one
company to another.134  
Stakeholder  theory  grants  extensive  powers  to  managers  as  the  only  restraints  to  their
decision-making freedom come from forces outside the company, i.e. the financial markets,
the market for corporate control and, when all else fails, the product markets.135  As Jensen
puts it, there is no principled way within the stakeholder construct that anyone could say that
a manager has done a good or bad job.136  An employee can simultaneously be a shareholder,
a consumer, or can be affected by the environmental impact of the company.  Having more
than one interest means that this person will sooner or later be faced with the problem of
deciding between them.  To paraphrase the old adage, when there are many masters, all end
up being short-changed.137  Without  the clarity  of a mission provided by a single-valued
objective  function,  companies  embracing  stakeholder  theory  will  experience  managerial
confusion,  conflict,  inefficiency,  and perhaps  even  competitive  failure.   When  there  are
conflicts of interests, a choice has to be made and the stakeholder theory offers no help in
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making that choice.138  There is no clear yardstick by which to judge their performance.139
This leads to the potential for directors to engage in opportunistic behaviour, namely taking
the chance to benefit themselves at the expense of others, because they end up accountable to
no one.140  A total lack of equitable control can lead to fraudulent practices because, as Berle
and Means have noted, managers can serve their pockets better by profiting at the expense of
the company than by making profits of it.141  
Enlightened Shareholder value 
Enlightened shareholder value (ESV) is intended to apply as a generic statement of duties for
directors of companies of every size.142  As stated by the Committee on Trade and Industry,
the ESV approach towards defining directors’ duties maintained that the primary duty of a
company director was to maximize value for the company’s shareholders.  The interests of
employees, customers, suppliers, and local residents, as well as the environmental impact of
the  company’s  activities  and  its  good  standing  in  the  eyes  of  the  public,  all  had  to  be
considered when judging what was in the interests of shareholders.143  Even if we go back in
time and remember the words of Bowen LJ in 1883, who said that the law does not say that
there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company144,
it is obvious that directors had the discretion to take account of stakeholders’ groups when
promoting the interests of the company. 
Sir  Adrian  Cadbury  was  the  first  to  speak  about  finding  the  equilibrium among  all  the
competing considerations: long-term and short-term notions of gain,  cash and accounting
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concepts  of  value,  democracy  and authority,  power  and accountability.145  In  his  classic
book146, he identified three levels of company responsibility.  The primary level comprises
the company’s responsibilities to meet the material obligations to shareholders, employees,
customers, suppliers and creditors, to pay taxes, and to meet its statutory duties.  The second
level includes the direct results of a company’s actions in carrying out their primary task,
regarding for example the environment  and the community’s  human resources.  The last
level includes the interaction between the company and the society in a wider sense.  Profit
maximisation remains the objective of the company but is subject to developing relationships
of trust with shareholders, as this is the best way to ensure sustainability and secure overall
prosperity  and welfare.147  ESV retains  a  director-centric  character  and gives  directors  a
broad discretion to add stakeholders’ interests and other broader factors to the traditional
shareholders’ interests.  It is neither altruistic nor wealth-sacrificing theory; it just places its
focus  on  generating  long-term  shareholder  wealth  through  investor  and  management
attention to the company’s impact on extended stakeholder constituencies.148  Stakeholders’
interests become part of the decision-making process, but they do not actively participate in
it nor do they have a direct voice or the opportunity to express their views.  Directors should
be able to balance the competing interests for the benefit of all contributors and not just
shareholders.149  
Directors are required to only consider the interests of other stakeholders and only when in
honest pursuit of the promotion of the success of the company for the benefit of its members.
The objective of all healthy organizations is to create a framework which is economically,
ethically  and socially  responsible  and sustainable.150  Even the Hampel  Report,  which is
considered to be an endorsement of shareholder value, mentions stakeholders’ interests as
relevant to the company’s success together with the presentation and the enhancement of the
shareholders’ investment.151  By adopting measures necessary to maximize corporate value, a
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company can advance the interests of stakeholders as well as the interests of shareholders.
John Kay pointed in the right direction by saying that it is sensible to consider adapting the
corporate model to reality rather than reality to the model.152  ESV should not be rejected a
priori,  the  basic  concept  behind  its  emergence  of  ESV was  to  the  creation  of  a  strong
combination  of  the  two  existing  models,  a  hybrid  with  superior  characteristics.   It  is
erroneous to criticize ESV as a mere re-branding of a shareholder value adapted to placate
the increasingly concerned stakeholder  community.153  It  puts emphasis on the long-term
sustainability of the firm and the need for relationships of trust, while maintaining efficiency
and accountability accruing from the profit maximization goal.  
Stakeholders’  interests  are  taken  into  consideration  significantly  more  than  before,  and
shareholders continue to have profit maximization as their main goal.  Kay has talked about
the Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model (EMS), which focuses on an objective,
instead of people or certain groups.  Entity maximisation does not focus solely on profit
maximisation, for it encompasses such things as augmenting reputation, which can be seen as
the  most  important  asset  of  a  company.154  Directors  do  not  have  to  engage  in  active
balancing between investors’ interests as their aim is to maximise entity wealth: to increase
the overall long-run market value of the company as a whole.  Team Production (TP), was
developed a few years earlier in 1999 by Blair and Stout but differs from EMS in that it is
requires directors to look after the investors’ interests.155  
Kay in 2002 claimed that the challenge was to develop a genuinely inclusive capitalism, that
involves  differences  in  the  way  companies  behave,  markets  operate  and  business  is
regulated.   In his model,  shareholder return is the result,  not the objective,  of successful
business;  in  which  securities  markets  are  mechanisms  for  financing  and  refinancing
companies  rather  than  hyperactive  casinos;  in  which  employees  and  investors  have  the
objectives  of satisfying customers  and outperforming competitive  products;  in  which the
regulation of business is designed to enforce on a minority the behaviour which most people
adopt naturally.156  The theories and models are useful and thought provoking contributions.
There is room for improvement and the greatest challenge is to provide a clear answer on
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how each one of them could be enforced in practice and how they could have a positive
influence on the transformation of the corporate decision-making process.  The debate on the
merits of being on one side or another of this great divide or taking the third new way has
been, and will no doubt continue to be, long and hard, with predictions that one arrangement
would triumph over the other in a fast-changing world. 157  The ESV approach is a good basis
for discussions and it represents a hybrid model, which, if properly developed, can become
functional and workable.  Once directors and managers are convinced that such prescriptions
are not wet, woolly and vacuous158, the road will be open for the creation of well-governed
companies, capable of achieving long-term success and sustainable development; companies
which will aim to satisfy customers, increase employee responsibility and empowerment and
create stable, trust-based supplier relations, all with a view towards generating value for the
firm in the long run.159 
Internal and External Governance
Most of the corporate  governance literature focuses on external  mechanisms for limiting
managerial  discretion:  competition  in  product  and factor  markets;  discipline  from banks,
institutional investors, and other large capital suppliers; and the market for corporate control.
Firms have access to internal control mechanisms as well-performance-based pay, internal
audits,  a  strong  Board,  competition  among  the  top-management  team,  but  these  are
considered weaker, less effective instruments.160  The arrangements of corporate governance
would provide for a management structure with clear lines of accountability; independent
non-executive directors on the board, an independent audit committee, the risk profile of the
bank; transparent ownership structure, internal structures that enabled the risk profile of the
bank to be clear,  transparent and managed; and monitored risk analysis and management
systems.  A key conclusion is that including through regulation and supervision, mechanisms
are needed for  the creation  of  appropriate  incentives for  all  the major  players  including
regulators and supervisors.161  There are distinct limits to what regulation and supervision can
achieve in practice.  It must be recognised that, there is no viable alternative to placing the
main responsibility for risk management on the shoulders of the management of financial
institutions.  External regulation and supervision by official agencies must not be viewed as
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an alternative to robust and effective internal supervision processes and responsibilities.  The
lessons of banking crises are that there needs to be more effective surveillance of financial
institutions both by supervisory authorities and the markets.  As directors are important to
run the company, we are therefore going to consider the obligations on directors.
Promoting company success 
Corporate benefit: to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a
whole.   The  company  sets  out  some  factors  to  which  a  director  must  have  regards  in
fulfilling the duty to promote success.162  Company Act 2006 also codify directors’ duties.
These are  the likely  consequences  of any decision in  the long term;  the interests  of  the
company’s  employees;  the  need  to  foster  the  company’s  business  relationships  with
suppliers, customers and others; the impact of the company’s operations on the community
and  the  environment;  the  desirability  of  the  company  maintaining  a  reputation  for  high
standards of business conduct, and the need to act fairly as between members of a company.
Previously in the United Kingdom, under  the  Companies  Act 1985, protections  for non-
member stakeholders were more limited which permitted directors to take into account the
interests of employees but that could be enforced only by the shareholders, and not by the
employees themselves.163  Directors must act honestly and in bona fide.  Difficult questions
arise when treating the company too abstractly.  It may benefit a corporate group as a whole
for a company to guarantee the debts of a sister company, even if there is no benefit to the
company giving the guarantee.   There is no benefit  to a company in returning profits to
shareholders  by  way  of  dividend.   The  more  pragmatic  approach  normally  prevails.164
Directors are not required by the law to live in an unreal region of detached altruism and to
act in the vague mood of ideal abstraction from obvious facts which must be present to the
mind of any honest and intelligent man when he exercises his powers as a director.165 
We might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of the company and paying away its money
with both hands in a manner perfectly bona fide perfectly irrational.  It is for the directors to
judge,  provided  it  is  a  matter  which  is  reasonably  incidental  to  the  carrying  on  of  the
business of the company.  The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but
there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company.166 
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Care and skill  
Duty of care: the level of care and skill a director must demonstrate has been framed largely
with reference to the non-executive director.  It was expressed in purely subjective terms,
where the court held that a director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater
degree  of  skill  than  may  reasonably  be  expected  from a  person  of  his knowledge  and
experience.167  This decision was based firmly in the older notions that prevailed at the time
as  to  the  mode  of  corporate  decision  making,  and  effective  control  residing  in  the
shareholders; if they elected and put up with an incompetent decision maker, they should not
have recourse to complain.  However, a more modern approach has since developed, the
court held that the rule in Re City  Equitable Fire Insurance Company related only to skill,
and not to diligence.168  It has been suggested that both the tests of skill and diligence should
be assessed objectively and subjectively;169 in the United Kingdom the statutory provisions
relating  to  directors'  duties  in  the  new  Companies  Act  2006 have  been codified  on this
basis.170  Care and skill include in effect the duty not to fetter a director’s discretion and lack
of independence.  A director owed the duty of care once the company is insolvent or nearing
insolvency.  It is still the company until all the procedure is completed.
Individual directors with relationships to management or to a significant shareholder are by
definition not considered to be independent; however, the absence of such relationships does
not guarantee independent judgment.  Such definitions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and reflect different approaches to the drafting of codes of governance.  These principles
underline the importance of all directors being independent-minded which means exercising
objective judgment in the best interests of the corporation in all circumstances regardless of
the consequences which such judgment may have for the director personally.171  Each board
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should include a strong presence of independent non-executive directors with appropriate
competencies including key industry sector knowledge and experience.   Each board may
include a minority of directors who are non-executive directors and who are not independent
but who may effectively discharge their responsibilities as directors because of a relationship
with the corporation or past experience with the corporation.  Where committees of the board
are established, their remit, composition, accountability and working procedures should be
well-defined  and  disclosed  by  the  board.   All  corporations  should  establish  the  key
committees of the board which include the audit, compensation and nomination / governance
committees.  At least a majority and, preferably all members of the audit committee should
be  independent.   The  compensation  and nomination  /  governance  committees  should  be
composed of a majority of independent directors.  Every corporation should have a process
for reviewing and monitoring any related party transaction.   A committee of independent
directors should review every related party transaction to determine whether such transaction
is in the best interests of the corporation and if so, ensure that the terms of such transaction
are fair to the corporation.172  
Loyalty and conflicts of interest  
Duty of loyalty and conflict of interest: directors owe strict duties not to permit any conflict
of interest or conflict with their duty to act in the best interests of the company.  This rule is
so strictly  enforced that,  even where the conflict  of interest  or conflict  of duty is  purely
hypothetical, the directors can be forced to disgorge all personal gains arising from it, see
also Volcker report and Walker Review.  Lord Cranworth stated in his judgment in Aberdeen
Ry v. Blaikie173 that a corporate body can only act by agents, and it is the duty of those agents
so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting.
Such agents have duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature towards their principal.  So strictly
is adhered to that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of the
contract entered into.174  It is a rule of universal application that no one, having such duties to
discharge,  shall  be  allowed  to  enter  into  engagements  in  which  he  has,  or  can  have,  a
personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom
he is bound to protect and we should consider that is often a case of stating their conflict and
getting the consent of the majority.175 
Ring-Fencing 
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Ring-fencing made it  into statute by way of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act
2013, of  which  ss1-12 needs  to  be implemented  by 2019.   It  has been the subject  of a
consultation paper by the PRA.176  The one criticism of ring-fencing that is difficult to argue
against is that its implementation will be riddled with problems.  It will be difficult to define
in regulations how this fencing has to work exactly.  It requires a complete overview of all
the different entities under a banking group as well as an overview of all the capital residing
in or allocated to each entity.  These entities would have to be separated based on whether
they are inside the fence or not.  The capital would have to be distributed and the flow of
capital  between the entities,  or simple reallocation,  would have to be closely monitored.
Considering some banking groups consist of at least hundreds of different legal entities, this
is difficult at best and, in case of a bank failure, open to endless challenges in the courts.  In
the daily running of the ring-fenced bank, how intrusive would the PRA and HM Treasury be
prepared  to  become.   The  question  is  how  UK  banks  will  respond  to  the  ring-fence
requirements.  Originally, HSBC, which has a large part of its operation overseas, is reported
to consider  moving its  headquarters  out  of the  UK to Hong Kong,177however,  they later
changed their plan that they were not going to do this and they are about to open a new office
in Birmingham to hold the non investment part of the bank.  Such a move might include the
sale  of  its  UK  retail  branches  but  in  any  event,  would  circumvent  the  ring-fencing
requirement and the bank levy on its balance sheet.  Overseas banks with a retail operation in
the UK are considering to move their non-retail activities out of the UK.178  It appears that
the  Treasury  might  be  giving  in  to  the  pressure  and  water  down  the  ringfencing
requirements.179  It should be noted that monitoring ring-fencing would take up considerable
resources of the regulator.  This would take time and resources away from other areas of
supervision.  
Rules and guidelines must be provided on how to deal with any technological infrastructure
needed for both parts of the bank.  It must be clear how the ring-fenced bank can continue to
rely on the infrastructure when it is owned by the other part of the bank.  This could be done
by way of service agreements or by a form of separation of internal service providers from
s.175  CA 2006,  Keech v.  Sandford (1726)  Sel  Cas.  Ch.61,  Aberdeen Railway  v.  Blaikie (1854)  1  Macq  HL 461,  per  Lord
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the banks.   There is  a need to keep the migration  process as short  and cost-effective  as
possible. The regulators’ usual tools such as stress-testing are not best suited to test potential
legal challenges to ring-fencing.  It would be possible for banks to extend their recovery and
resolution plans to include scenarios where legal challenges are made, which could cause
delays or further payments or compensation.  After all, ring-fencing is merely a part of a
whole range of measures.  As it stands, ring-fencing as proposed appears to be problematic.
A possible way of improving it is by insisting on separating out proprietary trading activities
and specific  other  derivatives  and securities  related  activities  into  separate  legal  entities.
This would be more akin to the Volcker rule and the Liikanen report.180  This would result in
a much smaller and more practicable separation. 
Consider the objective of the ring-fence: the purpose of the retail  ring-fence is to isolate
those banking activities where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to
a bank’s customers in order to ensure, first, that this provision is not threatened as a result of
activities which are incidental to it and, second, that such a provision can be maintained in
the event of the bank’s failure without government solvency support.  Reintroducing a Glass-
Steagall-type separation would be intrusive.  It is arguably no more intrusive then any of the
forced mergers that took place during the crisis.  The differences are that  these mergers
happened in the heat of the moment and appeared to be good deal for both sides: one was
rescued and the other got a bargain.  A further step is needed to make it work.  Ring fencing
could further to abolish Volker rule, see also Walker Review below.
The Walker Review 
The Walker Review took place in the UK after the financial crisis, ordered by the Labor
government.   It  contains  some recommendations  as regards remuneration.   The terms of
reference for the review were to examine corporate governance in the UK banking industry
and make recommendations, including the effectiveness of risk management at board level,
the balance of skills, experience and independence required on the boards of UK banking
institutions;  the  effectiveness  of  board  practices  and  the  performance  of  audit,  risk,
remuneration and nomination committees; the role of institutional shareholders in engaging
effectively with the companies and monitoring the boards; and whether the UK approach is
consistent  with international  practice  and how national  and international  practice  can be
promulgated.  The report makes recommendations in the role and constitution of the board,
the  board  composition  and  education,  the  role  of  shareholders,  risk  management,  and
remuneration.   The  Review  is  in  line  with  the  report  on  improvements  to  corporate
governance by the Basel Committee181 but applied to the UK situation. 
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Remuneration has been discussed in principles 10 and 11 of the Basel Committee182 and in
relation to the discrepancy between remuneration and banks’ risk appetite observed by the
Senior Supervisors Group.183  The Walker Review takes a different approach and bases its
assessment  of  remuneration  on  a  report  by  the  Financial  Services  Authority  called  the
Remuneration  Code  2009.184  The  Financial  Services  Authority  later  updated  the
Remuneration Code185 to reflect the Capital Requirements Directive EU CRD3, the Financial
Services Act 2010 and the Walker Review itself.  The objectives of the Remuneration Code
2009 are to sustain market confidence and promote financial stability through removing the
incentives for risk taking by firms, and to protect consumers.186  Although the Remuneration
Code recognizes that remuneration practices were not the dominant factor in the crisis, it
states  that  it  has contributed.   There are  other  elements  of culture than are important  to
protect  consumers.   Some of  these  include  acting  with  due  care  and  integrity,  creating
accountability, promoting competition, and treating customers fairly.  The review points out
that much of the governance of remuneration is arranged through the Companies Act 2006,
s420-422  provide  details  on  directors’  pay  and  s215-217  provide  details  on  severance
packages for directors.  There is a category of what is called high end employees within
financial institutions, perhaps more prominent than in any other industry, who earn more
than the median of the board, often have a function of significant influence and who could
impact on the risk profile of the bank.187  
Transactions with the company  
By definition, where a director enters into a transaction with a company, there is a conflict
between the director's interest to do well for himself out of the transaction and his duty to the
company to ensure that the company gets as much as it can out of the transaction.  This rule
is so strictly enforced that, even where the  conflict of interest or conflict of duty is purely
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corporate body can act by agents,  and it  is the duty of those agents so to act as best  to
promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting.188 
Use of corporate property, opportunity, or information  
Directors  must  not  use  for  their  own  profit  the  company's  assets,  opportunities,  or
information.   This  prohibition  is  much  less  flexible  than  the  prohibition  against  the
transactions with the company and attempts to circumvent it using provisions in the articles
have met with limited success.  In the House of Lords, in upholding what was regarded as a
wholly unmeritorious  claim by the shareholders,  held that  what the directors  did was so
related to the affairs of the company that it can properly be said to have been done in the
course  of  their  management  and  in  the  utilization  of  their  opportunities  and  special
knowledge as directors; and that what they did resulted in profit to themselves.189  
Remedies for breach of duty  
It  is clear that it  is  a breach of  fiduciary duty for a director  to wrongfully authorize the
transfer of company assets to another company and that his breach lies in the act of signing
the transfer forms, not in his failure to make proper enquiries before signing.190  A director
took expert professional advice in relation to a highly technical matter may give him a good
answer  to  any  allegation  of  breach  of  fiduciary  duty.191  In  relation  to  the  taking  of
professional advice192 there should be an agreed procedure for directors in furtherance of
their duties to take independent professional advice if necessary, at the company’s expense.
This procedure should be set out in a formal document.193  It is important for directors to
fulfill their mission and see that corporate resources are used efficiently.  Directors should
prepare themselves for roles beyond the selection of the chief executive officer and other
senior management  personnel  or even the issue of succession planning.  Such additional
roles may include: the determination of board policies, and corporate mission and direction;
the  establishment  of  performance  standards,  both  ethical  and  commercial,  by  which  the
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management  will  be  judged  and  their  explicit  communication  to  management  in
unambiguous terms; and the reviewing of top management’s performance in following the
overall strategy and standards set by the board.194 
Directors  owe  duties  to  the  company  and  not  to  any  individual  shareholder  or  outside
body.195  The proponents of the stakeholder approach regard the company as the collective
interests  of shareholders, creditors and employees.  A director must conduct the business
affairs  of a company for the benefit  of the company as a whole and not for some other
collateral purpose.196  The test is subjective; it may be passed even if the court considers the
actions to have been unreasonable, providing a director honestly believed he was acting in
the company’s best interests.  Although a director may believe that in entering a transaction
he is acting in the best interests of the company as a whole, he will be held to be in breach of
his fiduciary duty if the purpose of the transaction was outside or in abuse of the director’s
allocated powers; even though the transaction may not have been outside the contractual
capacity of the company.197  A leading case on the application of the proper purpose duty.198
The  approach  of  construing  the  proper  purpose  rule  to  be  the  dominant  element  in  the
determination of whether a corporate act was in the best interests of a company is generally
followed by the English courts.  The conflict of interest rule is closely related, as rule of
equity, to the fiduciary duties owed by a director of a company.  A breach of the conflict of
interest rule will result in a breach of fiduciary duty199, but not always.200  The rule may be
stated as rule which prohibits  a director from using a corporate opportunity for his  own
personal use or benefit.201  This principle of equity, equally applicable to a trustee-beneficiary
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relationship, is referred to as the fair dealing rule.  A transaction which involves a conflict of
interest, unless exempted by the company’s articles will, unlike a breach of a fiduciary duty,
be set aside without enquiry as to whether any harm was inflicted on the company.202  The
conflict of interest rule is strict in the sense that it fails to distinguish between, directors who
have  set  out  to  exploit  a  corporate  opportunity  and  directors  who have  profited  from a
corporate opportunity in a situation where the company was, at the time of the opportunity,
unable  or  unwilling  to  act  upon the  opportunity.   In  Canada the  approach is  to  impose
liability in circumstances which suggest that the director in question acted in bad faith.203 
The standard of care expected from executive directors will be of a higher standard than for
non-executive director however, where non-executive directors are entrusted with business
matters in which they have a personal expertise, they too must exhibit a reasonable standard
of care appropriate to their level of expertise.204  The judicial interpretation of the nature of
the duty of care expected of a director was based upon the judgment of  a decided case.205
Although elements of the characteristics put forward by Romer J are still to be found, the
said characteristics have been subject to a significant shift towards a stricter approach to the
construction  of  the  duty.206  The  characteristics  may  be  said  to  comprise  the  standard
whereby, a director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties any greater degree of
skill  than could reasonably be expected from a person occupying a similar position,  that
person  having  the  general  knowledge,  skill  and  experience  that  may  be  reasonably  be
expected  of  the  holder  of  the  position  in  question.   However,  the  knowledge,  skill  and
experience of the particular director accused of breaching the duty should be considered in
determining whether there has been a breach.  The test is comparable to the one used to
determine wrongful trading.207  The duty of care is owed by the director once the company is
insolvent or nearing insolvency.
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Directors are obliged to follow the necessary procedures that are set to assure accountability
and disclosure of the manner in which management performs its stewardship.208  The buck
stops with the directors who make up the board.  It makes no difference whether they are
executive or non-executive, independent, alternates, or merely acting directors.  They are all
accountable for the actions of the board and are ultimately responsible for the results of the
company they direct.209  
Link with financial regulations  
The domain of an auditor clearly  covers the authenticity verification of transactions.  It is
however, when the entire organization collapses, the auditor giving a statement mentioning
that we have checked the books produced by the company and not verified it.  It is important
that  the regulators and other investigating agencies  must look the said issue as a system
failure rather than only a monetary fraud.  Under the corporate system, the position of the
owner has been reduced to that of having a set of legal and factual interests in the enterprise
while the management group, which has control, is in a position of having legal and factual
powers over it.210  
From a public policy perspective, corporate governance is about nurturing enterprises while
ensuring accountability in the exercise of power and patronage by firms.  The role of public
policy is  to  provide firms with the incentives  and discipline to minimize  the divergence
between  private  and  social  returns  and  to  protect  the  interests  of  stakeholders.211  The
negative aspects of limited liability have long been recognized to the extent that common law
and  statutory  provisions  have  evolved  to  curb  the  exploitation  of  the  limited  liability
company.  The protection provided by such measures is nonetheless invoked as a rarity.  The
fraudulent  trading  provision  (s.213 IA  1986)  has  been  used  in  only  a  handful  of  cases
because of  the difficulty  of  establishing a  director’s  dishonest  intent.212  The prohibition
against phoenix companies has delivered so few cases as to suggest the problem does not
exist, when in practice it clearly does.  S. 213 IA 1986 is linked to director disqualification
and  disqualification  may  directly  or  indirectly  lead  to  compensation  orders,  see  also
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Schedule 6 to the Insolvency Act 1986,  ss 15A –  15C and s 13  of the Financial Services
(Banking Reform) Act 2013 Act.
S 13(1) In schedule 6 to the  Insolvency Act 1986 (Categories of preferential debts) after
paragraph 15A insert-“Category 7: Deposits covered by Financial  Services Compensation
Scheme
15B So much of any amount owed at the relevant date by the debtor in respect of an eligible
deposit as does not exceed the compensation that would be payable in respect of the deposit
under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to the person or persons to whom the
amount is owed. 
Interpretation for Category 7
15C (1)In paragraph 15B “eligible deposit” means a deposit in respect of which the person,
or any of the persons, to whom it is owed would be eligible for compensation under the
Financial Services Compensation Scheme.  (2)For this purpose a “deposit” means rights of
the kind described in— (a)paragraph 22 of Schedule 2 to the Financial Services and Markets
Act  2000  (deposits),  or (b)section  1(2)(b)  of  the  Dormant  Bank  and  Building  Society
Accounts Act 2008 (balances transferred under that Act to authorised reclaim fund).” (2)In
section 386 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (categories of preferential debt), in subsection (1),
after “production” insert  “ ; deposits covered by Financial Services Compensation Scheme
”.  (3)In Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (list of preferred debts),
after paragraph 6A insert— 
“Deposits covered by Financial Services Compensation Scheme
6B So much of any amount owed at the relevant date by the debtor in respect of an eligible
deposit as does not exceed the compensation that would be payable in respect of the deposit
under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to the person or persons to whom the
amount is owed.” 
(4)In Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (interpretation of Part 1),
after paragraph 9 insert— 
“Meaning of eligible deposit
9A(1)In paragraph 6B “eligible deposit” means a deposit in respect of which the person, or
any  of  the  persons,  to  whom it  is  owed  would  be  eligible  for  compensation  under  the
Financial Services Compensation Scheme.  (2)For this purpose a “deposit” means rights of
the kind described in paragraph 22 of Schedule 2 to the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000 (deposits).” 
Delinquent  directors  have  been  subject  to  disqualification  but  the  number  of
disqualifications,  compared  to  the  number  of  company  liquidations,  suggests  that  the
disqualification provisions are merely skimming the surface in removing unfit directors.213
213
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The statutory and common law attempts to curb the exploitation of the limited liability have
proved ineffective.  In practice the cases tend to be brought under s.214 because it is easier to
prove.   The outcome tends to be much the same in that the directors concerned become
personally liable.  Banking supervision asks public agencies to second-guess the decisions of
executives who earn millions in bonuses and business strategies that yield billions in profit.
Perhaps there was once a golden age when the authority and wisdom of central bankers were
so great that such regulation was possible and effective,  although the recurrence of bank
crises in the United States from 1865 to 1929 suggests otherwise.  The financial services
industry is the most powerful political lobby in the country and public trust in and respect for
regulation  are  low.  But  in  financial  services,  the  demand  is  for  more  regulation.   The
government  should  protect  small  depositors  and  ensure  that  the  payment  system  for
households and businesses continues to function.  There should be the same powers to take
control  of  essential  services  in  the  event  of  corporate  failure  that  exist  for  other  public
utilities.  The deposit protection scheme should have preferential creditor status to restrict the
use  of  retail  deposits  as  collateral  for  speculative  activities.214  In  addition,  s  36  of  the
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 Act also designed to deal with bank failure
specifically (in light of the perceived culpability of Fred Goodwin).
S 36 Offence relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail
(1)A person (“S”)  commits  an offence if— (a)at  a  time when S is  a  senior  manager  in
relation to a financial institution (“F”), S- (i)takes, or agrees to the taking of, a decision by or
on behalf of F as to the way in which the business of a group institution is to be carried on, or
(ii)fails to take steps that S could take to prevent such a decision being taken,  (b)at the time
of the decision, S is aware of a risk that the implementation of the decision may cause the
failure of the group institution,  (c)in all the circumstances, S's conduct in relation to the
taking of the decision falls far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in S's
position, and (d)the implementation of the decision causes the failure of the group institution.
(2)A “group institution”, in relation to a financial institution (“F”), means F or any other
financial institution that is a member of F's group for the purpose of FSMA 2000 (see section
421 of that Act). 
(3)Subsections (1) and (2) are to be read with the interpretative provisions in section 37. 
(4)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— 
(a)on  summary  conviction— (i)in  England  and  Wales,  to  imprisonment  for  a  term  not
exceeding 12 months (or 6 months, if the offence was committed before the commencement
of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) or a fine, or both; (ii)in Scotland, to
imprisonment  for a  term not  exceeding 12 months  or  a  fine not  exceeding the statutory
 Company Directors Disqualification Act (s.6)
214
Kay, J., ‘More  Regulation  Will  Not  Prevent  Next  Crisis’,  Financial  times,  26  March  2008,  available  in  the   website: http://
www.johnkay.com/2008/03/26/more-regulation-will-not-prevent-next-crisis.
53
maximum, or both; (iii)in  Northern Ireland,  to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6
months  or  a  fine  not  exceeding  the  statutory  maximum,  or  both; (b)on  conviction  on
indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or a fine, or both. 
Governance of Delinquent Directors following Insolvency 
It is the duty of the court to make a disqualification order against any person in a case where:
(a)  that  person is  or  has  been  a  director  of  a  company  which  has  at  any time  become
insolvent; and (b) that person’s conduct as a director of the company makes the person unfit
to  be  concerned  in  the  management  of  a  company.215  The  minimum  period  of
disqualification, following a contravention of section 6(1), is two years.216  The maximum
period for disqualification under section 6 is 15 years.  
Focusing solely on dilution and the cost of stock options begs the question on a number of
issues, notably: what types of companies may benefit from option-based compensation, what
types  of  employees  should  receive  option-based  compensation,  and  whether  or  not  the
benefits  of option-based compensation outweigh the costs.  Shareholder concerns suggest
that option-based compensation will continue to be a focal point for controversy.217  The
compensation of managers in listed companies can be designed to ensure that they must
regard the creation of shareholder value as the primary objective in the short term and in the
long term.   Option schemes could include exercise dates  postdating the departure of the
manager  from  the  company.218  The  introduction  of  agency  theory  suggested  that
compensation should probably be contingent on more than one performance measure and
predicted that the relative importance of alternate performance measures should be a function
of their precision and sensitivity to the manager’s performance.219  Regardless of the absolute
level of the CEO’s compensation over some time period, the board, shareholders, and the
world at large will look at this compensation in terms of the market value of the company’s
shares created during the relevant time period, as measured by the increase of the market
capitalization of the firm.  Only the shareholders can answer the question as to the fairness of
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the CEO’s compensation – and then only in the context of the gains that accrued to the
shareholders during the relevant time period.220 
Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and
care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.  In some jurisdictions
there is a standard of reference which is the behavior that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in similar  circumstances.   The duty of loyalty  is  of central  importance,  since it
underpins  effective  implementation  of  other  principles  in  this  document  relating  to,  for
example,  the equitable treatment of shareholders,  monitoring of related party transactions
and the establishment of remuneration policy for key executives and board members.  It is a
key  principle  for  board  members  who  are  working  within  the  structure  of  a  group  of
companies: even though a company might be controlled by another enterprise, the duty of
loyalty for a board member relates to the company and all its shareholders and not to the
controlling company of the group.221 
Disqualification for fraudulent/wrongful trading
A court  may find a  person liable  under  sections  213 or  214 respectively  for  fraudulent
trading or wrongful trading under the Insolvency Act 1986.  Further, the court under s 10 of
the CDDA 1986 may of its own volition make a disqualification order against that person.
The  maximum  period  for  an  order  under  s  10  is  15  years,  e.g.  Re  Brian  D  Pierson
(Contractors) Ltd222, see also s 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 –
offence of causing a bank to fail.
Difference between legal systems 
Limited  liability  has  been the  vehicle  for  economic  expansion and from the  time  of  its
introduction  the  corporate  form has  encouraged  capital  to  be  aggregated  for  investment
purposes.  In the nineteenth century, loan funds for small to medium size entrepreneurs were
not readily available and thus the aggregation of capital through the medium of the company
was a means to enhance the value and potential of a small business.  As part of the twentieth
century’s credit boom, the availability of business loans has, in private companies, deflated
the need for  the aggregation  of capital.   In  the context  of  a  private  company,  a limited
liability  status  may  not  necessarily  be  viewed  as  an  advantage  in  the  funding  of  the
enterprise.  In private companies comprised of very few members and where the majority of
the memberships are directors of the company, the advantage of limited liability  may be
artificial because large creditors of the enterprise and in particular the banks are likely to
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demand personal guarantees of the members/directors to secure the repayment of debts and
to  secure  this  against  their  personal  assets.   To  this  end,  should  the  company  become
insolvent;  the  company’s  human  constituents  will  gain  little  from  having  traded  the
enterprise as a limited liability company.  
United States Corporate Governance 
Individual  rules  for  corporations  are  based  upon the corporate  charter and,  less
authoritatively,  the  corporate  bylaws.   In  the  United  States,  shareholders  cannot  initiate
changes in the corporate charter although they can initiate changes to the corporate bylaws.
Corporate governance seems to have been used to denote the structure and functioning of the
corporate policy.223  Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty,
trust  and  integrity,  openness,  performance  orientation,  responsibility  and  accountability,
mutual respect, and commitment to the organization.  Of importance is how directors and
management  develop  a  model  of  governance  that  aligns  the  values  of  the  corporate
participants and evaluate this model periodically for its effectiveness.  
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance 
Rights and equitable treatment  of shareholders: organizations should respect the rights of
shareholders  and help shareholders  to exercise those rights.   They can help shareholders
exercise their  rights by effectively communicating information that is understandable and
accessible and encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings.  Interests of other
stakeholders: organizations should recognize that they have legal and other obligations to all
legitimate stakeholders.  
Disclosure and transparency: organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles
and  responsibilities  of  board  and  management  to  provide  shareholders  with  a  level  of
accountability.  Disclosure of material matters concerning the organization should be timely
and  balanced  to  ensure  that  all  investors  have  access  to  clear,  factual  information.
Nevertheless,  corporate  governance,  despite  some feeble  attempts  from various  quarters,
remains an ambiguous and often misunderstood phrase.  It was confined only to corporate
management.  It must include a fair, efficient and transparent administration and strive to
meet certain well defined,  written  objectives.  Corporate governance must go well beyond
law.224  Corporate  governance  mechanisms  and  controls  are  designed  to  reduce  the
inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard and adverse selection.  
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Corporate and organizational bylaws regulate only the organization to which they apply and
are  concerned  with  the  operation  of  the  organization,  setting  out  the  form,  manner  or
procedure in which a company or organization should be run.  In parliamentary procedure,
the bylaws are the supreme governing document of an organization, superseded only by the
charter of an  incorporated society.225  The bylaws contain the most fundamental principles
and rules regarding the nature of the organization.  It was common practice for organizations
to have two separate governing documents, a constitution and bylaws, but this has fallen out
of favor because of the ease of use, increased clarity, and reduced chance of conflict inherent
in a single, unified document.  Unless otherwise provided by law, the organization does not
exist  until  bylaws  have  been  adopted.226  The  board  of  directors  is  selected  by  and
responsible to the shareholders, but the bylaws of many companies make it difficult for all
but the largest shareholders to have any influence over the makeup of the board; normally,
individual shareholders are not offered a choice of board nominees among which to choose,
but are merely asked to rubberstamp the nominees of the sitting board.  
Corporate governance  principles and codes have been developed in different countries and
issued from stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or associations of directors
and  managers  with  the  support  of  governments  and  international  organizations.   In  the
United States, companies are regulated by the state in which they incorporate though they are
regulated by the federal government and, if they are public, by their stock exchange.  The
guidelines issued by associations of directors, corporate managers and individual companies
tend to be wholly voluntary.  The GM Board Guidelines reflect the company’s efforts to
improve its own governance capacity.  Such documents may have a wider multiplying effect
prompting other companies to adopt similar documents and standards of best practice.227 
The historical development of corporate powers 
The statutory regulation of the division of corporate powers was ordained in favor of the
collective  will  of  a  company’s  membership,  i.e.,  the  company  in  general  meeting.   A
company’s board of directors was not considered to be an organ of the company but was
appointed to carry out the will of the general meeting.   Conflicts between the board and
general meeting were ordinarily resolved to the latter’s advantage.  The ability of the general
meeting to supervise and if necessary determine corporate policy persisted throughout the
nineteenth century.  The growth and expansion of the corporate form over time inevitably
resulted  in  the  general  meeting’s  decline  in  matters  involving  the  dictating  of  corporate
policies.  Many shareholders invested in companies for potential profit and not for the right
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to participate in management decisions.  In expanding companies, the partnership principles
on which  the  corporate  form had been founded  no longer  ruled  supreme.   Membership
interest,  attendance,  and participation at  general meetings all  declined.   This decline was
prevalent in larger companies where commercial reality dictates that the administration of
corporate  policy  demands  a  consolidation  of  corporate  powers  into  a  centralized  body,
meaning the board of directors.  The convergence when existing governance institutions are
flexible enough to respond to the demands of changed circumstances without altering the
institutions’ formal characteristics; formal convergence, when an effective response requires
legislative  action  to  alter  the  basic  structure  of  existing  governance  institutions;  and
contractual  convergence,  where the response takes  the form of contract  because existing
governance institutions lack the flexibility to respond without formal change, and political
barriers restrict the capacity for formal institutional change.228 
The business judgment rule
The business judgment rule is a presumption that directors making a business decision, not
involving self-interest, acted in good faith and with due care.229  The business judgment rule,
prevents a substantive review of the merits of a business decision made by directors acting,
without self-interest and in good faith and with due care.  The business judgment rule is
based on the proposition that directors, and not the courts, are charged with the management
of the business of the corporation.  In effect it takes away the objective proper purpose test
found in the UK.  Managers, because of their experience and access to information, are better
able  than  shareholders  or  the  courts  to  make  business  decisions.   In  the  US,  it  is
acknowledged that undue exposure to liability would deter persons from serving as directors.
The rule has never been absolute.  Its exceptions are as follows: (1) The business judgment
rule  does not apply if  the plaintiff  can show self-dealing.   Thus,  where a director  has a
conflict of interest in a transaction and where the transaction is not approved by a majority of
disinterested  directors,  the  directors  are  not  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  business
judgment rule.  The approval of a transaction by a majority of independent, disinterested
directors  enhances  the  presumption  that  the  business  judgment  rule  applies;  (2)  The
presumption only applies if reasonable diligence has been exercised,  so the rule will not
apply  to  instances  whereby a director  has  failed  to  take  adequate  advice  or  has  left  the
company’s affairs in the hands of another without providing adequate supervision.  Although
a conscious decision not to take action may be protected by the business judgment rule, the
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rule does not apply where directors have failed to give thought and act to a situation and (3)
The business judgment rule will  not provide a director who did not act in good faith or
whose decision constitutes a gross negligence.  
Corporate Power 
The  wording  of  article  80  permitted  conflicts  appertaining  to  the  division  of  corporate
powers to be resolved by the general meeting, in so far as it provided that the company’s
directors  were to manage the company but subject to contrary regulations  passed by the
company  in  general  meeting.230  In  Marshall’s  case  the  court  permitted  a  majority
shareholder  to commence litigation in  the name of the company despite  the refusal of a
majority of the board to sanction the litigation.  The relevant article of the company, which
determined the division of powers between the board and general meeting, was drafted in a
similar vein to 1948 Table A, art 80.  However, table A, art 80 is an old article, we may also
see s 177 Companies Act 2006.  The director has the duty to declare interest to the board of
director – the effect is the same as the old 1985 regime.
Conspiring in or tolerating legal violations 
A board that conspires to break the law is likely to get into serious trouble.  The results of
such situations are obvious, as all involved parties suffer the consequences.  Directors must
have the strength of character to respond to any pressures that hint of legal wrongdoings.
They should act to protect themselves and the interests of the shareholders from those with
criminal intent.  Autonomy could be given to the boards of listed companies to find their
managers  from  the  market.   This  could  include  recommendations  from  the  majority
shareholder who will continue to be advised by the Party Organization Department, but the
board  of  a  listed  company  will  be  given  the  responsibility  to  consider  these  candidates
against the best available candidates in the market.  With the development of globalization,
companies in civil law jurisdictions have sought to raise capital from the countries such as in
the US, UK and EU.  
The development of corporate governance codes
After the publication of Berle and Means’ work in 1932, their work detailed the separation of
ownership  from  management  which  resulted  in  lack  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the
shareholders  to  keep  controlling  the  management  of  large  public  corporations  who  are
supposed to work in their interests.  Alongside the division of control and ownership, another
concern  of  equal  importance  results  from the dispersion and diffusion of the ownership,
which reduces their abilities to run the corporation collectively, with the option of being able
to  sell  their  shares  which  can  be  taken  by  shareholders  who  are  not  satisfied  with  the
performance of the firm. 
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In the Cadbury Report (1992), institutional shareholders were encouraged to take a more
involved and active role in monitoring the companies, especially with regard to applying
their  votes  at  the  annual  general  meeting.231  The  London International  Stock Exchange
(LISE) accepted the Cadbury report recommendations as the best practice.  In November
1995, the Cadbury Committee and the Greenbury Committee requested the establishment of
another  committee  to  review the  implementation  of  their  committees’  recommendations.
The committee was sponsored by The Confederation of British Industry, The Consultative
Committee of Accountancy Bodies, The London Stock Exchange, The National Association
of Pension Funds, and the Association of British Insurers (Cadbury, 1992).  The Hampel
Committee  started  its  deliberations  in  1995,  which  coincided  with  Greenbury
recommendations (1995) to promote high standards of corporate governance.  Following the
Enron  and  WorldCom  Scandals  the  Smith  Committee  had  been  established.   The
Government  responded  to  the  corporate  failure  in  the  US  and  requested  the  Financial
Reporting Council to assess the preparedness in the country in avoiding such failure.  Higgs
and Smith reports of 2003 examined the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors
and the role of audit committees, and those reports led to an updating of the Combined Code.
The report supports all the main recommendations in the Combined Code such as separation
of the positions between the chairman of the board and the chief executive.  Sound corporate
governance aims to establish principles and practices for all listed companies to comply with.
Firm’s  governance  quality  is  linked  to  the  degree  of  variation  in  extent  and  form  of
compliance with the Code which is supposed to be reflected on its performance as well.232 
UK Corporate Governance Code 
The  FRC  has  launched  a  consultation  on  its  proposals  to  reform  the  UK’s  Corporate
Governance Code (the Code).   The Code has been revised regularly to ensure it  reflects
changing  governance  concerns  and  practices  and  economic  circumstances.   The  latest
proposals  take  into  account  those  lessons  of  the  financial  crisis  that  are  relevant  to  all
companies.  The principal lesson of the financial crisis is that those on boards must think
deeply about their individual and collective roles and responsibilities.  The chairman has a
vital role to play in ensuring that the executives have appropriate freedom to manage the
business and accept the importance of opening themselves to challenge and earning the trust
of the whole board.  For their part, the non-executives must have the skills, experience and
courage to provide such challenge.  The Code is made up of strong principles that require
careful thought and application to the circumstances of each company.  To ensure the board
is well balanced and challenging, new principles are put forward on the leadership of the
chairman, the roles, skills and independence of the non-executive directors and their level of
time commitment.  To enhance the board’s performance and awareness of its strengths and
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weaknesses,  board  evaluation  reviews  should  be  facilitated  every  three  years  and  the
chairman should hold regular development reviews with each director.  
The  UK Corporate  Governance  Code (formerly  known as  the  Combined Code)  sets  out
standards  of good practice  for  listed companies  on board composition  and development,
remuneration,  shareholder  relations,  accountability  and  audit.233  The  UK  Corporate
Governance Code ("the Code") is a set of principles of good corporate governance aimed at
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.  It is overseen by the Financial Reporting
Council and its importance derives from the FCA’s Listing Rules which are given statutory
authority under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000234 and require that public listed
companies disclose how they have complied with the code, and explain where they have not
applied the code - in what the code refers to as comply or explain.235  
The  Code is  a  consolidation  and refinement  of  a  number  of  different  reports  and codes
concerning opinions on good corporate governance.  The first step on the road to the initial
iteration of the code was the publication of the  Cadbury Report in 1992.  Produced by a
committee chaired by  Sir Adrian Cadbury, the Report was a response to major corporate
scandals associated with governance failures in the UK.  The committee was formed in 1991
after Polly Peck, a UK company, became insolvent after years of falsifying financial reports.
Hence the final  report  covered financial,  auditing and corporate governance matters,  and
made the  following three  basic  recommendations: the  CEO and Chairman of  companies
should be separated; boards should have at least three non-executive directors, two of whom
should have no financial or personal ties to executives; and each board should have an audit
committee  composed  of  non-executive  directors.  These  recommendations  were  highly
controversial,  although they did no more than reflect  the contemporary best practice and
urged that these practices be spread across listed companies.  It was emphasized by Cadbury
that there was no such thing as one size fits all.236  In 1994, the principles were appended to
the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange, and it was stipulated that companies need
not comply with the principles, but had to explain to the stock market why not if they did
not.  Before  long,  a  committee  chaired  by  chairman  of  Marks  &  Spencer Sir  Richard
Greenbury was set up as a study group on executive compensation.  
Greenbury  recommended that progress be reviewed every three years and so in 1998  Sir
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committee.   The  ensuing  Hampel  Report suggested  that  all  the  Cadbury  and Greenbury
principles be consolidated into a "Combined Code".  It added that, the Chairman of the board
should be seen as the leader of the non-executive directors; institutional investors should
consider voting the shares they held at meetings, though rejected compulsory voting; and all
kinds of remuneration including pensions should be disclosed.  It rejected the idea that had
been touted that the UK should follow the German two-tier board structure, or reforms in the
EU Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law.237  A mini-report was produced the following
year by the Turnbull Committee which recommended directors be responsible for internal
financial  and auditing controls.  A number of other reports were issued through the next
decade,  including  the  Higgs  review,  from  Derek Higgs focusing  on what  non-executive
directors should do, and responding to the problems thrown up by the collapse of Enron in
the US.  Paul Myners completed two major reviews of the role of institutional investors for
the Treasury, whose principles were found in the Combined Code.  Shortly following the
collapse of  Northern Rock and the  Financial Crisis, the  Walker Review produced a report
focused on the banking industry, but with recommendations for all companies.238  In 2010, a
new  Stewardship Code was issued by the  Financial Reporting Council, along with a new
version  of  the  UK  Corporate  Governance  Code,  hence  separating  the  issues  from  one
another.  In 2012, the Combined Code was replaced by a new updated Corporate Governance
Code.  Revisions to the earlier code included FTSE 350 companies having to put the external
audit  contract  out  to  tender  at  least  every ten  years.   The updated  Code (and a  slightly
modified Stewardship Code) was effective from 1 October 2012.239
Section A: Leadership 
Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for
the long-term success of the company.  There should be a clear division of responsibilities at
the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility
for the running of the company’s business.  No one individual should have unfettered powers
of  decision.  The  chairman  is  responsible  for  leadership  of  the  board  and  ensuring  its
effectiveness on all aspects of its role.  
Section B: Effectiveness 
The board and its  committees  should  have the  appropriate  balance  of  skills,  experience,
independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective
duties and responsibilities effectively.  There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent
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procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board.  All directors should be able to
allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their responsibilities effectively.  All
directors  should receive  induction  on joining  the board and should regularly update  and
refresh their skills and knowledge.  The board should be supplied in a timely manner with
information in a form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties.240  
Section C: Accountability  
The  board  should  present  a  balanced  and  understandable  assessment  of  the  company’s
position and prospects.  The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the
significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives.  
Section D: Remuneration  
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the
quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more
than  is  necessary  for  this  purpose.   A  significant  proportion  of  executive  directors’
remuneration  should  be  structured  so  as  to  link  rewards  to  corporate  and  individual
performance.  
Section E: Relations with Shareholders  
There  should  be  a  dialogue  with  shareholders  based  on  the  mutual  understanding  of
objectives.  The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue
with  shareholders  takes  place.  The  board  should  use  the  AGM  to  communicate  with
investors and to encourage their participation.  
Compliance  
In  its  2007  response  to  a  Financial  Reporting  Council  consultation  paper  in  July  2007
Pensions & Investment Research Consultants Ltd reported that only 33% of listed companies
were fully compliant with all of the Codes provisions.241  Spread over all the rules, this is not
necessarily a poor response, and indications are that compliance has been climbing.  PIRC
maintains that poor compliance correlates to poor business performance, and at any rate a
key provision such as separating the CEO from the Chair had an 88.4% compliance rate.
The question thrown up by the Code's approach is the tension between wanting to maintain
flexibility and achieve consistency.  The tension is between an aversion to one size fits all
solutions, which may not be right for everyone, and practices which are in general agreement
to be tried, tested and successful.  If companies find that non-compliance works for them,
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and shareholders agree, they will not be punished by an exodus of investors.  So, the chief
method for accountability is meant to be through the  market, rather than through law.  An
additional reason for a Code, was the concern of the Cadbury Report, that companies faced
with minimum standards in law would comply with the letter and not the spirit of the rules.242
Investor protection is a bedrock principle of capital markets.  
Changing the culture of financial regulation 
The 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis has been described as the greatest crisis in the history of
financial capitalism.243  The failure of the global financial system was triggered by the great
American real estate bubble, it developed into a global liquidity squeeze that left financial
markets at the brink of collapse.  The culture of banking prevalent at the time both caused
and exacerbated the crisis.  The business strategies were risky, focusing on short-term gains,
at the expense of financial security.  It is purported that to mitigate the risks of any future
global financial crisis a fundamental change in the culture of banking is needed.  
It was in many cases, risk monitoring and management practices within financial institutions
that dramatically failed.244  Whilst prudential regulation is important, the thesis has shown
that  it  is  insufficient  to  change  the  culture  within  the  financial  system;  a  multifaceted
approach is needed.  Whilst the new regulatory powers that have been adopted are to be
welcomed, formal financial regulation has limitations when addressing the culture within an
institution.  The limitations can be addressed by improving Corporate Governance structures.
There were many cases where internal risk management was ineffective and where senior
management failed to adequately identify and constrain excessive risk taking.  A greater
reliance  on  formal  corporate  governance  structures  would  improve  this  by  altering  the
general culture imposed within an institution.  The use of fiduciary obligations as a means to
hold directors to account has been largely ignored during the financial crisis, with the focus
being clearly towards holding the regulator accountable, a decision that saw the abolition of
the  Financial  Services  Authority  in  2012.   The  thesis  has  shown  that  a  more  rigorous
application of the objective standard of care under the duty of skill, care and diligence has
the capacity to change the decision-making processes of a director for the better.  
The objective standard has forced real change in the mind-sets of non-executive directors
ensuring that they consider their role as gatekeeper much more seriously.  The provision has
not gone so far as to state that non-executive directors need be perfect in their  decision-
making  processes,  following  the  crisis,  s.  174  has  driven  a  clear  cultural  shift  that  has
departed away from classic cases such as Grimwade v Mutual Society whereby it was noted
that directors are not bound to be wiser than those who appointed them.  This shift adopted
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within a multi-faceted approach is the key to ensuring a change in cultural expectations and
norms within the financial crisis.  It has been argued that with minor amendments to the
provisions of s.172, the imposition of an objective standard of care or alternatively a wider
interpretation  of  relevant  factors  by  the  judiciary,  s.172  could  have  a  real  and  positive
curbing effect on rogue directors, who do not act to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole.  Ensuring as much has the capacity to play a vital role
within the culture of banking post Global Financial Crisis.  The chasing of high, short term
profits during the financial crisis, led to generous bonus payments to directors and employees
without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on financial  institutions.245
Whilst remuneration structures need to attract and motivate individuals having characteristics
necessary for success in the industry,246 it is argued that some of the remuneration structures
allowed directors to take unnecessary risks.  
The thesis around the need for corporate governance mechanisms to play a full part in the
legal and regulatory response to the global financial crisis, as part of a cohesive package of
measures necessary to effect cultural change within banking has been tested in the context of
the collapse of the financial institutions.  This study has highlighted how greater emphasis on
existing Corporate Governance measures such as s.172, s.174 and remuneration, could have
been effective in changing the decision-making processes and prevailing culture within the
financial  institution  is  this  culture  shift  which  reform  to  the  prudential  regulatory
environment alone is unlikely to achieve.  As has been shown the duties are owed to the
company as a whole and as such it is the company who is the proper plaintiff in any action.
If the company refuses to bring an action against senior management then the system would
have to rely on shareholder activism, through minority shareholder provisions.  Whilst there
have  been  some  examples  of  shareholder  activism  since  the  crisis,  for  example  the
Shareholder Spring of 2012, it  remains to be seen whether the appetite for activism will
continue when the global financial crisis disappears into distant memory.  It is argued that
there may be a stronger appetite than first thought following the recent case of R.(on the
application  of  SRM  Global  Master  Fund  LP)  v  Treasury  Commissioners.   The  case
concerned a conglomerate of shareholders of Northern Rock who in 2009 for judicial review
against the government.247  In their claim they purported that the legislation relating to the
assessment of compensation payable to them as former shareholders of Northern Rock plc
following its nationalization in February 2008 was unfair and incompatible with their rights
under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Protocol 1 Art.1.  The shareholders
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case was rejected and subsequently pursued to the Court of Appeal, where the case failed on
appeal.248 
Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of corporate governance.  Corporate governance gives
attention  to  power  struggle  issues  between the  directors,  management,  and shareholders.
Governance involves  the alignment  of interests  among the stakeholders.   The discussion
begins with the meaning and implications of corporate governance.  We define corporate
governance as the collection of control mechanisms that an organization adopts to prevent or
dissuade potentially self-interested managers from engaging in activities detrimental to the
welfare of shareholders and stakeholders.  In the duties of directors and the care and skill of
the directors.  The level of care and skill a director must demonstrate has been framed largely
with reference to the non-executive director.  It was expressed in subjective terms, where the
court held that a director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of
skill than may reasonably be expected from a person of  his knowledge and experience.  It
moves to remedies for breach of duty.  It is a breach of fiduciary duty for a director  to
wrongfully authorize the transfer of company assets to another company and that his breach
lies in the act of signing the transfer forms, not in his failure to make proper enquiries before
signing.   Corporate  governance  is  considered  to  be  good  corporate  governance.   It  is
necessary to shed some light on difference between legal systems.  The business judgment
rule  is  based  on the  proposition  that  directors  are  charged with  the  management  of  the
business  of  the  corporation.   In  order  to  examine  more  corporate  failures,  we  are  now
moving  onto  the  next  chapter  namely  Corporate  Governance  crisis  in  the  Banking  and
Finance  Sector  as  it  is  considered  that  topic  is  one  of  an important topic  in  this  thesis,
besides,  we  may  know  more  clearly  the  relationship  between  corporate  crisis  and  the
business organization and we go to chapter two to look into the various corporate failures
with the issue of corporate governance.
Chapter 2
Introduction
Chapter 2 focuses on the issue of the corporate governance crisis in the banking and finance
sector.  Financial scandals are explored and rogue traders are explored.  The responsibilities
of the directors and insider trading are also explored.  There are many bank failure such as
Barings Bank, Allfirst Bank, BCCI, Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock, Lloyds, HBoS, the
Royland Bank of Scotland are examined in this chapter.  Besides, there are some non-bank
examples, however, they are highly related to our business world.  Some of the examples are
discussed in detail because we need to explore their real reason of failure.  There are lots of
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information about the examples and it really tell us the main reason of why and how the
corporate  failure.   The  problem with  the  credit  rating  agencies  was  not  that  they  were
negligent but they were over relied on by the banks and others.  There were multiple reasons
for collapse with corporate governance.  We may find that there is common reason of failure.
The  key  corporate  governance  implications/insights  from  these  cases  are  directly  or
indirectly especially regards to directors’ action.  The conclusion is how we can prevent the
corporate failure in the future.
Corporate Governance crisis in the Banking and Finance Sector
Governments and national  institutions all  over the world are aware of the important  role
played by financial institutions and impose regulations on the banking sector.  The need for
bank regulations is grounded on two basic factors: first,  the risk of a systemic crisis that
would spread along all the economy; second, the inability of depositors to monitor banks.
Despite the regulation that has been imposed on the banking industry, financial firms have
received little research effort on key aspects of their functioning.  Bankers lend to borrowers
that everyone else is lending to, the outcome of a process where the public price of risk is
compared with its historic average and a control is applied based on public ratings.249  
Incentives to risk taking are influenced by ownership structure, investor protection laws and
bank regulations.  Conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders are argued to be
more  important  in  firms  with  dispersed  ownership  structures,  as  coordination  problem
hinders effectively monitoring of managerial actions by small shareholders, who have to rely
on external  monitoring  through the  market  for  corporate  control.   By contrast,  conflicts
between  managers  and  shareholders  are  expected  to  be  less  important  in  firms  with
concentrated  ownership  structures,  as  controlling  shareholders  have  strong  incentives  to
monitor managers, and replace them in the case of poor performance.  Too much monitoring
reduces managers’ initiative to seek firm-specific investments, which is detrimental to firm
value.250  
Bank supervision arises as an activity capable of overcoming inherent failures of financial
markets.   In  such  approach  to  regulation,  bank  supervisors  have  the  proper  incentives,
abilities  and  the  necessary  powers  to  accomplish  their  purposes  of  ensuring  safety  and
soundness of the banking system.  Supervision plays a role in reducing excessive bank risk-
taking  and  promoting  bank  performance  and  stability.   In  this  view,  powerful  and
independent supervisory agencies are desirable,  in order to avoid regulators suffering the
political pressure of bankers.  By contrast, the private interest view assumes that supervisors
may use their power to serve either their own private interests or the ones of bankers and
politicians.   The  consequences  of  powerful  supervision  in  this  view  are  poor  bank
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performance and increased corruption.251 
Corporate  governance  failures  which  contributed  to  various  financial  crimes  in  major
banking institutions and those involved have been held sufficiently accountable in the USA
and the UK.252  We are now going to examine certain organizations failures before we are
going to further chapter, as the following organizations shows clearly the negligence of their
governance.
WorldCom Leadership and Management
WorldCom  successfully  acquired  a  total  of  65  companies,  of  which  11  were  acquired
between 1991 and 1997, and in that course, has accumulated around $41 billion in debt.253
By the time it declared bankruptcy in 2002, the organization had a combined loss of $73.7
billion.254  Among other factors, the organization’s growth strategy through acquisitions, its
loans to senior executives, and poor corporate governance have all contributed to the fall of
the  company.   Through  the  analysis  of  Organizational  Behavior  and  principles  of
management and leadership, the following paper discusses how the WorldCom failure could
have  been  predicted,  as  well  as  why  it  has  failed.  Following  WorldCom’s  failure  and
scandals, studies have demonstrated that Bernard Ebbers and Scott Sullivan, the CEO and
CFO of the organization at that time, had created an organizational ideology, or culture, in
which leaders and managers were not to be doubted or questioned.  A great deal of focus was
put on team work and being a strong team player, which is said to have been a strategy to
reduce  dissenting  opinions,  leading  the  organization  to  follow  a  groupthink  attitude.
Groupthink is a thought process that individuals tend to adopt when they are deeply involved
in  cohesive  groups  where  unanimity  is  the  prime  objective.   The  characteristics  of
groupthink include feelings of invulnerability, moral superiority, group pressure, and self-
censorship.   As  a  result,  organizations  WorldCom  Scandal  that  follow  such  thought
processes tend to inadequately examine alternate course of actions and avoid examining the
involved risks.255  
Entrenched Culture
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In addition to the organization’s leadership and management approach, there are indications
that improper conduct and fraudulent actions were taking place in most levels and parts of
the organization.  First, the organization’s strategic apex participated in fraudulent activities
on a regular basis.  The strategic apex acted in such a way as to lead the organization’s
middle line to ignore and commit  fraudulent behaviour and was propagated down to the
operating core on multiple occasions.  As certain email communications illustrated, certain
employees part of the operating core was well aware of the accounting irregularities and
participated in hiding such practices.  The techno structure was at a certain point taking part
in  this  downward  spiral  of  falsified  reports  and  suspicious  accounting  practices.   Their
auditors, Arthur Andersen failed to identify the accounting irregularities and did not persist
in  trying  to  identify  WorldCom Scandal.   The  organization’s  ideology had poor  values,
ethics, and promoted fraudulent conduct.  In one instance, following the attempts of certain
employees to establish a corporate Code of Conduct, Ebbers, the CEO, reportedly described
this effort as a colossal waste of time.256  In another specific incident, WorldCom’s board of
directors lent $415 million from the company’s coffers to help Ebbers cover some of his
personal debts, mounting to more than $800 million, in an attempt to avoid a massive sell of
company stock by the CEO which would have further driven down the company stock.257 
Organizational Structure
In addition  to  the  organizational  behavior,  WorldCom’s organizational  structure,  or  lack
thereof,  significantly  contributed  to  its  failure.   In  what  first  seemed to be  a  successful
growth  strategy,  one  significant  business  reality  had  not  been  considered:  mergers  and
acquisitions  are  costly,  time consuming,  and represent  significant  managerial  challenges.
WorldCom had acquired 11 companies in only six years, from 1991 to 1997, but had failed
to properly integrate them in the organization.  In fact, following the acquisitions, conflicting
and repetitive systems remained and billing systems were not coordinated.258  
The  United  States  experienced  another  major  corporate  collapse  in  July  2002  with  the




 Pulliam, S., Solomon, D., Mollenkamp, C. (2002). Former WorldCom CEO Built  An Empire on Mountain of Debt. The Wall Street
Journal. Retrieved October 13, 2008 fromhttp://academic.udayton.edu/LawrenceUlrich/EbbersAquisition.htm The UK Stewardship Code
(FRC 2010), Principle 1 
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 3 
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Preface at p. 1  
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Preface at p. 1 
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 3 
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 5 
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 6 
The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 7 
258
Moberg, D., Romar, E. WorldCom. http://www.scu.edu/ethics/dialogue/candc/cases/worldcom.html
69
accounting irregularities at the company, culminating in the admission by the company to
falsifications  in  its  accounts.   Bernie  Ebbers,  the  former  CEO was  charged  with  fraud,
conspiracy and making false statements in relation to the accounts; while Scott Sullivan, the
former CFO agreed to plead guilty to similar charges.259  In 1990s, WorldCom was one of
the  largest  companies  in  the  world  and its  CEO had  become a  spend-thrift,  buying  up
ranches,  yachts  and  timberlands;  in  addition  to  collecting  loans  from  the  company  at
ridiculously low interest rates.  There were indications that he and his CFO dominated the
board of directors.  The actions of the CEO appeared to be unprofessional in many instances
and an example is the issue of obtaining loans from the company at unfair interest rates.  The
failure of WorldCom resulted in a huge loss of confidence on the part of investors.  It had
devastating effects on the residents of Mississippi in the United States, the home state of the
company and the CEO because a lot of those residents had in the spirit of solidarity invested
all their financial possessions in WorldCom shares and refused to exit the company until
their shares became invariably worthless.  
If  the  directors  at  WorldCom  had  behaved  more  appropriately  by  being  honest  and
professional in relation to their corporate accounts and dealings, there might have been a
more effective corporate governance process in the company and this might have helped
prevent or mitigate the corporate failure.  Bennie Ebbers was indicted,260 and convicted in
March 2005 of securities  fraud, conspiracy and filing false documents  with regulators.261
Scott Sullivan, the former CFO at WorldCom testified against his boss reiterating that he
was  acting  under  his  instructions.262  In  July  2005,  Ebbers  was  sentenced  to  25  years
imprisonment.263  Judge  Barbara  Jones  of  the  Federal  District  Court  in  Manhattan  who
handed  down the  sentence  stated  that  Mr  Ebbers  was  the  instigator  of  the  $11  Billion
fraud.264  In rebutting arguments that Mr Ebbers was deceived by his subordinates, she stated
that “Mr Ebbers’s statements deprived investors of their money.  They might have made
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different decisions had they known the truth”.265  This statement underscores the importance
of  shareholders  being in  possession of  accurate  and relevant  information  regarding their
investee companies as it impacts on their decision making in relation to the company.  This
case appears that there were no good corporate governance and as a result the company was
severely suffered from financial loss due to poor supervision.
Financial Scandals 
We are going to further examine the financial failures that we have just been discussing. In
the first place, we have reason to believe that the company failure, for an example Enron,
was mainly due to a combination of factors including corporate governance failure issues. 
Enron Scandals 
The Enron scandal, revealed in October 2001, involved the energy company Enron and the
accounting,  auditing,  and  consultancy partnership of  Arthur  Andersen.   The  corporate
scandal eventually led to Enron's downfall, resulting in the largest bankruptcy in American
history at the time.  Arthur Andersen, which was one of the five largest accounting firms in
the world, was dissolved.  Enron was formed in 1985 by Kenneth Lay after merging Houston
Natural  Gas and  InterNorth.   When  Jeffrey  Skilling was  hired,  he  developed  a  staff  of
executives that, through the use of accounting loopholes, special purpose entities, and poor
financial reporting, were able to hide billions in debt from failed deals and projects.  Chief
Financial Officer Andrew Fastow and other executives were able to mislead Enron's board of
directors  and  audit  committee  of  high-risk  accounting  issues  and  pressure  Andersen  to
ignore the issues.  Enron's  stock price, which hit a high of  US$90 per share in mid-2000,
caused shareholders to lose nearly $11 billion when it plummeted to less than a $1 by the
end of November 2001.  The  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an
investigation, and Dynegy offered to purchase the company at a  fire sale price.  When the
deal fell through, Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001 under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code, and with assets of $63.4 billion, it was the largest corporate
bankruptcy in U.S. history until WorldCom's 2002 bankruptcy.266 
The manipulation of special purpose entities and Enron’s ultimate demise
Andrew Fastlow, the company’s chief financial officer (CFO) engineered the solution to the
problem  of  avoiding  the  transparency  of  Enron’s  increasing  debts.   This  involved  the
creation of investment partnerships, a form of limited liability partnership.  In theory, such a
partnership  would  involve  Enron  and  other  investors  contributing  assets  or  other
consideration to pursue a specific  business objective.   As distinct legal entities,  albeit  in
effect subsidiaries of Enron, the partnerships had their own legal capacity to borrow funds
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from the  lending institutions.   Many of  the  partnerships  were  structured  in  the  form of
‘Special Purpose Entities’ (SPE).  This entitled any debts of the SPE to be kept off Enron’s
balance sheet.  According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, an SPE could be
created where an independent owner of the SPE made a capital investment in the entity and
where the independent owner took substantial risks and rewards of ownership, exercising
ultimate control over the SPE. 
Apportioning blame for Enron’s demise 
The responsibility  for the rapid failure of Enron may be attributed to the failings  of the
various internal and external corporate watchdogs.  These are the company’s independent
board, the company’s auditors, investment banks, credit rating agencies, lawyers, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.  In apportioning responsibility for Enron’s demise,
the  greater  part  of  any  culpability  must  rest  with  the  internal  watchdogs,  namely  the
directors, executives and auditors.  In reality, the Enron case was a ‘crony capitalism’, in
which the ties between the company’s management and auditors were so close that little
external attention was paid to Enron’s financial position, so hidden by aggressive accounting
strategies.
The auditors’ responsibilities
Although auditors are employed to act to protect investors’ interests, their position in the
governance structure of a company is one whereby they are placed in a position of conflict.
While auditors work to protect the interests of investors, their remuneration is derived from
the  corporate  entity  and  more  specifically  in  accordance  with  the  decisions  and
recommendations of the company’s management.   Auditors may be reluctant  to criticize
management for fear that they will lose future auditing work.  Prior to the collapse of Enron,
it had been become common practice for accountancy firms to perform auditing work and to
act as financial  consultants to the company in which they had an auditing responsibility.
Enron’s audit committee failed to exercise effective corporate governance as it related to the
scope of Enron’s internal auditing activity.267 
The responsibility of the directors
In the US, the responsibility for the internal governance of a public company rests on the
shoulders of its board of directors.  The board comprised a majority of directors who are
devoid of day-to-day responsibilities.  Both State and Federal laws regulate the directors of a
public company.  Directors are subject to duties of loyalty and care although in accordance
with the business judgment rule, directors operate under the favorable presumption that in
making business decisions they will have acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the decision was in the best interests of the company. 
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The Enron Board
Following the Enron scandal, a special committee of Enron’s board of directors was set up to
investigate the company’s demise.  The report of the special committee concluded that the
board  had  failed  to  act  with  sufficient  diligence  in  its  approval  of  the  partnership
transactions.  Although the non-executive directors of Enron may have been negligent in the
performance of their corporate duties, the conduct of the company’s executive directors may
be described as reckless and, in some instances, fraudulent. 
Insider trading
The management and directors of Enron engaged in insider dealing, a prohibited fraud in the
US.  The practice and timing of stock sales by senior managers and various board members
can be viewed as indicative of their knowledge that the company would soon be plagued by
financial chaos.268  
The Enron matter would probably prove to be an important event in the history of American
shareholder capitalism.  Its future depends on the proper balancing of imperfectly fashioned
incentives  and  self-restraint.269  The  bankruptcy  of  Enron led  to  many  in  Washington
debating the way it oversees the $200 billion power industry.  But there is no consensus on
erasing  the  legacy  of  deregulation  that  the  company's  political  largess  helped  forge.
Congressional leaders and top regulators are moving forward on what had been Enron's No.
1 objective: a push to reduce local control of electricity transmission lines so that energy
merchants like the Enron Corporation can use them to transport and sell power.   But the
politics of power are shifting, and some of Enron's longstanding opponents - chief among
them the Southern Company of Atlanta, which owns many local power monopolies - see a
fresh chance to slow deregulation, or even roll it back.  
Among those called for inquiries into Enron's collapse at the time were Representative Billy
Tauzin, a prominent Republican from Louisiana who is chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce  Committee;  the  Senate  majority  leader,  Tom  Daschle,  and  Senator  Jeff
Bingaman, a Democrat of New Mexico who is chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee.  The Bush administration, along with some Democrats - including
Mr. Bingaman and William Massey, a Democrat on the energy commission - favoured plans
advanced by Enron that would pry open regional electricity markets.  The durability of such
views was a sign of how effective Enron was during the last decade in keeping Washington
at bay as the company pushed to restructure the electricity industry and limit government
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oversight of new energy markets.  Enron and its employees were the largest contributors to
President Bush's campaigns over the years, and Enron gave more money to politicians in the
last election cycle than did any other energy company.  Between 1993 and Enron’s collapse,
its employees and its chairman, Kenneth L. Lay, donated $2 million to Mr. Bush.  It holds
that Enron’s business model exemplifies the pathology of the shareholder value system and
it is a paradox of our time that shareholder-focused capitalism was harming shareholders.270 
During the 1990s, Enron grew from a small domestic Texan energy company to become one
of the largest United States corporations, taking advantage of deregulation and globalisation
to create  opportunities which translated to profit  and growth.  It was a company run by
respectable persons with huge political connections and had been ranked for several years in
a row as Fortune magazine’s most innovative company.  It collapsed, due to disclosures of
non-existent transactions which were placed as off balance-sheet items and consequently,
estimated incomes which would never materialise.  The company filed for bankruptcy on 2
December  2001  resulting  in  the  loss  of  thousands  of  jobs  and  over  $1  billion  of  its
employees’ retirement savings.   In a paper by Sherron Watkins, a former vice president of
Enron and the “whistle blower” at the company before its collapse, there is an account of
how Kenneth Lay, a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at Enron would preach the company’s
core values of respect, integrity, communication and excellence (RICE); and would not live
up to its tenets by getting involved in situations such as compelling Enron employees to
patronise his sister’s travel agency constantly when that agency did not provide affordable
and excellent service.271  Mr Lay’s actions suggest that he was a person who did not abide
firmly by the values of integrity and professionalism.  
Jeffrey Skilling was CEO of Enron between February and August 2001.  He was described
as someone who infused a new business image into the company, one that placed emphasis
on generating profit, regardless of the cost.  This resulted in the company recruiting only the
brightest traders and rewarding achievement with outrageous salaries and bonuses; with Mr
Skilling instituting a Performance Review Committee which became known as the harshest
employee ranking system in the United States.272  The core values of the company were
relegated to the background and replaced with a relentless drive towards profit making, a
situation which could result in a negation of professionalism in the long run, as occurred at
Enron.  The  Chief  Financial  Officer  (CFO)  of  Enron,  Andrew  Fastow,  set  up  three
partnerships that engaged in business transactions with Enron and formed part of the reason
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for  the  losses  that  the  company  disclosed  eventually.273  It  is  difficult  to  think  that  the
company directors at Enron could not have known the level of conflict of interest that would
result  in  a situation  in  which its  CFO is consummating  business transactions  between a
company he works for and a partnership he owns.  
Andrew Fastow was  lobbying the  rating  agencies  to  provide  Enron with  positive  credit
ratings to attract investment.  Such behaviour indicates that these company directors lacked
integrity.  Enron directors reneged on their duties and responsibilities, which contributed to
ineffectiveness  in  the  governance  of  the  company.   There  are  various  accounts  of  huge
salaries  and  bonuses  earned  by  the  executives,  with  Andrew  Fastow  earning  over  $30
million in management fees for his partnerships.  They indulged in selling off their  own
shares whilst telling other employees that the company was performing optimally before
they  filed  for  bankruptcy.   Aside  from  the  obvious  cases  of  numerous  job  losses  and
financial  crippling  of  employees  that  the  Enron  collapse  brought  about,  many  other
companies were affected by its failure, examples include Arthur Andersen (its auditors), JP
Morgan Chase, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch.  One of the most far reaching consequences of
the fall of Enron would be the death of one of its former executives, J Clifford Baxter.  He
had complained to the CEO about questionable accounting practices within Enron, but, upon
being called to testify before the United States Congress, he committed suicide in order to
avoid the embarrassment.274  
In the original indictment of the Enron executives, Richard Causey, Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey
Skilling were charged on 53 counts with various issues ranging from issuing fraudulent and
misleading statements,  conspiracy,  securities  fraud, money laundering,  bank fraud,  wires
fraud and insider trading.275  The Enron Examiners’ Report concluded that certain senior
officers engaged in wrongful conduct and violated their duty of loyalty to the company.276  In
the US Senate Report on the role of the Enron Board of Directors, it was stated that the
directors  breached their  fiduciary duties because they witnessed numerous indications  of
questionable  practices  by Enron management  executives  over  several  years  but  chose to
ignore  them  to  the  detriment  of  the  company  shareholders,  employees  and  business
associates.277  The US Senate Report concluded that the board of directors contributed to the
failure of Enron because the issues which plagued the company such as high risk accounting
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practices, inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, extensive undisclosed off the book
transactions and excessive executive compensation were all facts within the knowledge of
the directors who failed to provide sufficient oversight and restraint of management excesses
as required by their obligations.278  In May 2006, Jeffrey Skilling was found guilty on 19
counts of conspiracy, fraud, false statements and insider trading.  Kenneth Lay was found
guilty on 6 counts of conspiracy and fraud; and Judge Sim Lake ruled that Mr Lay was guilty
of 4 counts of fraud and false statements.  After the indictment, Richard Causey pleaded
guilty.  Kenneth Lay died in July 2006 before sentencing was concluded and before a notice
of appeal could be filed, and the court vacated his conviction and dismissed his indictment
upon a motion brought by his estate.279 
The judgment and sentencing was made in respect of Jeffrey Skilling who was committed to
an imprisonment term of 292 months.280  Jeffery Skilling appealed against his conviction on
grounds which included that he did not get a fair trial from the jury which was constituted in
Houston, the venue of the crime and the court proceedings.  In June 2010, the US Supreme
Court vacated his appeal on the grounds of a fair trial but upheld his appeal on the grounds
of the honest services statute upon which his conspiracy conviction was based.281  The jurors
in the first trial noted the flaw in the character and personality of the Enron executives. 282
The jurors refused to believe that the executives were telling the truth when Jeffery Skilling
and Kenneth Lay claimed that they did not know that things were going wrong at Enron.
The jurors noted that it was appalling that Mr Lay was selling his own Enron shares even as
he assured employees and shareholders that the company was fiscally sound.  One of the
jurors commented as follows that was the character of the person that he was.283  The jurors
stated that Mr Lay put his personal financial welfare ahead of his duties to the shareholders
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and employees.284  The Enron collapse represented a remarkable event from many points of
view.  It was probably the biggest bankruptcy in history285, its proportions and consequences
being unprecedented.  What is more striking is the impact it had on the American capitalist
system  as  a  whole  and  on  that  corporate  governance  system  that  was  considered  a
sophisticated and safe operational platform for corporations worldwide.286
In the 1990s, when American stocks were leading the world and index peaked at record
heights,  Enron  was  at  the  zenith  of  its  growth  and  was  acclaimed  as  one  of  the  most
innovative firms on the market by the Wall  Street financial  press.287  Enron stock prices
continued a spectacular rise until 2001, when a series of revelations concerning accounting
frauds and executives misconducts led the way to the historical fall of the seventh largest
corporation of the United States and six-time winner of Fortune Magazine’s award.  Enron’s
downfall  was followed by other scandals, among which WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia,
which  presented  similar  patterns  in  the  way  the  frauds  had  been  committed  through
accounting irregularities.288  The consequence to the scenario was a loss of confidence in the
stock market, especially from those groups who suffered the heavier losses after the scandal,
like employees, whose pension schemes were tied to the share value of the company.  The
reaction was prompt from American authorities, since the Congress enacted a new piece of
legislation,  known  as  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act289,  just  few  months  after  Enron  filed  for
bankruptcy.  In analysing the Enron scandal, it is possible to single out two reasons of the
corporate failure: on one hand the corporate governance failure, especially with regards to
the  role  of  gatekeepers  who  did  not  prevent  the  making  of  the  frauds  and  sometimes
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risky managerial strategies led to the serial application of financial transaction that led to
collapse.  A brief account of the rise and fall of the Texas corporation will help defining the
legal issues underlying this financial scandal.  Enron was formed in 1985 through the merger
of two gas companies, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth.  Kenneth Lay, founder, Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman of the company had been keen on that ideology and through
his lobbying power in Washington he participated in the crusade for deregulation laws to be
passed, in order to “liberate businessmen from the rules of regulation of government”.290  
Under Skilling’s leadership Enron developed the new idea of working as a “Gas Bank”,
operating as intermediary between suppliers and end-users in the gas market.291  In the 1990s
it  became clear  that  the focus of Enron business was rather  in the trading operations  of
financial securities based on energy commodities, than in the trading of physical assets.  The
growth during this period was related to and dependant on acquisitions in the energy market
and on capital investments which took years to deliver significant earnings.  A key aspect of
Enron strategy and of its governance structure was the vast use of Special Purpose Vehicles
(SPV) made by the management.  SPVs were structured as separate entities to which Enron
would  contribute  assets,  in  order  for  the  SPV  to  borrow  from  capital  markets,  issuing
securities to investors backed by the underlying assets contributed by Enron.  Such schemes
would  guarantee  an  investment  grade  credit  rating  that  was vital  for  Enron to maintain
trading operations.292  These transactions,  coupled with a corporate  governance structure,
gave way to the financial engineering that led the Houston group to bankruptcy.  
The  accounting  problems  came  to  light  in  2001  as  Enron  had  to  restate  its  financial
statements  for the period 1997–2000 to reflect  the consolidation of some unconsolidated
SPVs.  This event generated concerns from the specialised press about the company and its
financial  problems,  since  the  firm’s  debt  ratio  had  not  reflected  the  situation  of  the
unconsolidated SPVs.293  Although Enron’s profits started declining by the end of the 1990s,
the public became aware of the firm’s financial difficulties only in 2001, when Enron’s share
price dropped to less than a dollar in November.  It is safe to state that the firm’s decline was
a quick one, regardless of the public perception, for two main reasons.  Firstly, the long-term
contracts that Enron concluded with its counterparts entailed an element of trust that Enron
could perform its obligations throughout the term of the contract; once Enron’s credit rating
declined, its counterparts refused to trade, withdrawing their cash balances held with Enron
290
 See B. McLean and P. Elkind, “Enron: The Smartest Guy in the Room”, Portfolio 2003. 
291
 S.L. Gillian and J.D. Martin “Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and the Collapse of Enron”, Centre for Corporate
Governance University of Delaware, Working Paper Series 2002-001, p.5,6. 
292
 This resembles the structure of securitisation transactions, even though it is argued that the transactions in place at Enron are not
classifiable as securitisation.  S.L. Schwarez “Securitization Post-Enron”, Duke Law School Research Paper No. 38, 2003, p.9,10.  
293
 Supra Gillian and Martin 2002, p.11.  
78
and requiring cash collateral.  These actions created financial pressure as well as a liquidity
crisis.  Secondly, what enhanced Enron’s vertical  decline was the exposure to contingent
liabilities related to its off-balance sheet SPVs.  Once the credit problems appeared in their
magnitude, Enron’s ability to obtain credit and support its trading vanished completely and
brought the business to a halt.294 
On paper the Enron board was a perfect one – especially when compared to some continental
counterparts, like the Parmalat board – composed by fourteen members, of whom only two
were insiders295; most of the outsiders had business experience in the fields of finance and
accountancy, and in management roles in other boards.  Most of the directors owned stock in
significant  amount  as  they  all  received  stock  options  as  part  of  their  compensation
schemes.296  It is pointed out that the audit committee had a state of the art charter which
made it the overseer of the company’s reporting process and internal controls with direct
access to financial, legal, and other staff and consultants of the company, and the power to
retain  other  accountants,  lawyers,  or  consultants  as  it  thought  advisable.   Enron’s  board
structure appeared to be at the leading edge of best governance practice, as confirmed by the
review of best corporate boards where the Chief Executive Magazine included Enron among
the five top boards in the US.297  In the aftermath of the scandal, it was reported by the Enron
Special Investigation Committee that the board had been inefficient in its main duties with
regards  to  the  audit  committee.   The  acclaimed  independence  of  its  directors  was
compromised by conflicts  of  interest  arising  as  a  consequence  of  side-payments  and by
bonds of long service and familiarity.298  A peculiarity of the Enron governance which serves
as an explanation to the conflicts of interest is the sui generis structure that allowed the Chief
Financial  Officer  Andrew Fastow to run independent  entities  that  entered into risky and
volatile transactions worth billions of dollars.  Other senior officers were allowed to profit
from self-dealing transactions299,  without the supervision or the full  understanding of the
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board concerning their outcome.  These transactions were realised through a complicated
network of subsidiaries employed in off-balance sheet partnership with Enron.300 
The US Senate investigation  on the  role  of the Enron board in  the company’s  collapse,
sought  to  address  the  issue  of  directors’  independence.   The  findings  confirmed  that
highlighting numerous financial ties between the company and certain directors, especially
in the form of consulting fees paid in addition to board fees, and transactions with entities in
which directors played a central role.301  It has been suggested that six out of twelve non-
executive directors had conflicts of interest through financial ties, and most of these directors
were members of the audit  and finance committees,  enhancing the detrimental  effects  of
their conflicts of interest.302  Another aspect of the Enron governance system that can be
pointed  at  as  a  reason  for  the  board’s  inefficiency  is  the  compensation  policy.   The
appointment  of  directors  of  public  corporation,  when sitting  in  high  profile  committees,
often require remuneration, the high compensation can have the two-side effect of hindering
directors’ critical approach and independence, since a sharp questioning of management’s
decisions may play against re-appointment.303  
Stock-based compensations can produce undesired effects since pursuing and protecting the
share price can lead to decisions conducive to conflicts.  The importance and the advantage
of  stock option  as  a  means to  align  managers’  and shareholders’  different  goals  can  be
compromised by the level of stock option granted to managers.  An excess in the amount of
option  can  bring  about  two problems  which  have  been  at  work  in  the  Enron  case:  the
fraudster and the risk-preferring executive.304  It is observed that managers with high levels
of  options  have  incentives  to  get  the  share  price  high,  by  any  possible  means,  fraud
included305; and that can be achieved through risky practices that can diminish the value of
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the firm itself, but increase the value of managers’ firm-related investments.306  Stock option
compensations played a central role at Enron and it has been suggested that the range and
amount of stock options was far higher than the average of Enron’s peer group.  This can be
read  as  a  reason  behind  some  board’s  behaviour,  namely  the  attenuation  of  careful
monitoring of management practices, especially concerning those designed to preserve the
firm’s credit rating.307
The Enron board was deficient in its controlling functions and this  trend is evident with
regards  to  transactions  involving  the  approval  of  SPVs  and  the  monitoring  of  those
partnerships.  At several junctures the board ignored red flags that could have restrained
certain  managerial  actions  that  led  to  the  collapse.308  As  part  of  the  broad governance
failure, the breakdown of gatekeepers’ functions became evident during the years between
Enron and Parmalat,  with  most  of  these scandals  exposing malfunctions  in  the  areas  of
accounting and audit most prominently.  This label led to the prompt enactment in the US of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  Enron has been referred to as demonstration as well as the
peak  of  gatekeepers’  failure,  which  in  turn  raises  the  question  of  how  to  rectify  this
governance breakdown.309  The role of gatekeepers310 within corporate governance should be
to assess a corporate client’s own statement or a specific transaction.  
In the United States the role of statutory auditors was defined with the Securities Act 1933
and with the Securities Exchange Act 1934, at a time when the markets had been hit by the
Great Depression.  These Acts required companies issuing securities in the stock markets to
have their financial statements certified by professional and independent accountants, acting
within that  function as watchdogs in the public  interest.311  In theory this  public  interest
function should be supported by the fact that gatekeepers have less incentive to lie than their
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defined the reputational capital  that gatekeepers pledge and which is attained after many
years  of  performing the same services  for  a  number of  clients.   The  assumption  is  that
gatekeepers would not sacrifice their reputational capital for a single client and for a fee
which is deemed to be modest when compared to the whole clients’ portfolio.312  Evidence
from the last decade shows a different picture and suggests that gatekeepers do acquiesce
and  sometimes  contribute  to  the  fraud  perpetrated  by  their  clients,  even  though  this
behaviour may seem irrational and not in line with the above assumption.313 
Arthur Andersen was Enron’s auditor at the time of the collapse and the firm could count on
a portfolio of around 2.300 audit clients; it seems that they had little incentive to risk such a
reputational  capital  for  one  client,  as  big  as  Enron could  be.314  This  reputation  theory
represents a landmark within courts’ interpretation on these matters, as documented by Judge
Easterbrook  in  DiLeo  v.  Ernst  &  Young.   Arthur  Andersen  –  a  firm  that  could  boost
revenues for over $9 million in 2001 – became involved in a series of securities frauds in the
1990s that in the last few years of its life culminated with the association with the Enron
scandal.  During the 1990s the standard of financial reporting went down, with an increasing
average of earning restatements by public companies that indicated that previous earning
management had gone out of hands.  The big accounting firms had earlier  acquiesced in
earning management – premature revenue recognition above all – that could no longer be
sustained.315  This trend can be extended to other consulting functions beyond the audit.
Securities analysts were more jeopardised after Enron since in 2001 sixteen out of seventeen
analysts were recommending a buy or a strong buy on Enron’s stock.316  The desire to retain
some sort  of  reputation  and to  be  perceived  as  credible  and objective  was  in  that  case
superseded by the necessity to please investment banking clients.317  
It is assessable within the study of the Enron collapse that none of the watchdogs, who could
have  detected  signs  of  the  frauds,  when  the  downfall  was  inevitable.   Two  different
312
 Supra Coffee 2002, p.6. 
313
 R.A. Prentice “The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioural Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation”, 95 Nw.U L Rev. 1333
(2000). See P. Davies “Enron and Corporate Governance Reform in the UK and the EC”, in “After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and
Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US” by J. Armour and J.A. McCahery, 2007. 
314
 Supra Coffee 2002, p.7.  
315
 Supra Coffee 2002, p.11,12.  
316




explanations  have  been  proposed  for  this  collective  gatekeepers’  malfunction  that
compromised the overall corporate governance system.318  The theory focuses on the decline
of  the  expected  liability  costs  arising  out  of  acquiescence  by  auditors.   The  benefits  of
acquiescence rose as a result of the big audit firms’ strategic behaviour in the market, since
they combined multiple consulting services, using the audit as a portal of entry to get big
clients.   This  combination  of  consulting  services  with  audit  services  enabled  clients  to
exercise a form of pressure over the audit firm in a low visibility way.  Without having to
fire the audit firm and incur in public embarrassment and investigations, the client who was
dissatisfied  with  the  auditor’s  intransigence,  could  terminate  the  consulting  relationship,
depriving the audit firm of the largest source of revenue.319  The explanation relates to the
market bubble of the 1990s, during which the stock prices kept soaring, gatekeepers were
seen as troublesome from management’s perspective as their red flags would have dissuaded
potential investors.  This same explanation can be applied to securities analysts who were
overwhelmed by the boom of the IPO market and became the means by which investment
banks could  compete  for  IPO clients  as  underwriters.320  Understanding Enron from the
perspective  of  gatekeepers’  failure  would  entail  a  minimum  level  of  understanding  of
American accounting rules, which differ from those in place in most other jurisdictions.  The
widespread reaction to this  was that  the SEC called for a principle-based system, which
would require  the auditor  to not  simply certify  compliance  with the Generally  Accepted
Accounting Principles, but rather to confirm that the issuer’s financial statement reflected its
financial position.321  
Enron lied  in  certain  managerial  strategies  and risky transactions  employed.   Structured
finance322 is a difficult area of law to understand and transactions therein are not easy to
asses as regards the risk they entail.  Off-balance sheet financing, mainly in the shape of
securitisation,  represented a key tool for the Enron management  to raise finance through
capital markets, coupled with high-risk derivatives transactions.  The idea reflected by the
Enron management in hindsight, is that it employed different means to disguise the rapid rise
of  debts:  Enron  was  consistently  hedging323 part  of  its  investments  through  the  use  of
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structured finance transactions, with the purpose of minimising financial  statement losses
and avoid to add debt to its balance sheet as this would have damaged the credit rating.  
The SPV would hedge the value of a particular investment on Enron’s balance sheet, using
Enron’s assets as source of payment.324  What the management at Enron did not predict was
the fall of its stock value, which of course entailed the plunge of the SPVs’ value as well;
this in turn triggered the payment of the guarantees provided by Enron since the SPVs would
lack at that point 12-sufficient assets to perform their hedge.325  Another consequence of the
decline in share value was the breach of the three percent independent equity requirement for
non-consolidation326, which added the SPVs’ debts to the alarming Enron’s balance sheet.327
The problem with the use of SPVs related to the huge level of contingent liabilities that were
not consolidated with the company’s balance sheet.  Enron was funding its growth through
the syndication of capital investments in off-balance sheet SPVs.328 
An example  that  illustrates  this  form of  hedge transactions  is  given by the  relationship
between Enron and LJM Cayman L.P., an entity formed in 1999 by CFO Andrew Fastow
who served as its general partner, in breach of the Enron’s code of conduct and generally of
the fiduciary duties that bound him to the company.329  LJM was created with the purpose to
raise funds in order to hedge Enron’s merchant  investments in other partnerships and to
acquire other assets in Enron’s merchant portfolio.  Among the transactions between Enron
and LJM, one raised concerns as it represented the first time that Enron transferred its own
stock to an SPV and used the SPV to hedge the value of a merchant investment.330  The
background for this  hedge was a $10 million investment in a partnership called Rhythm
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NetConnection  in  1998;  a  year  later  Rhythms  went  public  and  the  Enron  management
decided to hedge the unrealised gains of around $300 million.  The solution to avoid any
decline in Rhythm stock to be reflected on Enron’s income statement,  was to hedge the
Rhythm investment with LJM.331  It is worth pointing out that LJM’s funds came in part
from Fastow and from other investors, while the remainder came from the use of trapped
value of forward contracts332 which the company had entered into with investment banks to
purchase  its  own shares.   When the  company tried  to  release  the  value  of  the  forward
contracts  in  order  to  keep it  as  income,  this  implied  another  intricate  procedure:  firstly,
settling the forward contracts  in return for shares of Enron stock; secondly, selling these
shares to LJM for a note receivable and then a put option333 on the Rhythm shares.  The point
of this transaction was that the LJM’s ability to honour the put option was contingent on the
value of the Enron stock it owned; it can be said that the value of Enron’s Rhythms put was
relying on Enron’s share price itself.   The put  option was utilised  as a  device to hedge
earnings and resulted in no economic gain to Enron.334 
Other  similar  transactions  were  carried  out  between  Enron  and  its  SPVs,  with  similar
objectives.   These  transactions  were  referred  to  as  “Raptors”  and  had  great  impact  on
Enron’s balance sheet,  through the use of derivative transactions  that  followed the same
structure outlined.  The difference is that some of these Raptors took the form of total return
swaps335 on  Enron’s  interests  in  merchant  investments,  with  the  consequence  that  the
arrangement would have worked if the SPVs had the capacity to meet their obligations.  But
this capacity depended on the value of the SPV’s principal asset, which was Enron stock.336
When the value of Enron investments started to fall, this caused the Raptors to suffer losses
since the hedges were based on those underlying investments; similarly, as Enron’s share
price declined, the Raptors’ ability to honour the hedge was compromised.337  It has been
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observed before the United States Congress that by the time the bankruptcy became public,
Enron had developed from an energy firm into a derivatives trading firm, and that could be
recognised  by  the  characteristic  layout  of  the  new  building  where  the  top  floor  was
overlooking the derivatives trading pit below.338  
Derivatives are complex financial instruments that belong to the finance world more than to
the legal  one and for  this  reason they appear  too impenetrable  to  be understood by the
investor.  The value of derivatives is based in fact on one or more underlying variables, like
the price of stock or the cost of natural gas; the market for derivatives where Enron engaged
is an unregulated one, since under US securities law, derivatives were not deemed securities
and  were  not  audited.339  Enron  used  derivative  transactions  to  manipulate  its  financial
statements  and  this  happened  in  three  ways:  firstly,  by  hiding  huge  losses  suffered  on
technology stocks; secondly, by hiding debts incurred to finance unprofitable new ventures;
and thirdly, by inflating the value of other troubled businesses.  It can be observed that most
of these derivatives transactions did not involve energy at all.340
When the value of Enron’s stock collapsed, the SPVs were unable to perform the hedge as
expected.341  After the Enron scandal unfolded in all its magnitude, European markets felt
somewhat relieved and vindicated that such a sequence of corporate failures had occurred on
the other side of the Atlantic.  There was a feeling that the American corporate governance
system was immune from such malfunctions and the balance of powers in place would have
prevented similar  events.   Americans had looked at European corporate governance as a
system jeopardised by underdeveloped capital markets and by ownership structures that did
not allow full growth of corporate power.342  The Enron bankruptcy proved the point of those
who had highlighted the greed of American executives and the overwhelming power that
they enjoyed within corporations as a threat that could lead to frauds; the same scenario in
continental  Europe  would  have  been  hindered  by  that  same  denigrated  ownership
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structure.343  It appears that the corporate governance flaws in the Enron / WorldCom cases
could be eliminated and subsequently they led to Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Parmalat
Parmalat was uncovered as one of the most astonishing financial frauds in history, involving
what was considered a stronghold of Italian industry, affecting a group with more than 200
companies and some 36,000 employees, and above all opening up the floodgates to what
appeared to be a fraud carried out for more than a decade.  What triggered the insolvency
was  a  communication  sent  by  Bank of  America  to  Parmalat’s  auditors  Grant  Thornton,
stating that the document confirming a bank account for a Cayman Island company was a
forgery.  This company was supposed to hold almost €4 billion of Parmalat’s group, but the
money had never existed in real.344  Parmalat was founded in 1961, in Parma, mainly as a
family business operating within the food trade.  Its founder, Calisto Tanzi, appeared to be
driven by a desire to expand the business and the first chances to do so were represented by
the commercialisation of pasteurised Ultra-Heat Treatment milk, which had a long shelf life
and was suitable to be exported to distant destinations.345 
Tanzi was a pioneer in taking advantage of the Tetra Pak packaging process which, by the
beginning of the seventies, allowed Parmalat to gain a strong position in the dairy industry.346
The big leap anyway took place in the eighties, when the group started pursuing a policy of
expansion into foreign markets, mainly in South America, and consolidated a position of
market leader in Italy.   During this period, Tanzi tried to venture into new and different
markets, from the TV one, to tourism and sport.  These ventures proved to be critical for the
group and marked the beginning of the group’s financial difficulties.  The enterprises in the
TV business347 and tourism confirmed to be a complete fiasco and the low margins of profit
generated  by  the  dairy  production  were  not  sufficient  to  match  the  high  expenditures
required for the new investments.  The strategy to be pursued at that stage was to resort to
the public market and conduct what is referred to as a reverse merger348, which was achieved
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by acquiring 51% of Finanziaria Centro Nord, a public company whose stock was traded on
the Milan Stock Exchange.  This transaction gave Tanzi the opportunity to access the public
market with the new corporate vehicle – Parmalat Finanziaria SpA – of which he maintained
control.349  The merger served several purposes, firstly, obtaining funds without a dilution of
ownership and secondly, incurring less costs and thirdly, a lower degree of disclosure than a
direct IPO would have entailed.350 
It was that Parmalat’s  managers began cooking the books, making in other words major
adjustments to the accounts in order to give a healthier image of the company.  This practice
was  carried  out  by  forging  documents  and  through  a  variety  of  transactions  whereby
fabricated  receivables  recordable  as  assets  were  sold  to  SPVs.351  Off-balance  sheet
financing, in the form of securitisation, became in this phase a common tool for Parmalat’s
CFO Fausto Tonna, to hide losses and create accounting dumps.352  This mechanism needed
to be nourished because of the amount of interest  rates to be paid on the various loans.
Parmalat went on pursuing its policy of issuing bonds, but when in 2002 they issued a €306
million convertible bond which caused their stock price to fall.  Market observers353 started
to wonder why Parmalat was borrowing, adding debt at a high rate, when its books showed
profits and cash available for €1.4 million.354  In 2003 CONSOB355 increased its controls on
the group, following a negative stock market reaction to another attempt to issue bonds. 
The fall in stock price was related to a poor quality of disclosure that characterised Parmalat
management  and  the  relationship  with  those  gatekeepers  who  were  trying  to  acquire
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information.356  This attitude forced the group to attend a meeting with both CONSOB and
Banca d’Italia in order to explain their policy and clarify the reasons behind the strategy of
issuing bonds at very unfavourable conditions.  At the meeting they announced that the CFO
had resigned and a  new one had been appointed,  Alberto  Ferraris,  a  former  Citi  Group
employee.  This move was essential to the group’s strategy since the new CFO, thanks to his
contacts  in  the  banking  industry,  launched  a  wave  a  private  placements,  procuring  the
services of Bank of America and Deutsche Bank.357  The investment banks’ help did not
solve  Parmalat’s  troubles;  when  Deutsche  Bank  announced  a  new private  placement  in
September 2003 Standard & Poor lowered the group’s credit rating to a level just above junk
status.358  When the company was requested  by CONSOB to be more explicit  about  its
accounts, more pressure mounted on the auditors, especially on the external ones Deloitte.
They stated that they were not in a position to give a fairness opinion of Parmalat’s true
value, since there was a grey area represented by a mutual fund in which the group had
participation and by some complex swap transactions with the fund itself.  Another finding
came to light as one of the group’s subsidiaries had entered into an obscure contract with a
SPV created by Citi Group: Buconero.359  
Parmalat’s agony came to an end when in December 2003 some of the bonds were due and
the company publicly  declared  that  they could not  service them.   The credit  rating  was
downgraded to junk status and Grant Thornton, acting as second auditor, was requested by
CONSOB to investigate  on a company in the Cayman Islands called Bonlat,  which was
supposed to hold €3.95 billion of the group’s cash.  As said at the beginning of this account,
the fraud unfolded at this stage.360  Enrico Bondi was appointed commissioner; his attempt to
try to establish the true status of the group’s consolidated balances, brought to a shocking
result: there were debts for €14.3 billion and a complete lack of liquidity, which sharply
contrasted  with  the  group’s  latest  balance  sheet.   As  the  group’s  insolvency  procedure
started, litigations commenced both on the criminal side in 2004, and on the civil side in
2005,  involving  27  defendants  and  some  7000  investors  as  plaintiffs.361  The  corporate
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governance structure of the Parmalat group was contravention with the principles dictated by
the Milan Stock Exchange.  Independent directors had no incentive whatsoever to perform
their  duties  and provide an objective  standpoint  on the business,  because they had been
nominated thanks to personal ties with Mr Tanzi.  Those directors had no expertise to cover
that  type  of  position  and  to  dig  into  the  group’s  intricate  business;  this  made  them
acquiescent to Tanzi’s decisions.362  The audit committee and the remuneration committee’s
members were linked to the group’s ownership and this hindered any effective mechanism of
checks and balances.363  Another reason for the lack of non-executives supervision can be
found in the absence of derivative litigation in Italy364, since directors can only face lawsuits
from bankruptcy receivers and that narrows the field of application for that remedy.365 
Tanzi who had a high school diploma, covered the posts of both Chairman and CEO, and the
CFO Fausto Tonna had similar qualifications.366  This made the board dependent on advice
provided by external consultants, like lawyers, accountants and investment bankers, who all
played an important role in the frauds, since they masterminded the strategies that led to the
financial collapse.367  It is worth reiterating that the second tier board, a feature of European
corporate governance, was never effective at Parmalat in its duties of monitoring audit and
accounts.   In  1975  a  Company  Law  reform  transferred  the  audit  functions  of  listed
companies to external auditors.368  In 1998, another reform related to listed companies was
enacted,  limiting the statutory auditors’ functions to two areas: firstly, the supervision of
company’s  compliance  with  relevant  laws  and  statutes;  secondly,  the  monitoring  of
company’s management, regard to standards of good management and to organisational and
management structures.369  In order to limit  the board’s complacency towards controlling
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shareholders, the reform mandated that listed companies introduced clauses in the articles of
association  that  enabled  minority  shareholders  to  appoint  a  statutory  auditor  if  they
represented  a  significant  stake.   At  Parmalat,  this  rule  was  circumvented  because  the
required threshold set in the articles of association was 3%, and it was not met.370  It has been
observed371 that  the  Italian  rules  related  to  corporate  governance  are  as  strict  as  those
provided under English and American Law.  The Milan Stock Exchange issued corporate
governance recommendations to which listed companies have to either comply or explain.  
Substantive rules should not be regarded as the main issue of this corporate failure, but what
marked a difference with the legal scenario of some common law jurisdictions is the role of
enforcement.372  Because of the absence of a real deterrent upon directors, both in terms of
derivative litigation and class action, the governance issue falls back on gatekeepers.  The
involvement  of  market  players  like  Grant  Thornton,  Deloitte,  Citi  Group  and  Bank  of
America in  the actions  brought by the Commissioner  is  a  sign of  the central  role  these
professionals had, both for Parmalat and for investors.373  The issues related to gatekeepers’
role and their presumed incentive to monitor their clients and perform a service in the public
interest have been examined in the previous section with regards to Enron.374  
In 1998, the group faced the problem of having to choose new auditors, which at that time
may have meant revealing to third parties the true picture of the company’s status and the
purpose  of  some  of  the  transactions  in  place.375  The  solution  came  from  two  Grant
Thornton’s partners who suggested creating a new shield, the famous Bonlat, a subsidiary
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, which could be certified by Grant Thornton, acting as
second auditor.  Bonlat started being used as a wastebasket, thanks to the cooperation of the
primary audit firm, the newly appointed Deloitte.376  As it has been acknowledged by the
 Art. 2403 (1) Civil Code.  
370




 Ibid p.26-28.  
373
 Ibid p.31,32. 
374
 Supra Coffee 2002. 
375
 Supra Ferrarini and Giudici 2005, p.27. 
376
91
CONSOB investigation377, Grant Thornton’s controls were lacking and the audit firm had a
reputation – thanks to its involvement in the Cirio scandal previously – for playing a central
part in letting its clients pursue accounting irregularities.  Although auditor’s independence
and exclusivity of their service are considered central in the new approach towards auditing
functions within most jurisdictions, this concept has been thwarted by the peculiar way in
which  consulting  firms  organise  their  structure.378  Deloitte  had  been  investigated  with
regards to a transaction in which the Malta branch was involved in an inter-company loan
between  Bonlat  and  another  subsidiary.   Allegedly  the  investigation  brought  to  light
Deloitte’s  lax  attitude  towards  the  transaction  and  overall  towards  several  similar
operations.379  It appears that firms auditing Parmalat were ineffective and acquiescent in
their  roles  of  watchdogs,  since  their  prime  concern  was  to  acquire  more  profitable
consultancy services.380  Those among the auditors who raised red flags about information
provided by Parmalat or because of transactions carried out, were removed or disregarded.381
A substantial part of Parmalat’s narrative is concerned with the analysis of certain practices
and transactions conceived by management and external advisors to raise funds and to keep
the group’s accounts look healthy from the market’s perspective.  Whether the techniques
adopted  can  be  singled  out  as  corporate  finance  is  doubtful,  since  setting  up  fictitious
transactions has little to do with finance.382  
Parmalat started having financial problems well before its final bankruptcy.  Resorting to the
capital  markets was the only way to keep the business running; this design, entailed the
distortion of several  financial  tools  and the adoption of aggressive and risky managerial
practices.  In the 1980s the group had to start adjusting its balance sheet in order to obtain a
better  rating  when  issuing  bonds  on  the  stock  market;  this  was  done  by  establishing  a
number of wholly-owned off-shore vehicles that were conceived as a tool to absorb group’s
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losses through fictitious asset sales.383  It came to be known that through these strategies
around €1.5 billion of non-existing assets were absorbed by various SPVs, up until 1998.
Under the professional advice of Grant Thornton, Bonlat Financing was created as a further
shell entity.384  Transactions were recorded on Parmalat’s accounts as liabilities for Bonlat
and as assets for Parmalat.  Since Bonlat was part of the group and its financial statement
had to be included in the consolidated group account, Bonlat had to show some active entry
in order to offset its debts to the parent company.  This was achieved by the management in
a way: by forging documents confirming the execution of fictitious transactions involving
other companies within the group.385  Through the scientific approach to cooking the books,
coupled  with  a  fake  bank  account  created  at  Bank  of  America,  Bonlat’s  non-existing,
worthless assets were siphoned to $7 billion by 2002.386  
When Bonlat’s accounts started to get out of hands, Parmalat management resorted to a new
device, the Epicurum fund, set up under Grant Thornton’s and Mr Zini’s initiative.387  The
core function of this  fund based in the Cayman Islands was to create  the appearance of
financial  activities and to conceal the misappropriation of funds carried out by the Tanzi
family.  Parmalat’s participation in the fund was itself fictitious since it resulted from the
sale to Epicurum of €500 million of Bonlat’s credits from Parmatour.388  The obscurity of
transactions related to this particular entity helped the authorities to discover the fraud, when
in 2003 Deloitte announced that it had failed to certify Parmalat’s financial statement due to
the lack  of  information  concerning the  relationship  between Parmalat  and the  Epicurum
fund.389
Another subsidiary which raised concerns as to the genesis and scope of its operations was
Buconero, an entity conceived by the Citigroup management who proposed to Parmalat a
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structured finance transaction centred around a subsidiary they incorporated in Delaware:
Buconero LLC.  This company remained under the direct control of Citigroup, despite being
a financing vehicle for the Parmalat group.390  Buconero entered into a joint venture with a
Swiss  subsidiary  of  the  group,  contributing  €117  million  to  the  partnership  which  the
subsidiary intended to use to make inter-company loans to other entities within the group.
Parmalat in fact recorded the amounts contributed by Buconero as equity, but Citibank had
conceived  the  transaction  as  a  way  to  give  the  bank  a  bond-like  rate  of  return,  while
effectively shielding it from a loss on the investment.391  While those amounts should have
been recorded as debt instead of equity, this would not have served the usual purpose of
overstating Parmalat’s equity and understating its debt.392 
If  structured finance had become an over-complicated  business  at  Enron,  where obscure
derivatives transactions were being carried out, at Parmalat the same goals were achieved
through more simple and traditional means.  Firstly, fictitious transactions were taking place.
Parmalat reported that it had purchased and retired $3.39 billion of its outstanding debt; that
was achieved by forging bank documents stating that Bonlat repurchased $3.39 billion of
debt  issued  by  another  Parmalat’s  subsidiary.   The  debt  remained  outstanding  was  not
mirrored in the financial statement that once again was giving a false image of the group’s
financial status.393  Secondly, Parmalat resorted to the use of double billing in order to inflate
assets and obtain liquidity.  This scheme helped the group raising huge amounts of money
since the fake invoices  were being securitised and further liquidity  obtained by banks.394
Thirdly, a device employed to understate debt was to mischaracterise bank debts as inter-
company debts, since the latter does not appear on consolidated financial statements, unlike
debts owed to third parties.395  It  can be recognised that a multitude of techniques were
employed in order to alter the financial statement of the group.  If in the USA gatekeepers
were in a way deceived by a market bubble, by the sophisticated employment of structured
finance and by the excessive flexibility of accounting rules, their counterparts in Italy played
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a more vital role in the scandal, since for a much longer time and to a higher degree they
were contributing to hiding frauds and at the same time to their perpetration.  This can serve
as explanation as to the rationale of recent reforms, which in Italy have been concentrated
around the role and position of gatekeepers rather than on accounting rules.396 
Despite different ownership structures and antipodeans corporate cultures, the accounts of
Enron and Parmalat showed surprising convergence.   Even more striking is the extent to
which  both  firms’  financial  strategies  revolved around  the  abuse  of  debt  capital  market
finance,  and  more  around  a  complex  web  of  structured  transactions  involving  remote
offshore entities which all in all contributed to the apparent success of the two corporations
and to their collapse.397  The persistence of similar corporate finance strategies, despite a
rather  divergent  underlying  financial  environment  in  the  US and Italy,  is  an element  of
concern and it justifies some of the criticisms towards the intrinsic dangers and instability of
stock  market  finance.   Shareholder  sovereignty  was  pursued  in  both  contexts  and  it
inevitably led to the unrestrained application of takeovers as the ultimate means to achieve
shareholder democracy and alleged control over management.398  
Parmalat’s  rise as one of the largest Italian corporations was consequential  to a wave of
acquisitions that were backed by debt that the group was never able to recover because of the
limited margin of profit of its core business.399  Going public became for Parmalat a means to
stay afloat by concealing a problematic financial status through accounting manipulations
and by issuing bonds on the basis of inflated share value.  The fraud was conceived as a way
to survive, as a temporary solution in order to weather out financial difficulties.400  Enron’s
rapid growth was driven by an innovative approach towards the energy business, helped to a
great extent by the industry deregulation in the USA.  The corporate finance strategies came
to have the same prominent role they had at Parmalat because through off-balance sheet
financing the management dumped bad assets into the archipelago of off-shore entities; this
helped inflating the company’s stock price and creating a more successful image through the
lens of capital markets.  It needs to be repeated that all this was exacerbated by perverse
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governance mechanisms where distorted incentives in the shape of stock options played a
central part in pushing top executives to pursue aggressive strategies.401  
While  regulatory  responses  were  enacted  in  the  US and in  the  EU as  a  reaction  to  the
scandals, other areas of law escaped legislative correction.  In hindsight though, some of the
legal issues characterising Enron and Parmalat remained unanswered as they found a clear
echo in the events that underscored the more recent global crisis.  The abuse of debt capital
market  finance,  clearly  identified  with  the  securitisation  process  and  with  CRAs’  self-
regulatory  structure,  has  become  post  2008  a  more  defined  cause  of  modern  financial
scandals.  The undisputed reliance on market forces led regulators  post-Enron to leave the
process of financial innovation unrestrained and largely unregulated.  With regards to the
specific  role  played by gatekeepers  in the above scandals,  legislation  enacted after  2002
introduced more stringent rules for the regulation of the relationship between advisors and
clients.   What  remained  deficient  was  the  statutory  legitimisation  that  auditors  lack  in
performing their functions.  While auditors and rating agencies have come to perform an
institutional and regulatory role, since they audit and rate their clients in the public interest,
they lack a legal and democratic legitimisation for this role.402  
Both scandals  expose the limits  and dangers  of shareholder  value.   The accounts of the
Enron and Parmalat scandals provided a dimension to the corporate governance and they
provided a platform for a comparative examination of some of the main control issues.  The
two corporations  epitomised  different  corporate  cultures  reflected  in  divergent  corporate
governance structures and arrangements.  We are going to examine that the failure of some
banks was due to the negligence of the management. 
Barings Bank
At the  sudden collapse  of  a  leading  British  investment  bank  stood  a  28-year-old  trader
named Nicholas W. Leeson, a Briton who in the course of less than two years lost more than
a £842 million a caused the bank to fail.   Working in Singapore for Barings P.L.C.,  an
investment house that had survived nearly two and a half centuries of ups and downs, Mr.
Leeson eluded detection by his own firm and by outside regulators as he made an ever-
mounting and ill-fated gamble on Japanese stock prices and interest rates.403  
In London, the British Government ordered an urgent inquiry.  In an interview with The
Financial Times, Peter Baring, the firm's chairman, speculated that Barings could have been
brought down by a deliberate act of criminal sabotage.  But he said the bank did not know
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what had happened. Mr. Leeson, who had succeeded in the arcane business of derivatives
despite  having  failed  his  high-school-level  math  exams,  disappeared  from  his  post  in
Singapore, just before the firm discovered the huge loss.  He was reported to be in Kuala
Lumpur.  One - a bet that Japanese stock prices would rise - involved the purchase of futures
contracts representing $7 billion worth of shares.  The other was a bet that interest rates
would rise,  and it  took the form of contracts  representing $22 billion worth of Japanese
government bonds and currency investments.  There have been disputes within Barings in
the short period about whether the Singapore operation was adequately supervised.  Some
officials questioned whether the Barings banking subsidiary, which oversees the derivatives
business,  had  enough  expertise  to  monitor  the  situation  properly.   Mr.  Leeson  had  no
reputation within Barings as a risk taker.  Coming from a lower-middle-class family north of
London, he had become quite successful since joining Barings three years earlier making big
but ostensibly safe investments that sought to profit on the tiny differences between what
identical financial instruments sold for in Japan and Singapore.404 
Mr. Leeson changed tactics. Instead of matching buy and sell orders, he in effect became
purely a buyer.  Throughout the period Japanese stock prices were falling, creating losses
that Mr. Leeson apparently tried to cover by increasing the size of his bet. Mr. Leeson's
dealings, were primarily purchases of futures contracts on the Singapore exchange.  They
were less exotic  than the complex derivatives cooked up by some banks and investment
firms.  Because the purchases required only a small  down payment - 10 percent or less,
traders said - Mr. Leeson was able to amass a position large enough to excite  comment
throughout Asian financial markets about his aggressive strategy, analysts said, even as his
trading was going unnoticed by regulators.  There are reports that Mr. Leeson used another
complex strategy called a straddle, which amounted to a bet that the Japanese stock market
index would stay essentially level.  When regulators first tried to assess the extent of the
damage, they calculated that of the $650 million in losses they could identify at that point,
$500 million was attributable to the bet on stock prices, with the remainder from the interest-
rate bet.  If, as expected, Barings defaults on the contracts as they mature, the Singapore
exchange and its clearing corporation was liable to pay the counterparties - the investors who
made the opposite bet and stand to gain what Barings had lost.  The Singapore exchange
became a creditor of Barings, to be repaid based on how much Barings and its various parts
bring when they were sold.  As all of the contracts remained open and vulnerable to further
losses from drops in Tokyo share prices or declines in interest rates.  Perhaps it was the
inherent lack of risk in such trading that prompted people to not be concerned about Leeson
wearing multiple hats.  Leeson took unauthorized speculative positions primarily in futures
linked to the Nikkei 225 and Japanese government bonds (JGB) as well as options on the
Nikkei.  He hid his trading in an unused BSS error account, number 88888.  Exactly why
Leeson was speculating is unclear.405  However, Leeson started actively trading in the 88888
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account as soon as he arrived in Singapore.  He lost money from the beginning.  Increasing
his bets only made him lose more money.406  A year later, this had mushroomed to GBP
23MM.  By the end of 1994, Leeson's 88888 account had lost  a total  of GBP 208MM.
Barings  management  remained  blithely  unaware.   On  February  23,  1995,  Nick  Leeson
hopped on a plane to Kuala Lumpur leaving behind a GBP 827MM hole in the Barings
balance sheet. 
By February 1995, Leeson had accumulated an enormous position - half the open interest in
the Nikkei future and 85% of the open interest in the JGB future.  The market was aware of
this and probably traded against him. Prior to 1995, he made consistently bad bets.  The fact
that he was so unlucky should not be too much of a surprise.  Traders sometimes speculate
without authorization.  Leeson made headlines precisely because he was so unlucky.  By the
time he was discovered, he had bankrupted his employer.  What is amazing about Leeson's
activities  is  that  he  was  able  to  accumulate  such  staggering  losses  without  Barings'
management noticing.407  Leeson needed cash.  By falsifying accounts and making various
misrepresentations,  he  was  able  to  secure  funding  from  various  companies  within  the
Barings organization and from client accounts.  His misrepresentations were flimsy at best.
He claimed that he needed funds to make margin payments on behalf of BSS clients, and he
gave a technical argument related to how the SIMEX collected margin as justification.  This
claim was false.  
Despite his having to fund millions of GBP in losses, there were various factors that allowed
Leeson to avoid discovery.  There was a merger going on between two parts of the Barings
organization.  Barings had acquired stock brokerage Henderson Crosthwaite in 1984, which
became BSL.  BSL was run as a separate company from the banking business, which was
called Baring Brothers and Company (BB&Co.).  In November 1993, BSL was merged into
BB&Co. in anticipation of a subsequent initiative to form a Barings Investment Bank (BIB).
The merger was not easy because the two firms had different cultures.  It was a distraction
right  in  the  middle  of  Leeson's  tenure  at  BSL.   Barings  was  starting  to  form  a  risk
management function.  Risk controllers were appointed in London, Tokyo and Hong Kong
during 1994, but not in Singapore.  In BSS, Leeson effectively controlled the front and back
offices.  There was no middle office.  There was no single person within Barings responsible
for supervising Leeson.  As part of the 1993 reorganization, Barings had adopted a matrix
approach  to  management  of  its  offices.   There  was  one  reporting  structure  based  upon
products  that  cut  across all  offices.   Another  was based upon operations,  ensuring local
management  of  such items  as  systems,  controls,  settlement  and accounting.   Employees
complained that lines of reporting were not always clear.  
 He claims that he used the 88888 account to hide some embarrassing losses resulting from mistakes made by his traders.  
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Leeson was involved with two products—futures arbitrage and trade execution for clients or
other companies within the Barings organization.  During 1994, his product line of reporting
could arguably have been to either Ron Baker, who managed derivatives, or Mike Killian,
head of Global Futures and Options Sales.  Leeson could have reported to James Bax, who
was head of the Singapore office, or to Simon Jones, who was Regional Operations Manager
for South East Asia.  Another issue was that Leeson was an accomplished liar.408  Leeson
was somewhat of a celebrity within Barings.  While he was accumulating losses in account
88888, he was publicly recording profits in three arbitrage trading accounts, numbers 92000,
98007 and 98008.  This was accomplished through cross-trades with account 88888.  By
performing futures transactions at off-market prices, Leeson was able to achieve profits in
the arbitrage accounts while placing offsetting losses in the 88888 account.409  
Peter Baring, Chairman of Barings, commented to Brian Quinn, Director of the Bank of
England that: the recovery in profitability has been amazing following the reorganization,
leaving Barings to conclude that it was not terribly difficult to make money in the securities
markets.  Six days after fleeing Singapore, Leeson was arrested in Frankfurt trying to make
his way back to London.  He was returned to Singapore to stand trial.  Convicted of fraud, he
was sentenced to six and a half years in Singapore's Changi prison.  For good behavior, he
was released from prison in July 1999.410  Banks learned one lesson and forgot another.
Barings’ collapse showed that banks should be either small or big: there is no security in the
middle ground.  Proprietary trading is a game only for big banks that have deep pockets.
When these banks take huge daily positions in foreign-exchange markets, they are gambling:
they cannot know whether the price is going to rise or fall.  The only people who benefit
from the proprietary positions taken by the big banks are the staff and the shareholders, who
receive bonuses and dividends.  The customers whose interests are at risk receive no benefits
at all.411  This case appears that there was poor corporate governance and as a result the bank
was collapsed.
ING, a Dutch bank, purchased Barings Bank in 1995 for the nominal sum of £1 and assumed
all of Barings'  liabilities, forming the subsidiary ING Barings. In 2001, ING sold the U.S.-
based operations to ABN Amro for $275 million, and folded the rest of ING Barings into its
European banking division.412
408
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Allfirst Bank 
A former currency trader accused of hiding over £700m in losses at the Allfirst bank in the
US pleaded guilty to one of the largest bank fraud cases in US history.  Rusnak cooperated
with the investigation.  US Attorney Thomas DiBiagio said the investigation was continuing
into the huge fraud scandal,  but he said authorities  had no other  suspects.   Rusnak was
indicted in June in the biggest bank fraud case since Nick Leeson, a trader in Singapore for
Barings Bank, lost millions on future trades, leading to Barings’ 1995 collapse.
Rusnak allegedly ran up the losses at Allfirst Financial over five years, mostly from trading
Japanese yen.413  While trying to recoup those losses, he dug himself a deeper hole by taking
ever-larger  risks.   Rusnak evaded detection  by entering  false  information  on the  bank’s
books and records about his trading activity.  He created fictitious trades that appeared to
create assets to offset liabilities.  Prosecutors said Rusnak did not directly profit from the
trading  losses,  but  by  manipulating  Allfirst’s  computerized  system  for  tracking  trading
activities, they said he was able to generate a record appearing to show profits for the bank
between 1997 and 2001.  A judge will determine that based on a balance between the harm
caused to the victims and Rusnak’s ability to pay.  Rusnak had faced a maximum sentence of
30 years in prison and a €1m fine.  Leeson served 3 1/2 years of a 6 1/2-year sentence before
his release from jail in 1998.  AIB, based in Dublin, announced a proposal to sell Allfirst to
New York State based M&T Bank Corp. AIB denied at the time that the currency trading
scandal had anything to do with the sale. John Rusnak, an employee of AIB's Baltimore-
based Allfirst Financial subsidiary dubbed Mr Middle America for his apparently average
lifestyle, ran up huge trading losses over an 18 months period up to December in what the
company called a complex, determined fraud done on the basis of conspiracy.  
After allegedly going to ground, Mr Rusnak appeared at his home in an up market Baltimore
suburb where he lived with his wife and two children.  It was unclear whether Mr Rusnak
and any accomplices  had gained personally  from rogue trading,  or  whether  the massive
losses were merely the result of incompetence.  He allegedly bought foreign currencies that
later fell in value and in a deception reminiscent of Nick Leeson, who brought down Barings
- attempted to cover up the trades by setting up fictitious deals that appeared to offset the
loss-making contracts.  AIB said it would have been hard to violate its internal company
controls in this way without collusion internally and externally, and has suspended five staff
at  Allfirst  who were  responsible  for  monitoring  Mr Rusnak.   The bank's  annual  profits
reduced by 60 per cent to 596m euros ($1.2b).414  Analysts had mixed reactions to the news,
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with some seeing it as a major black spot while others said AIB, because of its size, could
absorb the loss.  KBC Securities, saying AIB 2001 profit would be cut 60%, lowered its
rating to reduce from accumulate.  But SG Securities said the market had over-reacted in
selling the share down, and maintained a buy recommendation.  Deutsche Bank upgraded the
stock to buy from market perform and set a target price of €12.9.  Experts said banking
controls would come under the spotlight.  The industry had hoped it had closed the gaps laid
bare by Barings's collapse.415  AIB said Rusnak was part of a two-person foreign exchange
trading operation at Allfirst that had annual revenue of less than $10 million.   It did not
identify the other person, but said he had not been suspended.  Allied Irish said it had halted
foreign exchange trading at Allfirst and suspended several executives and confirmed that the
deals  had  been  in  dollar/yen.   Finance  Director  Gary  Kennedy  has  said  the  bank  had
unwound the fraudulent positions and a bank spokesman confirmed that all the positions had
been closed.  This case appears that there was poor corporate governance and as a result the
bank management showed very less supervision.
BCCI
BCCI’s unique criminal structure – an elaborate corporate spider-web with BCCI’s founder,
Agha Hassan Abedi and his assistant, Swaleh Naqvi, in the middle – was a component of its
spectacular growth, and the cause of its eventual collapse.416  There was no relationship more
central to BCCI's existence from its inception than that between BCCI and Sheikh Zayed and
the ruling family of Abu Dhabi.  Abu Dhabi was present at BCCI's creation as one of two
providers of BCCI's capital.  It was BCCI's largest depositor, and its largest borrower, and
for most  of BCCI's  existence,  its  largest shareholder.   The relationship between the two
entities was, as Price Waterhouse told the Bank of England days before BCCI's closure, with
BCCI  providing  services  to  the  ruling  family  of  Abu  Dhabi  far  beyond  the  ordinary
relationship of a bank to either its shareholders or depositors.  There are numerous examples
of the centrality of the Abu Dhabi relationship to BCCI, and its unusual nature.  In January,
1978,  when  BCCI  decided  to  enter  the  United  States  and  purchase  shares  in  Financial
General  Bankshares,  and needed  two additional  names,  the  ruling  family  of  Abu Dhabi
supplied them.417 
 Shares in the company fell as much as 23 per cent in early trading but recovered ground as the City hardened in the view that the 
$US750m was a one-off.  They closed down 17 per cent, leaving the bank valued at £6.1b ($20.6b). The FTSE 100 index fell to a seven-
week low of 5,073.8.
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Throughout  the  1970's  and  1980's,  the  Abu  Dhabi  ruling  family  and  the  Abu  Dhabi
government placed billions of dollars in deposits at BCCI and its affiliates.  In 1990, when
accountants  and regulators in the United Kingdom found fraud at  BCCI, the Abu Dhabi
ruling family and government stepped in again,  agreeing to buy the bank, assert control,
guarantee its losses, replace BCCI's head with the head of its own BCCI affiliate, the Bank
of  Credit  and  Commerce  Emirates  (BCCE),  move  BCCI's  operations  and  records  from
London to Abu Dhabi, and work on a plan to find a way to save the bank despite its having
acknowledged mishandling at least $2.2 billion of Abu Dhabi's money.  By July 5, 1991,
when BCCI was closed globally, the Government of Abu Dhabi, its ruling family, and an
investment  company  holding  the  assets  of  the  ruling  family,  were  the  controlling,  and
official  majority  shareholders  of  BCCI  owning  77  percent  of  the  bank.   But  since  the
remaining 23 percent was held by nominees, Abu Dhabi was in fact BCCI's sole owner.
After July 5, 1991, it was in Abu Dhabi that most of BCCI's top officials remained, where
they remain under the control of the Abu Dhabi government, under conditions said to be
luxurious, which the Abu Dhabi government refuses to discuss.  
The Bank of Credit  and Commerce International  Plc (BCCI),  an international  bank with
branches in over 70 countries, collapsed in July 1991.418  The bank had been founded by
Agha Hasan Abedi in 1972, and was managed until its failure by Agha Hasan and Swaleh
Naqvi, an early associate.419  The collapse was traced to a situation in which the executives
started falsifying BCCI’s accounts in order to hide the financial difficulty that was occurring
within one of its customers, the Gulf Group.  This led to a liquidity problem in the bank.
There were allegations that BCCI became involved in money laundering activities on behalf
of drug dealers in Columbia, resulting in the arrest of some officials of the bank in Florida,
United  States  in  October  1988.420  The  United Kingdom  Prime  Minister  at  the  time
commissioned Lord Justice Bingham to report on the events that led to the collapse and the
report published in 1992 indicted the auditors, Price Waterhouse for creating an avenue for
conflict of interest by acting as both auditors and consultants to BCCI.  The Bingham Report
criticised the Bank of England, for lacking in its supervisory role.  The blame on the Bank of
England was valid as it should have been obvious to anyone much earlier than 1991, when
the Bank of England chose to wind down operations at the bank, that there were issues at
BCCI which needed investigation, especially  with the arrest of the BCCI officials  in the
United States in 1988.  The behavior of the company directors was in issue as was evident
from their actions.  The UK Companies Act 1985 specified in its section 221 (1) that every
company  shall  keep  accounting  records  which  disclose  with reasonable  accuracy  the
financial  position  of  the  company  at  any  time.   The directors  at  BCCI  disobeyed  this
418






requirement.  It is against established rules for a company to engage in money laundering421,
and so the directors at BCCI who indulged in and approved this activity can be described as
persons  who  lack  integrity.422  This  case  appears  that  there  were  no  good  corporate
governance and as a result the bank was collapsed due to inadequate supervision.
The British government set up an independent inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Bingham, in
1992. Its House of Commons Paper, Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International, was published in October of that year. Following the report, BCCI
liquidators Deloitte Touche filed suit against the Bank of England for £850m, claiming that
the Bank was guilty of misfeasance in public office. The suit lasted 12 years. It ended in
November 2005, when Deloitte withdrew its claims after England's High Court ruled that it
was "no longer in the best interests of creditors" for the litigation to continue.423 Deloitte
eventually paid the Bank of England £73m for its legal costs.
Lehman Brothers
The story of  Lehman Brothers  is  a  case in  which disobedience  of established rules and
principles contributed to the company’s failure.  The Lehman Examiners’ Report states that
there  are  legitimate  claims  against  the  CEO,  CFO and  other  officers  who  oversaw and
certified  misleading  financial  statements  which  in  turn  contributed  to  the  demise  of  the
company.424  There was falsification of financial  records and there were instances of the
Lehman  Brothers  officers  exhibiting  inappropriate  behavior,  an  example  of  which  was
terminating the employment of one of its staff who blew the whistle on certain accounting
abuses.   Section  401 of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  provides  for  disclosures  relating  to  off
balance  sheet  items,  the  Lehman  Brothers  directors  flouted  that  rule  and  this  was  a
contributory element to the failure.  If the directors at Lehman Brothers had been persons
who were prone to obeying rules, they would have abided by the provisions of the Sarbanes-




 The collapse of BCCI created financial losses for a large number of individuals, employees, companies, local authorities, and 
countries.  
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terminating the employment of a whistle blower is an indication of a situation in which the
executives were involved in wrong doings and were taking steps to cover up their actions.
The Lehman Examiners’ Report analyses in the events that led to the failure and one of the
significant  issues raised is that Lehman’s financial  problems and the consequences to its
creditors and shareholders were exacerbated by Lehman executives whose conduct ranged
from  serious  but  non-culpable  errors  of  business  judgment  to  actionable  balance  sheet
manipulation.426  The  behavior  of  the  directors  was  a  major  contributory  factor  to  the
Lehman Brothers failure.  This corporate failure became the largest bankruptcy proceeding
ever  filed  as  at  September  2008.427  Even  though  Lehman  Brothers  took  out  insurance
policies to indemnify the company and executives for liability and settlements arising from
law suits, the economic and social losses accruing from the failure was enormous.428
While the roots of Lehman Brothers lie in a dry goods business founded by two German-
born brothers in Alabama in 1844 who later moved into the banking sector, the emergence of
the  present-day  investment  bank  can  be  traced  back  to  1990s  when  Richard  Fuld  was
appointed president and CEO.  Under his leadership Lehman started to push its business
beyond traditional investment banking schemes, moving aggressively into the new patterns
of financial markets and into the subprime securitisation market.429  Fuld’s managerial style
came soon to prominence for his authoritarian manners as well as for the aggressive culture
that was characterising at that time most rival investment banks and was aiming at closing
the gap with the two main rivals and market leaders, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.430
By mid 1990s Lehman had established itself as a leader in the market for mortgage-backed
securities and, riding the wave of the US housing boom, it acquired five mortgage firms,
among which BNC in California and Aurora Loan Services in Colorado, that contributed to
generate record revenues in the capital markets amounting to a faster rate of growth than any
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propelled by the employment of new securitisation techniques, by CDO and CDS contracts,
whose relatively poor understanding on the part of Fuld as regards relating risks and long-
term consequences, proved critical for the firm.  His lack of sophistication on new financial
instruments and his background as a bond trader all explained certain reactions to market
trends and to the way Lehman approached the market in the years preceding the crisis.432  
Between  2005  and  2006  Lehman  became  the  largest  producer  of  securities  based  on
subprime  mortgages;  in  2007,  although  cracks  in  the  US  housing  market  had  become
apparent, the firm’s philosophy remained aggressive and based on anything to make the deal
ethos  that  led  Lehman  to  getting  stuck  in  bonds  and  CDOs  that  could  not  pass  on.433
Lehman’s new investments turned out to be as toxic as the older ones, creating more bad
debts on the ailing company’s books.434  Lehman’s position worsened in 2008, as its shares
fell in response to the failure of two Bear Stearns hedge funds and to the near collapse of the
bank itself.  It has been suggested that the high level of leverage and the huge portfolio of
mortgage securities made the investment bank vulnerable to market fluctuations.  Investment
banks were looked at suspiciously by some investors as a number of features of their capital
structure were pointed out.435  They had been using half of their revenue for compensations,
which implied that employees maintained a strong incentive to increase the level of leverage
and overall to pursue short-term strategies.  As regards Lehman, it was observed that their
leverage was 44:1, meaning that if the firm’s assets fell by 1% that would imply a loss of
almost half of Lehman’s equity.436  Lehman’s assets were a matter of concern, especially as
investors were trying to assess the value of the firm’s exposures at the outset of the market
collapse;  the picture  that  came out  was not  one characterised  by transparency,  probably
because responses in such direction would not have inspired market confidence.437 
Fuld seemed to believe that Lehman could weather out any storms and while other firms
were  reporting  heavy  losses,  Lehman  was  declaring  profits  of  several  hundred  million
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dollars for the first quarter of 2008, with the rating agencies maintaining their full support
for the bank’s operations until its end.  Rumours of the firm covering up its losses started to
become stronger  among  investors  and this  proved to  be  determinant  as  the  crisis  grew
deeper and fear mounted as to the real extent of the firm liabilities.438  The way in which
losses were concealed at Lehman deserves special annotation because of the transactions
employed and the general support the bank received by various gatekeepers.  It has been
reported  that  $49bn  had  been  shifted  off-balance  sheet  through  a  process  called
“repo105”439, a transaction designed to hide the bank’s level of leverage and with little or no
economic  rationale.440  Lehman’s  auditors  Ernst  &  Young  expressed  confidence  in  the
bank’s accounts after the audit they conducted in 2007.  It can be noted that their confidence
was corroborated by a legal opinion provided by Linklaters, stating that “repo105” could be
treated as sales under English law.441  By using a legal opinion that was valid only with
regards  to  English  law,  Lehman  managed  to  keep billion  of  dollars  of  debt  off  its  US
balance sheet.442  
As  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Henry  Paulson  emphasised  Lehman’s  difficult  economic
position and the urgency to find a buyer, initial attempts to reach deals with Goldman Sachs,
Bank of America and Morgan Stanley, came to nothing, despite the Federal Reserve having
helped with a huge loan.443  By the time Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were nationalised with
an infusion of around $200bn by the Treasury, Fuld was desperate to raise capital in order to
appeal potential buyers, but at that stage he failed to meet requirements set respectively by
Korea Development Bank, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase.  A last throw of the dice was
represented by Barclays’ interest in taking over the Wall Street bank, but at that stage the
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British counterpart was conditioning the offer upon a heavy US guarantee against Lehman’s
liabilities, and as it turned out, the US government made clear that it would not proceed to
another bailout after  Bear Stearns had previously benefited from such support.444  When
Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11 in September 2008 the event became somewhat of a
public outcry of the freefall collapse of the capitalist order, as hundreds of employees were
filmed  outside  the  New  York  office,  leaving  the  premises  with  boxes  full  of  their
belongings.  Responses around the world’s main stock markets saw plunging indexes and
the NYSE was hit by news, this time of Merrill Lynch collapse saved by a Bank of America
buyout negotiated for $50 bn.445 
Paulson’s decision to let  Lehman Brothers go down proved to be a crucial  one, perhaps
justified by the critics he had received for having previously used public money to bailout
Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and for not having let the market deal with the
crisis as it had been suggested among most professional and academic circles in the States.446
The idea that the market could police itself resulted fallacious as it became clear that the
laissez-faire  attitude  promoted by the Bush administration  in  allowing a major  financial
institution to collapse created a catastrophic environment:  nobody in the financial  world
trusted anybody’s claims of solvency and the flow of money around the economy froze
up.447  It has been observed before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform448
that bad regulation,  lack of transparency and market complacency were among the main
causes that triggered the financial crisis and led to Lehman collapse.  The deterioration of
lending standards, it was argued, was exacerbated by the employment of securitisation on
lower quality mortgages.  
Checks that should have been performed by capital markets became problematic because of
the  nature  of  securities  like  CDOs;  the  picture  was  made  muddier  by  the  relationship
between issuers and rating agencies because of the increasing market power of the former
and the attitude endorsed by banks that started shopping for the best  rating and for the
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riskiest way to get a triple-A.449  As regards Lehman, the high level of leverage and the
strong reliance on short-term debt financing, coupled with the low level of collateral posted
for CDS contracts brought about the premises for a systemic failure and uncertainty about
the true value of the bank’s  equity.450  As the ensuing bankruptcy forced the market  to
reassess the risks related to certain practices,  the event had an enormous impact  on the
global financial system and it is identified as what kick started the economic crisis.451  This
case appears that there were no good corporate governance and as a result the bank was
collapsed due to inadequate supervision.  We are now going on to discuss Northern Rock as
it also showed the bank poor corporate governance due to poor management.
Northern Rock 
Mr Applegarth joined Northern Rock as a graduate trainee in 1983.  He rose within Northern
Rock having been appointed head of planning in 1989, assistant general manager in 1992,
executive director in 1996 and was made chief executive in 2001.  He was the youngest ever
FTSE 100 chief executive.452  Mr Applegarth was renowned for being driven, he was seen as
ambitious and the aggressive growth strategy at Northern Rock mirrored Mr Applegarth’s
personal approach.  It has been reported that these bullish tactics resulted in the majority of
the  executives  being  intimidated  by  him,453 evidenced  by  his  necessity  to  have  arrears
reported at half the CML average.  Although Mr Applegarth had spent twenty four years
working at Northern Rock, when questioned by the Treasury Select Committee he by his
own admission stated: I am not a qualified banker.454  This was in answer to question 666 of
the Select Committee evidence, and epitomises the dangerous nature of the Northern Rock
Board make up, and their lack of banking experience.  He quit as chief executive in 2007.455
Dr Ridley was appointed to the Board in 2004.456  At the Treasury Select Committee hearing
Dr  Ridley  described  himself  as  a  businessman  citing  his  participation  on  a  number  of
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different  Boards  as  evidence  of  his  extensive  experience,457 however  Dr  Ridley  had  no
previous banking experience prior to his appointment to the Board of Northern Rock.458  Dr
Ridley is a zoologist and it is difficult following his tenure as Chairman of Northern Rock to
not  observe  a  certain  irony  in  his  publication  The  Rational  Optimist:  How  Prosperity
Evolves.459  His father Viscount Ridley was chairman from 1987 to 1992 and sat  on the
Board of Northern rock for 30 years.  Following the financial scandal at Northern Rock Dr
Ridley resigned as chairman in 2007.460
Sir Ian Gibson was a respected man, he began his directorship career in the Board of Nissan
Motor Manufacturing in 1987.  In 1999 he became the senior vice-president of Nissan Motor
Company in Japan, and was knighted in the same year for his services to the motor industry.
Sir Ian’s experiences branched out further than just the motoring sector, during his career Sir
Ian has been Chairman of BPB plc, was on the Court of the Bank of England, has been
Chairman  of  Trinity  Mirror,  and  was  Deputy  Chairman  of  Asda Group plc  and  a  non-
executive director of GKN plc and Greggs plc.461  Sir Ian’s extensive business experience
spanning  across  a  wide  range  of  sectors  made  him  an  ideal  candidate  for  the  senior
independent  director.   Sir  Derek had experience within the financial  sector.   In 1967 he
joined  Westminster  Bank,  a  constituent  of  the  present  NatWest  Bank,  rising  to  become
NatWest’s Director of Personal Banking from 1986-1988.  He was appointed group chief
executive in 1992.  Sir Derek’s experience within the sector led him to some pivotal roles,
for example he is chairman of the Financial Services National Training Organisation462 and
in 2001 was appointed by Chancellor Gordon Brown to conduct a review of the long-term
trends that might affect the health care service in the UK.  He is a qualified Statistician and
Banker and attended the Program for Management Development at Harvard.463  Sir Derek
resigned at the same time as Mr Adam Applegarth on the 16 November 2007.464  
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It  has  been  reported  that  following  the  demutualization  of  Northern  Rock  in  1997,  the
company  led  an  extremely  aggressive  expansionist  business  model  which  by  2006  had
allowed the bank to grow its assets from £15.8 Bn to £101 Bn.465  It has been shown that the
development  of  their  business  model  resulted  in  89.2%  of  its  assets  contained  within
securitised mortgages.466  The intentions of the business model were to increase growth of
the company and Northern Rock were confident in the quality of their business model,467
however evidence has emerged that bring into the question the quality of the decisions made
under the Northern Rock business model.  Outside the bank, commentators remarked that the
business strategy was one of many extremes.468  A factor not lost on then Governor of the
Bank of England, Mervyn King, who was quick to point out that the rapid growth strategy
undertaken by Northern Rock resulted in the bank growing at a rate three times faster than
any other bank at that time.  Before the crisis hit the Chancellor of the Exchequer denounced
the behaviour of Northern Rock, he noted that in 2007 Northern Rock undertook a strategy
at odds with the market trends and had expanded its market share.469  Sir John Gieve, Deputy
Governor of the Bank of England, admitted that the Northern Rock business model made it
more vulnerable than other banks.470  
Combined with a fall in the share price, between January and September 2007,471 this should
have been a warning signal to the Board of directors to reconsider their expansionist policy.
Mr Applegarth commented that the bank was expanding that it had been doing for many
years but it is argued what whilst  making this  remark he failed to take into account the
changing nature of the financial sector.472  Following the demutualisation of the bank in 1997
the  period  had  been  one  of  prosperity.   For  a  bank  whose  main  line  of  business  was
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it is argued that the change in the market that began in 2006 was one that should have altered
the business model of a bank that was dependent on wholesale funding.  The expansion
continued into the 2007 where Northern Rock was running a business model that was taking
19% of the net lending.  If this is to be compared to HBOS, who was one of the largest
lenders in the market, during the same time captured 8% of net lending.  The conclusion from
the Treasury Select Committee outlined that they believed the directors pursued a reckless
business model which was reliant on wholesale funding.473  Whilst the governor of the Bank
of England commented that the business strategy was fatally floored.474  As a result of the
poor decisions Northern Rock posted losses of £167.6 million in 2007.475  As a result of the
actions of the Board during the crisis the losses rose to £1.36 Billion in 2008.476  
Each of these decisions can be seen to be breaching any one of the list of factors a director
must have regard to under s.172 (1).  Pursuing a growth strategy at odds with the rest of the
market is going to have negative consequences in the long term.477  Whilst this is the case the
greatest  problem with  regards  to  accountability,  is  that  the  matters  do  not  impose  free
standing  duties,  and  as  such  the  director  needs  to  think  about  and  to  give  proper
consideration to those factors.478  A director cannot be held liable if they do not consider a
specific factor, even though Parliament considered Directors’ consideration of them to be an
integral  part479of  their  duty  to  promote  the  success  of  the  company.   In  2010  evidence
emerged that Mr David Baker and Mr Richard Barclay deceived shareholders by concealing
1,917 mortgages to borrowers.  As a result,  the then Financial  Services Authority (FSA)
fined David Baker £504,000 and Richard Barclay £140,000.480  The FSA revealed that in
2006 Mr Baker became aware that the loans were omitted from mortgage arrears figures,
which formed part of the management information and communications made to the market;
Mr Baker knowingly did not escalate this information satisfactorily nor make any formal
473
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record that this issue had arisen.   This was heightened by Mr David Jones for when he
became aware of the situation in 2007 he agreed to continue to allow false mortgage arrears
figures to appear in footnotes accompanying the 2006 annual accounts.  As Margret Cole,
FSA’s director of enforcement of financial crime points out: ‘David Jones had numerous
opportunities to put things right, but failed to do so.’481  
From 2005, staff members at Northern Rock were under pressure to ensure that they reported
arrears and possession figures on loans at half the CML average.482  Whilst balancing the
aggressive growth strategy that was expected of them the DMU (Debt Management Unit),
Mr Baker reduced the number of reported loans.  If Baker and Jones had reported correct
figures the FSA believed that Northern Rock's arrears would have increased by more than
50%, or repossessions figures by about 300%.483  Professor William Buiter was critical of the
aggressive expansion pointing out: the actions of directors can be perceived as a result of the
extreme Northern Rock business model, set in place by Mr Adam Applegarth.  In defence of
the Northern Rock Board, expansionist policies were not limited solely to Northern Rock, as
failures have shown, a number of institutions entered into difficulties pursuant to similar
policies of rapid growth.  The example of executive failure can be observed in the Royal
Bank of Scotland following its  acquisition  of ABN Amro.  There was no due diligence
undertaken of ABN Amro in the six months prior to the deal being approved and received
unanimous support of the RBS Board.484  This transaction resulted in a £24.1 Bn loss in
2008, a point all more poignant to make given the bank would have been profitable and not
entered into difficulties had it not acquired the Dutch Bank.485  
A director must act in the way he considers, not what the court may consider,486 in good
faith, would be likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members.
It is the subjective standard of care that may be the greatest  stumbling block to cultural
reform.  As has been highlighted in  Regentcrest  plc v Cohen487 the decision the director
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makes need not be a reasonable one, so long as the director believed that they were acting in
the best interests of the company, and that their belief was an honest one.  It is clear that Mr
Applegarth believed that his business model was prudent.488  Whilst expressing regret Mr
Applegarth said that it was a good business model but, it could not deal with the unforeseen
global freezing of the liquid markets.489  During questioning he mentioned that the failures of
the bank were due to an unforeseeable global freeze.    Under s.172 a director is expected to
act for the benefit of the members as a whole.  This means that a director is to act for the
benefit of all members.490  In the problems of enforceability of s.172, it would appear that the
duty to promote the success of the company had little effect on the decision-making process
of  Adam Applegarth  and  the  business  model  of  Northern  Rock.   The  role  of  the  non-
executive director  as gatekeeper has been reminded the reader the duty of skill  care and
diligence is to be found under s.174 of the Companies Act 2006.  Under the duty a director’s
actions are measured against the actions which would have been taken by a diligent person.
The ability of the non-executive to hold the executive market participants to account is the
role  of  the  non-executive  director  and  to  monitor  and  supervise  their  conduct.491  It  is
purported that it was the risk monitoring within Northern Rock that failed.492  It is purported
that  a greater  reliance  on formal  corporate  governance structures would improve this  by
altering the general culture imposed within an institution.  Whilst the culture begins with the
CEO it has been identified that there is a core, irreducible requirement of directors to be
involved in the management  of the company and to take all  reasonable steps to be in a
position to guide and monitor.493 
To investigate the liability of the directors, it is necessary to analyse whether any of them
had any further skill,  knowledge or experience that would raise the threshold of liability
from the basic objective standard of a prudent director, to that where their skill would result
in them falling under s.174(2)(b) of the Companies Act 2006.  The Board of Northern Rock
stated that the bank was hit by a liquidity squeeze that could not have been foreseen.494  It is
488
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imperative that any analysis must not be made through hindsight, there were specific and
warnings given to the banks and Northern Rock prior to the run that should have made the
non-executive directors question the business model that had been put before them at Board
meetings.  The indication that came from the authorities was in 2007 when the FSA released
their  financial  risk outlook report  stating if economic conditions were to deteriorate,  this
could lead to crowded exits, draining liquidity from the market and causing erratic price
swings in commodities.495  In 2007 the Bank of England released their financial  stability
report  where  they  noted  developments  in  the  US  sub-prime  mortgage  market  have
highlighted  how  credit  risk  assessment  can  be  impaired  in  these  markets  and  how
participants can be hit by sharp reductions in market liquidity.496  It is important to stress test
and take those stress tests into account.497  Further evidence to the fact was given by the
Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, who expressed warnings to the financial
sector  in  2007,498 in  his  speech  he  remarked  that  liquidity  of  the  markets  in  complex
instruments is unpredictable.499  Northern Rocks share price was as clear an indicator as any
that problems were afoot.  The share price was rapidly falling between January and July
2007, at a rate that was not the same as the industry trend.500  
As the Higgs report notes a director should challenge and contribute to the development of
strategy, and monitor financial controls and ensure systems of risk management are robust
and  defensible.501  These  signals  should  have  led  the  directors  to  at  least  question  the
business model of the executives, and not simply be appeased by the executives.  Whilst not
questioning the business model  Mr Gibson stated that  he was aware of the risks of  the
business,502 and under questioning in the Treasury Select Committee the directors argued to a
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point that of 2007 the directors began to see warning signs of the US sub-prime problems.503
It was purported by the directors that there was a change in strategy to reduce the rate of
growth of the company.504  On the face of things this would appear to be a positive response
by the Board, to reduce the rapid expansionist policies in light of dramatic market shifts; the
reality of the situation is far different.  By his own admission Mr Applegarth reported that
following the implementation of the new business model the rate of growth would have been
reduced to 16-17%.505  That is correct, following warnings of a large shift in the financial
market outlook, the company reduced its aggressive expansionist policy by a mere 2-3%,
and it is difficult to see any slowing of growth at all.  Through all of this, it appears the non-
executive  directors  remained  mute  and  positively  approving  a  growth  rate,  which  the
committee members themselves remarked as being pretty aggressive compared to their dull
businesses that some of them had been running in the past.506  If these decisions are to be
considered in the light of s.174 of the Companies Act 2006 both Sir Ian Gibson and Dr Riley
owed a duty to the company to be an independent voice and to act as gatekeepers to the
aggressive policies put forward by the executives.  Since the issues of Northern Rock have
unfolded a number of cases have been decided, for an example, the case of Lexi Holdings .507
Although different on facts to Lexi Holdings the concepts are the same.  Both Gibson and
Riley owed a duty to monitor the risks posed to the business model and ensure good strategy,
in not voicing a protest to the impeding problems their inactivity it is argued would result in
the breaching of their duty of skill care and diligence.  The fact that they remained silent in
the face of a dominating director such as Mr Applegarth meant that following Lexi Holdings
Plc they would be in breach of their duty of skill, care and diligence under s.174(2)(a) in
allowing ‘themselves to be dominated or bamboozled by one of their number.’508  
Sir Derek was happy with the strategy taken by the Board and the operation with the risk
committee itself.509  It is argued that his previous experience in the financial sector should
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have led him to question the business model far more rigorously than he did. Sir Derek was
brought in to the company following his work at NatWest, during his time at that company;
in 1997 NatWest led an aggressive strategy into the US market.  A £90 million loss was
uncovered  in  its  trading  books  and  was  overlooked  by  NatWest’s’  review  of  its  risk
controls.510  This is evidence of a director who had experience of aggressive expansionist
business models, and expansionist business models that have not worked.  It is argued that
Sir Derek should have brought this experience to his role in the risk committee of Northern
Rock.  By his own admission, the strategy had been in place before he joined the Northern
Rock Board in 2000,511 and having taken up the position did not voice any concerns over
such an aggressive strategy dismissing it  as a growth strategy.   Dr Ridley attempted to
justify the capture of 19% of new lending in 2007 by remarking that we did not increase the
rate of mortgage lending in the first half of 2007.512  But it is argued that the markets had
been changing and the bank had been informed on several  occasions  that  markets  were
tightening.  There may have not been any increased lending but there should have been steps
to reduce the rate of growth with the changing financial environment.  Sir Derek Wanless
denied that this was an aggressive strategy, claiming that during 2007 Northern Rock had
10% of the market in new lending, but under questioning conceded that this was in fact 19%
of new lending after repayments.513  Sir Derek’s experience in the financial sector should
have led to him questioning the business model, applying his own knowledge of aggressive
business strategies.  The diversification of Northern Rock was a defence that was brought up
repeatedly  by the  directors;  the  directors  argued that  diversifying  into  different  business
areas  allowed  them  to  continue  on  such  a  growth  strategy  whilst  ensuring  a  suitable
reduction in risk.514  
Upon  analysis  it  is  clear  that  75-80%  of  all  of  Northern  Rock’s  business  was  in
securitisation, if this is to be compared with other banks HBOS for example only holds 20%
of business in securitisation.  There is little diversification whatsoever, Sir Derek Wanless
should have known this and, it is argued, failed in his duty of skill care and diligence under
s.174(2)(b) as a result.  There was pressure applied to executives to report pleasing figures to
the chief executive, then following the cases of Re Westmid Packing,515 Lexi Holdings Plc
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and Weavering Capital (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Peterson516 it is the duty of the directors
to be the independent voice and ask questions of the Board and the business model that was
been implemented.  It is argued that Dr Ridley and Sir Ian Gibson did not do this and their
inactivity in the face of evidence that there may have been some problems with the business
model adopted by the executives of the company resulted in the breach of their standard of
care.  The fact that they were appeased by Mr Applegarth is in itself a breach of duty by the
remaining directors  to allow themselves  to be dominated or bamboozled by one of their
number and it is argued that if the decisions were made today the influence of s.174(2)(a) of
the Companies Act 2006 may alter the decision-making process of the directors.  The fact
that  Sir  Derek Wanless had financial  experience  meant  that  he should have applied that
knowledge to his role as chair of both audit and risk committees.  Whilst the directors failed
to monitor and regulate the decision-making processes within Northern Rock.  It is argued
that following the financial crisis, and Lexi Holdings and Weavering Capital, the case law
would force the directors of the company to purse more rigorous questioning of the decisions
of the executive director, and his aggressive business model.  The remuneration structures of
the Board, in an attempt to recognize whether a shift in remuneration culture may have been
a contributing factor to the decisions made during the troubles.  The thesis has demonstrated
that there is a link between the structures of remuneration within a financial institution and
the business decisions taken by that institutions senior management.  Whilst remuneration
structures  need  to  attract  and  motivate  individuals  having  characteristics  necessary  for
success in the industry,517 it is believed that shareholders must not allow directors to take
unnecessary risks.  
Northern Rock had a comprehensive remuneration structure prior to the financial crisis.518
The ‘Northern Rock Executive Directors Remuneration Package’ consisted of a basic salary,
an annual  cash bonus,  a  deferred  share  scheme and a  long term incentive  plan.519  The
Remuneration  Package  structure  encompassed  both  performance  and  non-performance
related  elements  and  offered  an  excellent  balance  to  resolve  the  agency  problems  that
permeate through from a misalignment of the interests of the directors and shareholders.  It
would appear that Northern Rock were following good governance guidelines.  The Annual
Reports confirmed that the Board recognized the need to ensure that performance related
remuneration  should  align  the  interests  of  Executive  Directors  with  those  of  the
shareholders.  The new remuneration structure was more favourable than the old structure.  It
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is argued that this change in structure orchestrated a cultural shift within the bank towards
more risky decision making with the hope to increase short term benefits for the directors.  
The potential  benefits  to be accrued from ‘The Short Term Bonus Scheme’ increased to
200% of salary with half of any bonus earned deferred in shares for three years.520  It was the
new Share Matching Plan that was most controversial.  The Share Matching Plan replaced
the previous Deferred Share Scheme.  Under the previous scheme if the company grew by at
least 3% p.a, then the company would match the scheme at a ratio of 1:1.  The new plan
allowed executives to voluntarily invest in shares up to the value of their after tax cash bonus
with an award of Matching Shares at a 2:1 ratio, if the company achieved real EPS growth of
15% p.a.   This  gave  an  incentive  to  directors  to  continue  in  pursuit  of  their  aggressive
growth strategy.  It was in their interests to ensure growth remained above 15%, even at the
detriment  of  the  viability  of  the  company.   It  is  fascinating  to  note  that  a  number  of
institutional shareholders had voiced their concerns of the remuneration structures even prior
to  the  financial  crisis.   Hermes,  were  one  of  the  first  institutional  shareholders  to  raise
questions  about  the  Northern  Rock  business  model,  its  remuneration  and  accounting
disclosure.521  David Pitt-Watson noted what he believed to be ‘Perverse incentives’ at work
at  Northern  Rock.   Mr Peter  Montagnon stated  that  the Association  of  British Insurers
perceived the bonus policy to be too generous522 and had brought their reservations to the
attention of the Board.523  
The problems arose from difficulties banks faced over the summer of 2007 in raising funds
in the money market.  The bank's assets were sufficient to cover its liabilities, but it had a
liquidity problem because institutional lenders became nervous about lending to mortgage
banks following the US sub-prime crisis.  With shares in Northern Rock plummeting by
nearly  a  third,  the  British  Government  moved to reassure  investors  with the bank,  with
account holders urged not to worry about the bank going bust.  Northern Rock is not the only
British bank to have called on the Bank of England for funds since the sub-prime crisis
began but  is  the  only  one  to  have  had emergency  financial  support  from the  Tripartite
Authority (The Bank of England, the FSA and HM Treasury).  However, the bank was more
vulnerable to a credit crunch as its high-risk business model depends on funding from the
wholesale credit markets, 75% of its funds coming from this source.  In his address to the
Treasury Select Committee, Bank of England governor Mervyn King had stated emergency










ensure that lenders who had made bad lending decisions would suffer relative to lenders who
had made sensible lending decisions.524  
In August 2007, the funding markets froze, causing a liquidity squeeze.  Northern Rock had
conversations with the Bank of England to put a support facility in place if it needed it.  The
governor  of  the  Bank of  England pointed  out  that  the  funding strategy was flawed and
professor Buiter described it as reckless.  The Treasury Select Committee concluded that the
directors of Northern Rock were the authors of the difficulties that the company faced and
that it is right that they had been replaced.  The Committee concluded that the board had
provided  information  about  its  strategy,  including  that  of  funding,  to  its  shareholders.
Northern Rock collapse caused by the Bank of England refusing to help or to support its
purchase by Virgin.  On 17 September 2007, the UK government announced its guarantee
for all depositors to halt the run on the bank.  On 20 September 2007, this was specified to
cover all deposits in existence with the bank on 19 September 2007.  Northern Rock was
nationalised on 11 January 2008. 
Lloyds and HBoS 
The failure of HBoS, published by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards in
March 2013, highlighted some failings.525  On 19 November 2015, the PRA and the FCA
published to reports into the failure of HBoS: one that examines the failure itself,526 and one
that  examines  the enforcement  actions  taken by the regulator.527  There is  the failing of
internal  control.   The  senior  management  of  the  bank  had  given  a  large  amount  of
independence to the divisions Corporate, Institutional and Treasury.  These divisions that
would go on to amass the enormous losses as individuals  leading these divisions would
underestimate the risk they were running.  The failing was on the regulators.  The FSA had
noted  a  lack  of  internal  control  and  an  overreliance  on  funding  through  the  wholesale
markets, it did not follow through on this.  The FSA was concerned with the implementation
of Basel II.  
HBoS was rescued by Lloyds and this is put forward as the reason as to why Lloyds required
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of HBoS, which benefitted.  It rescued the firm in providing security for customers, funding
and employment for most of its staff.  From Lloyds’ perspective, the question is whether it
would generate benefit when weighted against a negative impact on its financial position.
Relevance is the limited due diligence carried out on behalf of Lloyds, which caused the
board to make the decision based on insufficient information.  Given how events unfolded,
the board had reached the wrong conclusions.  There is the perspective from the government.
The merger is presented as a shotgun marriage, the Chancellor and Governor of the Bank of
England maintained that their contribution was to place competition concerns to one side.
Their support was clear and, together with the haste required at that point in time, the poor
due  diligence  by  Lloyds  can  be  explained.   It  does  constitute  a  failure  of  corporate
governance at Lloyds to have pursued the deal. 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 
The Royal Bank of Scotland was founded in 1727.  With the acquisition of NatWest in 2000,
it became the second largest banking group in the UK.  It was the successful integration of
NatWest during which Fred Goodwin made a name for himself, resulting in his promotion to
CEO in  2001.   The  acquisition  of  NatWest  included  the  NatWest  Markets  division,  its
investment banking arm.  In the UK, RBS acquired Churchill Insurance and Direct Line.  By
2007, RBS had become the global financial conglomerates.  But when ABN Amro, a Dutch
lender,  under pressure from hedge fund TCI,  sought to merge with Barclays Bank, RBS
launched a hostile bid.  It did so in May 2007 together with Santander and Fortis.  The plan
was to break ABN Amro into three parts: RBS would acquire its operations, including the
Chicago  based  LaSalle  Bank,  whilst  Santander  would  acquire  the  Latin-America  based
operations and Fortis its Netherlands based operations.  ABN Amro unsuccessfully sought to
defend itself by selling the crown jewels, in this case LaSalle Bank, to Bank of America for
$21 billion.  By October 2007, with the global financial crisis commencing and Northern
Rock receiving government support, the Barclays share-based bid lost in value to €61 billion
whilst the consortium’s cash bid remained steady at €71 billion.  
RBS had to take the whole of ABN Amro’s balance sheet with its own until it was split
between the consortium members.  It turned out that ABN Amro was exposed to the US
mortgage crisis.  RBS was exposed to severe combined losses from the mortgage positions
of ABN Amro and RBS, whilst it was low on cash following the takeover.  RBS had to ask
investors for £12 billion in capital in April 2008.  This was followed by a reporting of losses
in August 2008.  The UK government had to come to the rescue of RBS.  The RBS had not
actually  breached  any  rules  when  taking  over  ABN Amro,  not  only  board  and  general
meeting had approved, in addition, huge cash reserves in the bank at the time, see also Adair
Turner’s report.  On 29 November 2008 the government took a 58% stake in RBS worth £15
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billion.   Fred Goodwin was forced out.   On 19 January 2009,  the Blue Monday Crash,
happened at once.  RBS released a trading statement in which it announced that it expected
to report trading losses of around £7 billion and write downs, in relation to the takeover, of
around £20 billion.  The UK government announced that it would inject funds into the UK
banking system to guarantee bank loans to stimulate the UK economy.  The government
announced that it would increase its stake in RBS to 70%.  The RBS share price collapsed by
67%, dragging other UK banks with it.   On 16 Feb 2009, RBS reported a loss of £24.1
billion for 2008.  
The Failure 
The failure of RBS was one of the failures of a UK bank during the financial crisis.  It was
led by Sir Fred Goodwin. 529  At the height of the crisis, RBS was involved in the takeover of
ABN Amro, together with the Belgian Bank Fortis and the Spanish Bank Santander.  It was
in competition with old Barclays bank which had tabled an offer to merge with ABN Amro.
In October 2008, it  survived through the financial  support of the UK government.   The
support was provided of both liquidity and solvency support.  RBS’ and Fred Goodwin’s
reputation were in tatters, becoming national symbols of what went wrong with the City.
The FSA conducted an extensive analysis, which forms the basis for this case study.530  The
report can be split into the reasons for RBS’s failure, lessons for regulators, supervisors and
management, and FSA enforcement.  
The report finds some factors that caused RBS to fail.  The first factor was that RBS’s capital
position  was  far  weaker  than  its  published  regulatory  capital  suggested  due  to  poor
definitions of regulatory capital.   At the end of 2007, RBS had a capital  position of £68
billion which meant that it had a capital ratio of 11.2% against the required 8% by Basel I
and Basel II Pillar  1; likewise,  its  published Tier 1 capital  ratio stood at  7.3% against a
required 4%.  These ratios were low compared to its UK peers: RBS pursued, in the words of
Sir Fred Goodwin, a policy of capital efficiency.  Despite these good ratios, RBS did not
have enough capital to convince the markets that it could manage its future losses.  RBS had
worsened its capital position by a large debt-finance of the ABN Amro takeover, reducing its
Tier 1 capital ratio to below its own target of 5.25%.  The capital regime as prescribed by
Basel II proved to be inadequate.  This is being addressed by the introduction of Basel III.
One of the improvements is that the Tier 1 capital ratio for important banks, such as RBS, is
increased to 9.5%.  The FSA calculated that, applying the risk weightings and methodology
of Basel III, 
RBS would have held a Tier 1 capital ratio of only 1.97% at the end of 2007.  The other
reason was due to the deficient way in which the required capital  for trading books was
529
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calculated.   Following  the  Value-at-Risk  based  approach  combined  with  the  low  risk
weighting attached to the trading book, as prescribed by the regulators, RBS had only £2.3
billion of core Tier 1 capital available to cover all the losses from its £430 billion assets on
the combined RBS and ABN Amro trading books.  The Credit Trading area lost over £12
billion in 2008.  RBS was dependent upon short-term wholesale funding.  This was common
for banks, but the situation at RBS was excessive.  UK banks’ loan books were growing
much faster  than their  deposits:  the combined funding gap for  UK banks stood at  £500
billion at the end of 2006.  Although RBS had a capital  problem as outlined,  it was the
liquidity problems that were the driver behind the failure.  Other banks, financial institutions
and  other  wholesale  money  market  providers  were  unwilling  to  meet  RBS’s  funding
requirements.  
The other factor was uncertainty and concern about future losses in view of the aggressive
growth strategy that RBS had pursued.531  This was not restricted to the losses from their
credit  trading operation  but  also  from the  losses  from loan  impairments.   An economic
recession was due to follow on from the crisis gave rise to great uncertainty about future loan
loss provisions at all banks.  The market anticipated that RBS’s loan portfolio was of low
quality due to its aggressive growth strategy and its willingness to take on risk, all of which
was confirmed when RBS had to create large provisions for loan losses.  From 2008 to 2010,
RBS had to make impairment losses of around £30 billion.  Another factor was the losses in
credit trading of around £12 billion, which eroded the capital position and caused uncertainty
about  the  losses.532  In  2006,  RBS  had  decided  to  grow  its  structured  credit  business
aggressively.  This included increasing its exposure to monoline bond insurers and leverage
finance.   By 2007,  it  was  becoming clear  that  the  underlying  credits  for  these complex
products were turning bad, RBS was slow to react, believing in the high ratings of the trades
on their books.  Once RBS tried to offload their toxic positions, it found that its distribution
capability to sell positions that were turning sour to uninformed and uneducated clients was
far less than that of other banks.  It was stuck with its positions, leaving only the questions
whether  it  was  better  to  close  the  positions  and  take  a  loss,  whether  hedges  would  be
available  and what the best estimate of the losses at  any date  would be.   In 2008, RBS
realised trading book losses of £8.5 billion.  
The take-over  of  ABN Amro,  which  exposed RBS to  a  greater  number  of  risky assets,
increased liquidity risk and eroded its capital base.533  The takeover by the consortium of
ABN Amro cost €71 billion, only €27 billion was to be paid by RBS for the parts that it
wanted.  These parts included LaSalle, which had been sold to Bank of America before the








than the headline  figures  suggested and much smaller  than its  £23 billion acquisition of
NatWest  in 2000.  The credit  trading losses made by ABN Amro contributed greatly  to
RBS’s total losses, increasing the market uncertainty about RBS’s position.  The acquisition
was financed by short term debt: over €12 billion was financed by debt of a maturity of less
than a year.  Funding restraints arose as the cash from the LaSalle transaction remained stuck
in  the  Netherlands  whilst  RBS needed  to  quadruple  its  funding  commitments  as  it  was
committed to funding ABN Amro’s inherited ABCP conduits totalling around £8 billion at
the end of 2008.  As RBS was the consortium leader, it needed to consolidate the whole of
ABN  Amro  on  its  2007  accounts,  before  distributing  it  amongst  the  other  consortium
members.  This created uncertainty and a lack of transparency on where the losses would go,
especially as Fortis, failed in October 2008.  The increased fear in the financial markets for
systemic risk, which hit banks with vulnerable liquidity, low asset quality and low capital
ratios, such as RBS.  Regulators and policy makers had failed to appreciate the element of
systemic risk in the banking system.  It caused a deterioration of market confidence which
culminated with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  In the weeks after the
collapse  of  this  household  name,  there  were  banking  failures  and  the  markets  were  so
nervous that  nobody was prepared to  meet  RBS’s  funding needs.   It  had to  rely on the
emergency liquidity assistance provided by the Bank of England.  
Next to these reasons that led to the failure of RBS, the FSA report examined the impact of
the management, governance and culture at RBS on its failure.  RBS had to deal with the
same  bad  market  conditions  as  other  banks,  there  had  been  decisions  made  by  its
management that had left it in a more vulnerable position than other banks.  The context in
which  the  FSA  has  reviewed  RBS’s  management  is  to  satisfy  a  public  interest  in
understanding the causes of RBS’s failure.  The FSA identified some areas of management,
governance  and culture  for  closer  scrutiny.   The first  area  is  the  effectiveness  of  board
oversight and challenge.  The examination is hindered by practicalities.  It is not difficult to
check that the process was appropriate by reviewing minutes of board meetings.  
Another aspect is the board’s role in relation to the ABN Amro take-over.  The conclusion
was  drawn by the  new chairman,  who stated  that  the  key decision  that  led  RBS to  its
difficulties was the acquisition of ABN Amro.  Such a take-over is the responsibility of the
board and this was a risky take-over.  As RBS was the leader of the take-over consortium,
ABN Amro would be consolidated on its balance sheets before assets were transferred to the
consortium partners.  Records show that there was a significant number of meetings between
board members leading up to the take-over,  suggesting that the formal  process has been
adequate.  It is undeniable that the decision making had been poor: despite adequate formal
processes, the effectiveness of the board has to be questioned.  The FSA identifies several
reasons for such poor decision making, including an over-reliance on the past success from
the NatWest take-over, the acceptance of poor due diligence in case of a hostile take-over,
and the failure to appreciate the importance of customer and counterparty confidence in the
bank.  
There is the question whether or not, in his delegation of responsibilities to the management
of the investment  bank, he had maintained sufficient  overview and understanding of the
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actual  business.  It  should be noted that the head of the investment  banking arm, Johny
Cameron, settled with the FSA after an investigation and agreed that he would not take up
any function or fulltime employment in the financial services industry in future.534  The FSA
would not take any disciplinary action.535  To illustrate the lack of understanding with Johny
Cameron of the transactions his department was involved in, the FSA notes that he explained
his knowledge of around May 2007 regarding CDOs to be as ‘I don’t think, even at that
point, I fully, I had enough information’.  Brian536 may have thought ‘I understood more than
I did’.  It is around this time that ‘I became clearer on what CDOs were, but it’s probably
later’.537  It  is  obvious  that  senior  management  at  the investment  banking arm had little
knowledge of at least some of the areas that they were active in, let alone had a thorough
grasp  of  the  risks  associated  with  it.   The  board  and  the  CEO  should  have  held  the
investment  bank  on a  tighter  leash.   The last  aspect  is  the  quality  of  risk  controls  and
management information.  The FSA notes several severe deficiencies.  The board received a
monthly risk report that was backward looking instead of forward looking.  The Group Risk
Officer was not invited to attend important meetings, including the regular morning meetings
held by the CEO and his team.  To summarise, the point of these deeper reasons reviewed in
this section expose problems with management, culture and governance at RBS at the time
of the crisis.  
Failures of Bankers 
Since the height of the financial crisis passed, many cases have been reported in the media
with  regard  to  the  behaviour  or  conduct  of  bankers.   Several  of  the  UK  banks  were
implicated.   Examples  include  mis-selling  of  payment  protection  insurance,  anti-money
laundering violations and rigging of the LIBOR rates and exchange rates.  The majority of
these cases of bankers’ misconduct either predate or happened during the financial crisis.  A
close examination may not assist in answering the research question.  What does deserve a
discussion is how it demonstrates a breakdown of corporate governance by a disregard from
UK  banks’  employees  towards  its  customers,  regulators  and  other  stakeholders  and,  a
complete  breakdown in  trust  from the  stakeholders  towards  the  bank itself.   This  is  an
argument that follows the thread set out previously.  It affirms the findings of the previous
case studies that  there was a  lack of understanding and a  lack of information flow, that
controls were lacking and that challenges between senior management and other employees
were absent.  
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Mis-sold Products 
Payment  protection  insurance  (“PPI”)  is  an  insurance  for  the  borrower  that  insures
repayment of their loan in case the borrower is no longer able to make repayments due to
illness,  loss of job and death.  Due to the way that PPI works, the banks would get the
premium of the insurance for the running of the loan and the benefit of the pay-out in case of
repayment problems.  Banks would make little to no profit on the underlying loan, but only
on the insurance premium paid to them.  It transpired that UK banks sold PPI to customers as
part of their loans or credit card deals.  Many customers where either unaware of the fact that
they had bought protection or that they were not aware of eligibility criteria for potential
insurance pay-outs.  UK banks are paying compensation for mis-selling.  As October 2014,
RBS set aside another £100 million538, Barclays another £170 million539 and Lloyds another
£900 million.540  
Another  product  that  was  mis-sold  on  a  large  scale  were  interest  rate  swaps.541  These
products exchange a fixed swap rate for a floating interest rate.  By entering into such a
product, a client may hedge its uncertain future floating interest rate payments for fixed ones.
Depending on whether rates move up or down, the client may make a profit or loss by the
transaction, but the point is that he has taken away his uncertainty about the level of future
payments.  These products have been sold to small businesses on a large scale as part of
fixed rate loans.  The Treasury Select Committee described the situation as ‘there is nothing
wrong with selling a business a fixed rate loan, where the bank adds a hedge and fails to tell
the customer I regard that, at best as mis-selling and at worst, immoral’.  The conduct and
behaviour  of banks towards customers,  their  stakeholders,  has been poor.   It  affirms the
observation that regard for all stakeholders is a weak element of corporate governance at UK
banks.  
As a consequence of the increase in complexity in financial markets and products, misselling
does not only happen to consumers but also to professional counterparties.  The increased
complexity in financial products has led to these type of problems is nothing new.542  It is
illustrated  in  litigation  between  Ceylon  Petroleum  Corporation  (“CPC”)  and  its  banks,
brought both in arbitration and before the courts in England.  CPC, the national oil and gas
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company of Sri Lanka, set up as a state enterprise and a body corporate, argued that it did not
have the capacity to enter into a certain combination of options on oil on which it made
substantial losses.  Both Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”) and Citigroup had sold protection
to CPC against raising oil prices in the form of call options.  The dispute with Citigroup
resulted in arbitration, whilst that with SCB was fought in the English courts.  The trust of
CPC’s argument, which was accepted in arbitration but rejected by the Court of Appeal,543
was that it was a transaction of speculative nature, rather than one of insurance, and that CPC
as a state enterprise did not have the capacity to enter into such a transaction.  
Money Laundering 
Banks are involved in large financial transactions and large international flows of money.
Criminal organisations and others seek to abuse the international financial system and banks
to launder money or for other illegal financial activities.  Banks have strict compliance and
anti-money  laundering  checks  and  procedures  in  place.   Several  UK  banks  have  been
accused of violating anti-money laundering regulations.544  In December 2012, HSBC settled
with the US regulators for a fine of £1.2 billion for allegedly circumventing restrictions on
dealing with Iran and North Korea.  A similar settlement of $300 million had been reached
between US authorities and UK bank Standard Chartered.  It involves two UK banks that so
far had not required a bail-out and had escaped much of the publicity in other scandals.  Even
in these cases, there appears to have been weak internal controls, reporting and oversight.  It
suggests that there were weaknesses in corporate governance.  
Market Manipulation 
The LIBOR rate, or the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, is a benchmark interest rate that is
determined daily by averaging a number of submissions, the LIBOR submissions, by traders
at various large banks.  The LIBOR rate determines the value of many financial products,
ranging from saving accounts  and mortgages  to  complex derivative  products.   There are
international equivalents, such as US LIBOR in the US and EURIBOR for the Eurozone.
There is evidence that as 2005, traders at Barclays, sought to influence various LIBOR rates
from their regional hubs.545  It was investigated by the FSA, which concluded that there had
been 257 requests to fix LIBOR rates between January 2005 and June 2009.546  
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For Barclays, the first UK bank to be punished, the combined fines by various regulators
amounted to £290 million.  It’s CEO, Bob Diamond, who had become the centre of media
attention as the stereo-typical American style investment banker and the best paid CEO at a
UK bank, refused to go.  He was forced out by the Bank of England, who demanded a
cultural change.  Barclays’ chairman and COO left at the same time.  Other banks involved
include the Swiss bank UBS, which was fined £940 million.  RBS was fined a total of £390
million and the head of its investment bank, John Hourican, resigned.547  Regulators have
fined  several  banks  over  their  traders’  attempts  to  manipulate  foreign  exchange  trades
between January 2008 and October 2013.548  These include the UK banks HSBC and RBS as
well as UBS and US banks JP Morgan, City Bank and Bank of America.  The fine amounts
to £2.6 billion dollars, which was reached through a general settlement.  Investigations at
other banks, including Barclays, continues.  As for the LIBOR scandal, individual traders
were prosecuted and lost their jobs.  It was confined to a handful of traders and several banks
who attempted to manipulate the markets for their own benefit.  It is incredible that they
could have done this for such a prolonged period of time.  As noted by the Treasury Select
Committee, it does not look good that it was not spotted by either the Bank of England or the
FSA.549  But  it  indicates  a  prolonged  period  of  weak  internal  compliance  and  board
governance at Barclays, as well as a failure of regulatory supervision.  
Barclays 
Over the past twenty years, Barclays has grown rapidly from a domestic retail bank to a
global  universal  bank.   Its  investment  banking  arm  had  grown  fast,  acquiring  parts  of
Lehman Brothers after it had collapsed.  The bank has survived the financial crisis without
requiring government support, raising capital on its own instead.  In the years after the crisis,
the  bank was engulfed  by negative  publicity  relating  to  conduct  failures.   It  reached its
pinnacle when on 2 July 2012 the CEO, Bob Diamond, resigned.550  Mr Diamond, the stereo-
typical,  high-earning  and  outspoken American  investment  banker  who had  led  Barclays
Capital before becoming CEO, had become the focal point of what had gone wrong in the
City.  Under immense pressure from both politicians and the regulators following the LIBOR
scandal, his position had become untenable.  The bank announced in July 2012 a review of
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its  business  practices,  to  be  led  by  Antony  Salz.   This  has  become known as  the  Salz
Review.551  
Some of  the failures  include  under-investment  in  monitoring  compliance,  risk and other
control processes leading to breaches of international sanctions.  Related operational failures
include a failure to segregate its own money from that of the customers.  This occurred in
2009, for which the bank received a fine from the FSA.  This made it difficult for customers
to get any of their money back.  Another failure was the failing in 2009 relating to submitting
data of reportable transactions to the FSA, which it collects to detect and investigate market
abuse such as insider trading and market manipulation.  The bank did not have adequate
systems  and  controls  in  place  for  this  reporting  requirement.   It  is  reported  that  gross
premium from Barclays PPI sales exceeded £400 million per year between 2003 and 2008,
dropping slowly to less than £200 million after 2010, whilst the reported cost of meeting
claims was under 25% of gross premiums for every year since 2002.  Barclays made a profit
from PPI between 2002 and 2012 of an estimated £940 million.  
Schemes were designed to encourage staff  to sell  PPI,  including a two and a half  times
higher commission for loans sold with PPI instead of without.  When the FSA expressed
concerns about PPI in 2009, Barclays was one of the banks that brought a challenge against
the  FSA  and  the  Financial  Ombudsman  Service.   The  courts  decided  in  favour  of  the
regulators forcing banks, including Barclays, to review their PPI sales.  The report concludes
that Barclays was too slow in controlling the failures relating to PPI, e.g. in controlling the
selling  process  and  setting  appropriate  incentive  schemes;  in  reacting  to  customer
complaints; and in considering whether the high profitability was indicative of underlying
problems.552 
Barclays was involved in the mis-selling of interest rate swaps to small businesses, a practice
started in 2001.  This led to large number of complaints,  since 2008 when interest  rates
reached a historical low.  Following reviews by the FSA, Barclays launched a compensation
scheme in 2012.  Traders at Barclays Capital  were involved in the LIBOR manipulation.
The report concluded that this was due to deficiencies on the trading floor and a failure to
embed ethical values.  It was made worse by an ineffective control and supervision of traders
and a lack of separation between those trading and those submitting the rates.  There is one
important  point  to be made:  all  these issues,  and in particular  the LIBOR manipulation,
including  the  publication  of  communication  between  traders,  have  dented  any  trust  and
confidence that the public may have had in Barclays.  This takes the analysis back to the role
that banks play within the economy and why the stakeholders of the bank must include the
public.   To  emphasize  this  point,  consider  the  Structured  Capital  Markets  team  within
Barclays Capital, which was a tax-led transaction structuring business.  This was a profitable
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business that assisted clients and Barclays itself in avoiding to pay taxes.  Although Barclays
operated in an open way with HMRC, and although there is no evidence to suggest that it
aided tax evasion, this team was operating on the edge of highly abusive and aggressive tax
avoidance schemes.  
There are some recommendations made on how this can be achieved within Barclays.  An
examination of the responses to the failures at banks is a summary of the recommendations is
insightful  into  the  deeper  reasons.   The  main  ones  include  the  second  and  fourth
recommendations, which state that high values and standards must be set and that the board
and  senior  management  must  be  demonstrating  these  and  carrying  responsibility  for
implementing  these.   Responsibility  for  this  lies  with  the  top  of  the  organisation,  who
perform an exemplary role.  The third recommendation states that Barclays must develop an
understanding of its customers and their needs.  The customers’ needs and objectives should
be met whilst meeting the objectives within the organisation.  This is connected with the
recommendations with the sixth recommendation that a Code of Conduct must be published.
This gives guidance to employees on how to behave in their work.  The implication of these
recommendations is that one of the deeper problems at Barclays was the importance of profit
over customers, a principle emanating from the senior management all the way down the
organisation.   There  is  a  set  of  recommendations  that  fall  under  the  category  of  board
effectiveness.  It is recommended that a number of non-executive directors have banking
experience.   The  non-executive  directors  must  invest  sufficient  time  to  discharge  their
obligations.   The board  information  should  be  comprehensive.   This  points  to  a  deeper
underlying problem with the capability and commitment of the board members in overseeing
senior management at Barclays and the independent challenge that they provided.  
There is a set of recommendations that relate to the human resource function, performance
targets, pay and incentives.  The human resource function was not sufficiently empowered to
provide any direction on who was hired and on what staff were paid.  A part of pay was
linked  to  performance  targets.   These  were  linked  to  financial  and  sales  targets.   This
provided  a  message  to  staff  that  the  objective  was  to  make  money,  regardless  of  any
considerations  or  understanding  the  costumers’  needs.   All  these  failures  are  failures  of
corporate governance.  
The Co-operative Bank 
The failure of a bank due to a shortfall in capital is that of the Cooperative Bank.  Linking
this failure to the financial crisis might be considered somewhat of a stretch, perhaps by way
of adverse economic conditions or increased capital requirements, it must be included in this
research because it is the failure of a UK bank with a different model of operation and a
different model of corporate governance.  If the failure of the Cooperative Bank was not
examined as part of this research, the conclusion might have been reached that its approach
was  a  superior  model  of  corporate  governance  that  should  be  adopted  without  properly
assessing its downsides.  The bank has a cooperative model:  its customers could become
members of its parent, the Co-operative Group, and become owners.  The bank has a policy,
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which sets out many policy objectives.553  These include acting with transparency, being a
responsible bank that treat customers fairly and promoting economic and social development
in Britain.  
Timeline 
Before examining the problems, it is necessary to highlight some of the events in the bank’s
history because they contributed to  its  fall  from grace.   In 2009, the Co-operative Bank
merged with Britannia Building Society. 554  Britannia had a risk appetite, which included
concentrated commercial real estate lending.  Due diligence was insufficient and provisions
had  to  be  made  later.   Britannia’s  financial  position  was  deteriorating  whilst  merger
discussions took place.  In 2011, the FSA concluded that Britannia would have failed if there
had been no take-over. 
In 2011, the Co-operative Bank started its attempt to take over the part of Lloyds Banking
Group which it was forced to split off to comply with EU rules on state-aid.  This became
known as  Project  Verde,  including 632 branches  in  the  UK and around 5 million  retail
customers.  The Co-operative was struggling with the integration of Britannia, in particular
the integration of IT systems was proving problematic.  It would stretch its capital resources.
Amid these concerns, which were voiced by the FSA, the bank decided to bring in a CEO to
lead the transaction, which became its focus.  Despite an independent report by KPMG at
2012, and warnings from the FSA that it would increase capital requirements, nobody at the
bank considered pulling out of the deal.   After critical  reports  and an increase in capital
requirements,  the Co-operative pulled out of the deal in March 2013.  The Co-operative
Bank was hit by the PPI mis-selling scandal.  All of the mis-selling emerged from the Co-
operative side, as Britannia had not been involved in this practice prior to the merger.  As
was  the  case  with  other  banks,  the  income generated  by  PPI  premiums  outweighed  the
claims that were paid out.  The bank had to make provisions of up to £347 million by the end
of 2013, but it is concerning that the mis-selling practice was present at this bank despite its
commitments.   The costs  of the PPI scandal,  combined with the losses from Britannia’s
loans, Project Verde and from integrating the IT platform were eroding the bank’s capital.
After the increase in capital  requirements  by the FSA, the bank had to announce a £1.5
billion capital shortfall following an industry-wide exercise performed by the regulator.  The
bank was forced  to  negotiate  a  rescue packet  with  several  US hedge funds,  who would
provide capital in return for 70% control in the bank.555  It would result in the closure of
around 50 branches.  The part of the bank’s fall  from grace was the arrest of its former
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chairman,  Reverend Paul Flowers, in connection with an investigation into the supply of
drugs.556  
The Kelly Review 
The question is whether one could run a bank with the Co-operative ideals and principles, or
whether  this  case  has  proven  that  it  is  not  possible.   It  is  instructive  to  examine  the
conclusion of the Kelly report, written by Sir Christopher Kelly as an independent review
into the events leading to the bank’s capital shortfall.  This report tells a story of failings on a
number of levels.  The Bank Executive failed to exercise prudent and effective management
of capital and risk.  The Banking Group Board failed in its oversight of the Executive.  The
Group  Board  failed  in  its  duties  as  shareholder  to  provide  effective  stewardship  of  an
important member asset.  They failed to ensure that the Co-operative Bank lived up to its
principles.  In all these things they let down the Group's members.  The lessons set out in
Chapter 14 are far from novel.  It does no credit to those involved that they should need to be
learnt again.557  The conclusion must be that these are failures of corporate governance.  
The bank was held at arm’s length from the group.  It is understandable that there was some
form of separation, if only due to regulatory regimes applicable to the bank but not to the
group.  At the Cooperative, the group’s board would review a written statement provided by
the bank without much challenge.  The challenge would arise on values and principles, rather
than on core banking matters.  The report highlights two reasons for the lack of challenge.
The first is ineffectiveness which arose from its size.  But the second reason is the board’s
lack of experience in banking and finance.  The board, consisting of elected members who
had to spend their time on their re-election, did not contain any business experience.  The
report  states  that  it  was  so bad,  that  several  members  needed financial  terminology  and
concepts to be explained.  The five representatives from independent societies had worked
within  the  co-operative  movement  and  lacked  the  required  skills  and  knowledge.   The
consequences  are  clear:  sustained  success  requires  effective  governance.   Effective
governance requires a high performing board.  The composition of the Co-operative Group
Board, and the limited pool from which its members were drawn, made a serious governance
failure almost inevitable.  The approach to the election of non-executive directors has shown
incapable of producing a Group Board with the necessary governance competences or the
business and technical skills required for successful stewardship of the Group’s assets.  It is
Sir  Christopher  Kelly’s  damning  assessment  that  these  problems were  bound to  happen
given the poor corporate governance.  It is a proven element of good corporate governance
that  the  board  has  the  skills  and  expertise  to  oversee  the  group’s  complex  portfolio  of
businesses.  The board must have good management information to challenge the board. 
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The Myners Report 
The views expressed in the Kelly review are confirmed by Lord Myners, who was appointed
as Senior Independent Director to the Co-operative Group in December 2013, and who wrote
an  independent  report  on  its  governance.558  He  resigned  four  months  later,  noting  a
resistance to change, a denial of responsibility, deliberate delays and a hiding behind values
within  the  group,  amongst  his  reasons  for  leaving.   In  summarising  his  findings,  Lord
Myners notes that the present governance architecture and allocation of responsibilities is not
fit for purpose.  
This is in complete agreement with the conclusions reached by Sir Christopher Kelly.  The
recommendations made by Lord Myners are no surprise.  The recommendation is to create a
new Group Board, with an independent chair, 6 to 7 independent non-executive directors and
two executive directors.  This would ensure knowledge and skills are present on the board to
provide the necessary challenge.  It would remove the convoluted way in which the board is
selected.  Lord Myners outlines several proposals to re-organise the Areas and Regions into a
different  Membership Council  and other committees.   The point  is  his  proposals seek to
maintain the unique characteristics of a co-operative and they do not seek to convert it into a
standard exchange listed company.  The conclusion is that in order to achieve the social
goals, the Co-operative Group must be a successful business.  It needs to survive over the
long term and generate healthy profits to build its capital base.  This is important for this type
of organisation because, it is not able to raise capital by issuing shares.  
Value creation is necessary for value distribution amongst its members and to achieve any
other social goals it might have.  The case studies examined provide some answers to this
research question.  The case studies demonstrate that there can be no doubt that corporate
governance at UK banks was weak.  There were four themes that emerged which contributed
to this weakness.  These are the growth in complexity in financial markets, in products and in
institutions leading to a higher standard; the lack of effectiveness at board level; ineffective
systems and controls; and the problems associated with a lack of moral values and ethics.  A
far wider ranging and detailed analysis of the underlying crisis, which goes beyond the scope
of this research, can be found in the report by the US Financial Crisis Commission.559 
The Growth in Complexity and Required Minimum Standard 
Consider the growth and increasing complexity of both financial institutions and financial
instruments  in  the  decade  before  the  crisis.   Basel  1  was introduced as  an international
standard, to create a level playing field aimed at making banks safer.  It is clear that the rules
were simplistic;  the risk weighting of assets  left  much to be desired.   Regulators can be
blamed for designing such a  flawed system.  But  banks can be accused of  abusing this
system.  Banks sought to gain maximum returns on their capital for the shareholders and
allocated capital into assets that would attract a low regulatory risk weighting despite the
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real-world  risk  they  carried.   Turning  to  securitized  loans  and  mortgages,  the  Basel
Committee  reports  that  there  were  several  reasons  for  an  explosive  growth in  this  area.
There was a high demand for these products as they were perceived to be safe, confirmed by
their  rating,  whilst  they  provided  a  high  yield.560  Common  sense  would  dictate  that
something is amiss: there is a positive correlation between risk and return.  Issuers weakened
their asset screening and monitoring whilst investors did not understand the risk that they
were taking on.  There are some points to be made in relation to the research question.  There
is the element of working around legislation and reducing regulatory capital rather than the
adherence to what regulation is trying to achieve.  There is the creation of instruments so
complex and non-transparent, that investors should not have been offered, although it was
their own problem that they bought it.  It is the observation that the complexity in financial
innovation  and  financial  instruments  increased  at  an  incredible  pace  over  the  decade
proceeding the global financial crisis.  Combined with the rise of financial behemoths that
are  coined  too-big-to-fail,  the  financial  industry  had  become  more  complicated  and
interconnected.  This is supported by the evidence presented in some studies.  
Northern  Rock  was  a  lender,  but  its  aggressive  growth  plan  was  based  on  financial
innovation.  It sought to take many of its mortgages off its balance sheet via securitisation,
thereby relying on short-term funding.  Its systems and controls would have to be raised to a
high standard to match the complexity of its business model.  The skills and knowledge at
board level would have to increase to understand the risks flowing from the business model
and to understand the effects of reliance on international wholesale markets for funding.  The
problems demonstrate that the standard of corporate governance at Northern Rock was not
raised,  which  led  to  its  failure.   During a  period of  aggressive  expansion,  including the
growth of its CDO business and the take-over attempt of ABN Amro, the standard of what
constituted good corporate governance kept being raised.  The systems and controls at RBS
were lacking.  The understanding at senior management level of the business and products
they were entering into was absent.  The case studies of Barclays and the Co-operative Bank
demonstrate  the same or  similar  shortcomings  arising of  the  increased  complexity  of  its
business, products and environment.  Elements of what must be present can be identified.
The  standard  and  minimum  requirements  differ  for  each  of  the  UK  banks.   It  is  the
conclusion that, in the decade before the crisis, the standard for each UK bank was raised and
all the UK banks covered in the case studies fell below its individually raised standard. 
Elements of Corporate Governance 
Ineffective Board 
Where  the  previous  conclusion  related  to  the  increased  minimum  required  standard  of
corporate governance, that follow contain conclusions on elements of corporate governance.
In the examination of the case studies, it was a recurring theme that these elements where
absent or fell below the minimum required standard.  The case study of Northern Rock was
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ineffective in challenging its aggressive expansion.  At HBoS, the board did not only lack
experience in banking and finance, it was beating itself on the chest as a beacon of good
corporate governance moments before its collapse.  At both RBS and at Barclays, there was
a dominant CEO, Sir Fred Goodwin and Bob Diamond respectively.  Neither the board at
RBS nor at Barclays could provide sufficient challenge.  It resulted in the disastrous take-
over at RBS and the spread of a profit-focused culture at Barclays.  The case study making
the strongest case of all for a strong board is that of the Co-operative Bank.  It must be noted
that, with the take-over of Britannia and Project Verde, the standard of what constituted good
corporate governance kept rising without any changes being made to its governance.  It was
the conclusion of two reports, that the board at the Co-operate Group was ineffective and
required an overhaul.  
Ineffective Risk Management and Controls 
Another  element  of corporate  governance that  was missing in  the case studies is  that  of
effective  risk management  and controls.   In the case of RBS, there was no defined risk
appetite.  It is impossible to decide whether new transactions or business plans fall within the
risk appetite that senior management want the firm overall to adhere to.  The risk reports that
were written at RBS were backward looking instead of forward looking.  When these risk
reports would be discussed at board level, the CRO would not be in attendance.  All these
factors combined led to an ineffective risk management and control at RBS.  This led to the
situation that there was no understanding of the risks that the firm was running and what the
consequences would be in adverse conditions.  The firm was ill-prepared when the global
financial crisis started.  At Barclay the risks associated with how the profit was made were
not  sufficiently  considered.   The  conclusion  is  that  the  risk  management,  systems  and
controls  must  be  proportionate  to  the  risks  that  the  bank  is  taking.   As  with  minimum
standard of corporate governance, it is dependent on the specific bank.  
Culture, Values and Ethics 
The element of good corporate governance that was missing throughout the case studies is a
less tangible concept of culture, values and ethics.  The scandals, such as PPI-mis-selling,
interest  rate  swap mis-selling,  money laundering,  violation of international  sanctions and
market manipulation in LIBOR and foreign exchange markets, paint a picture of an industry
sector that has lost its moral compass.  The case study of Barclays revealed the existence of a
lucrative unit advising on tax avoidance schemes that were on the aggressive side of the
spectrum.  It revealed a culture where profit was placed before customers’ needs.  The Co-
operative  Bank’s image of the ethical  bank was damaged,  not just  due to its  losses and
incompetence, but also following the arrest of its former chairman on drugs related charges.
The banks fulfil  an important  economic function and it  would be difficult  to imagine an
advanced society without them.  They matter because of the consequences of a bank failure.  
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Regulatory failures  
Bernard Madoff  
Christopher  Cox,  the  former  SEC  chairman,  has  recognized  the  organization's  multiple
failures in relation to the  Bernard Madoff fraud.561  Starting with an investigation in 1992
into a Madoff  feeder  fund that  invested with Madoff,  and which,  according to the SEC,
promised curiously steady returns, the SEC did not investigate indications that something
was amiss in Madoff's investment firm.562  The SEC has been accused of missing numerous
red  flags  and ignoring  tips  on Madoff's  alleged  fraud.563  As a  result,  Cox said  that  an
investigation would ensue into all staff contact and relationships with the Madoff family and
firm, and their impact on decisions by staff regarding the firm.564  SEC Assistant Director of
the  Office  of  Compliance  Investigations  Eric  Swanson had  met  Madoff's  niece,  Shana
Madoff, when Swanson was conducting an SEC examination of whether Bernie Madoff was
running a Ponzi scheme because she was the firm's compliance attorney.  The investigation
was  closed,  and  Swanson  subsequently  left  the  SEC,  and  married  Shana  Madoff.
Approximately 45 per cent of institutional investors thought that better oversight by the SEC
could  have  prevented  the  Madoff  fraud.565  Harry Markopolos complained  to  the  SEC's
Boston office in 2000, telling the SEC staff they should investigate Madoff because it was
impossible to legally make the profits Madoff claimed using the investment strategies that he
said he used.566  
Allen Stanford  
A similar failure occurred in the case of Allen Stanford, who sold fake certificates of deposit
to tens of thousands of people, many of them working-class retirees.  In 1997, the SEC's own
examiners spotted the fraud and warned about it.  But the Enforcement division would not
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pursue Stanford, despite repeated warnings by SEC examiners over the years.567  After the
Madoff fraud emerged, the SEC took action against Stanford in 2009.   The SEC settled a
wrongful termination lawsuit with former SEC enforcement lawyer Gary J. Aguirre in June
2010.  Gary J. Aguirre was terminated in September 2005 following his attempt to subpoena
Wall Street  figure  John J.  Mack in an insider trading case involving hedge fund  Pequot
Capital Management;568 Mary Jo White, who was at the time representing Morgan Stanley
nominated as chair of the SEC, was involved in this case.569  While the insider case was
dropped at  the time,  a  month  prior  to  the  SEC's  settlement  with Aguirre  the  SEC filed
charges against Pequot.  The Senate released a report in August 2007 detailing the issue and
calling for reform of the SEC.570
Inspector General office failures 
In 2009, the Project on Government Oversight, a government watchdog group, sent a letter
to  congress  criticizing  the  SEC  for  failing  to  implement  more  than  half  of  the
recommendations made to it by its  Inspector General.571  According to POGO, in the prior
two years, the SEC had taken no action on 27 out of 52 recommended reforms suggested in
Inspector General reports, and had a pending status on 197 of the 312 recommendations
made in audit reports.  Some of the recommendations included imposing disciplinary action
on SEC employees who receive improper gifts or other favors from financial companies, and
investigating and reporting the causes of the failures to detect the Madoff ponzi scheme.572
In a 2011 article by Matt Taibbi in Rolling Stone, former SEC employees were interviewed
and commented negatively on the SEC's Inspector General's office.  Going to the OIG was
well-known to be a career-killer.573  Because of concerns raised by David P. Weber, former
SEC  Chief  Investigator,  regarding  conduct  by  SEC  Inspector  General  H.  David  Kotz,
Inspector General David C. Williams of the U.S. Postal Service was brought in to conduct an
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independent,  outside  review  of  Kotz's  alleged  improper  conduct  in  2012.574  Williams
concluded in his 66-page Report that Kotz violated ethics rules by overseeing probes that
involved people with whom he had conflicts of interest due to personal relationships.575  The
report questioned Kotz’s work on the Madoff investigation, among others, because Kotz was
a very good friend with Markopolos.576  It concluded that while it was unclear when Kotz
and Markopolos became friends, it would have violated U.S. ethics rules if their relationship
began before or during Kotz’s Madoff investigation.577  The report found that Kotz himself
appeared  to  have  a  conflict  of  interest  and  should  not  have  opened  his  Standford
investigation, because he was friends with a female attorney who represented victims of the
fraud.578 
Conclusion
Chapter 2 focused on the issue of the corporate governance crisis in the banking and finance
sector.  Corporate governance failures which contributed to various financial crimes in major
banking institutions and those involved have been held sufficiently accountable in the USA
and  the  UK.   In  this  chapter,  financial  scandals  such  as  WorldCom,  Enron  scandals,
Parmalat,  Barings Bank, Allfirst  Bank, BCCI, Lehman Brothers,  Northern Rock, Lloyds,
HBoS, the Royland Bank of Scotland and Barclays Bank were explored.  We have reason to
believe  that  the  company failure,  was mainly  due to  a  combination  of  factors  including
corporate governance failure issues.  The responsibilities of the directors and insider trading
were also under consideration.  Directors are subject to duties of loyalty and care.  Directors
operate under the favorable presumption that in making business decisions they will have
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the decision was in the
best interests of the company.  The management and directors of engaged in insider dealing,
a prohibited fraud in the US.  The practice and timing of stock sales by managers and various
board members can be viewed as indicative of their knowledge that the company would soon
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be plagued by financial chaos.  In order to examine more UK and US regulatory issues, we
are now moving to the next chapter  as it  is considered that the topic is also  one of the
important topics in this thesis.  Besides, we may know more clearly about the Sarbanes-
Oxley  Act  as  well  as  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act.
Corporate governance deficiencies highlighted in Chapter 2 prompts regulatory responses
that will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
Introduction
After discussing the financial scandals in Chapter 2, this chapter discusses the UK and US
regulatory response which took place in UK and in US.  It provides a discussion of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act, one of the most sweeping and controversial reforms in US legal history.
An examination of executive pay and corporate integrity and corporate governance reforms
give us a more complete picture of the corporate governance reforms and discussing with
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is crucial in this chapter.
UK and US Regulatory Response
The UK’s response - The Higgs Report
Despite a lack of large-scale corporate collapses in the UK, proposed UK reforms have been
strongly influenced by the corporate scandals in the US.  The proposed UK reforms originate
from the Higgs report and the report of the Co-Coordinating Group on Audit and Accounting
Issues under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Smith.  The central theme of the Higgs report
was the significance  and role  of non-executive  directors  in  the management  of  a  public
company.  Higgs recommended that the composition of the board of a UK public company
should  comprise  50% independent  non-executive  directors.   Higgs  sought  to  define  an
independent non-executive director as a person who sits on the board free of any potential
conflict  of  interest.   The  proposals  are  modest  but  can  contribute  to  good  corporate
governance standards in the UK, whilst the comply or explain principle ensures that they
should  be  flexible  enough  to  avoid  being  seen  as  overly  prescriptive.   Interpretation  is
important and the boards of companies must approach the proposals in an objective and
sensible fashion in order to adopt those suitable to them and adapt those that need to be
tweaked.  Failure to comply should not be taken as a negative sign by investors, providing it
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is accompanied by an adequate explanation that shows how governance standards are not
compromised  by the  decision.   It  is  important  that  the  proposals  are  not  interpreted  so
flexibly that they lack substance, nor so rigidly that they become a straitjacket.579
The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 and CA
2006
The UK government, in seeking to protect and improve the standards and competency of
business  practices  considers  that  robust  regulation  of  auditors  as  key  to  achieving  its
objectives.   The  corporate  failures  in  the  USA have shocked  and  perhaps  caused some
degree  of  panic  in  respect  of  the  UK  government’s  desire  to  reform  the  regulatory
framework of corporate and financial markets.  Besides, sections 170-181 of CA 2006 and
subsections (2) to (8) of FSMA 2000, ss 118 sets out different types of behavior which are
defined as constituting market abuse.  
The US response - Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) has been called the most sweeping corporate regulation measure
in decades.  Congress intended to assure that auditors would point out financial shenanigans
by  their  corporate  clients  before  fraud  or  conflicts  of  interest  can  hurt  a  company,  its
employees and its investors.  Just what constitutes a conflict of interest, remains a topic of
heated debate.  In the wake of Enron-Anderson and subsequent scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley
prohibits public accounting firms that audit companies from providing certain services, such
as internal audits and financial  information systems design.  Notably tax services remain
permissible  for  audit  firms,  but  the Public  Company Accounting  Oversight  Board  could
prohibit such services.580  Maintaining strong and efficient controls is of critical importance.
Besides, one of the main objectives  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to restore investors’
confidence in financial reporting.  Its success should be measured on the basis of whether the
Act has helped in maintaining the public’s confidence.   As far as poor stock returns are
concerned, a behavioral perspective would suggest that it is possible that SOX-complaint
firms experienced poor post-SOX stock returns because they lost their abilities to fool naive
investors.581  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a decisive step in the right direction and a strong
shield  against  corporate  fraud.   It  sends  a  signal  that  such events  should  never  happen
again.582  
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,  adopted on 30 July 2002 in the wave of  a  series of  scandals,
delivered a rapid response.  The Act unfortunately creates a series of problems due to its
outreach effects on European companies and auditors, and the Commission is engaged in an
intense regulatory  dialogue with a  view to negotiating  acceptable  solutions  with the US
authorities.  In many areas, the EU shares the same broad objectives and principles of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and in some areas robust, equivalent regulatory approaches exist in the
EU.  In some other areas, new initiatives are necessary.  Earning the right to be recognised as
at least equivalent alongside other national and international rules is a legitimate and useful
end in itself.583  
Corporate malfeasance and corporate misfeasance
Ensuring effective and proportionate protection of shareholders and third parties must be at
the core of any company law policy.  A sound framework for protection of members and
third parties, which properly achieves a high degree of confidence in business relationships,
is a condition for business efficiency and competitiveness.  In particular, an effective regime
for the protection of shareholders and their rights, protecting the savings and pensions of
millions of people and strengthening the foundations of capital markets for the long term in a
context  of  diversified  shareholding within  the EU, is  essential  if  companies  are  to  raise
capital at the lowest cost.584 
Corporate malfeasance is the commission of an unlawful act, while corporate misfeasance is
an  improper  performance  of  some  essentially  lawful  act.585  Back  when  Enron  was  an
admired even if opaque, the company and the stock markets were soaring and investors had
little time to worry about corporate integrity, ethics and accountability.   But the crash of
2001 and the financial scandals that followed have changed that.  The once-arcane subject of
corporate governance has been pulled into the spotlight as public companies, politicians and
government regulators try to show Americans that it's safe once again to put their faith and
their cash in Corporate America.  Assessing Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact / Sarbanes-
Oxley in the US does not appear to be able to deter Corporate Governance flaws in banking.
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The strongest case for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was argued by Charles Niemeier, one of five
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  
Although SOX was enacted with near unanimity in 2002, only a few years thereafter, four
high-profile  commissioned  reports  critiqued  the  legislation  for  having  adverse  economic
consequences for small firms and capital markets.  These critiques contributed to increasing
media coverage of SOX’s impact.    Examination of the coverage of the SOX critiques yields
three core findings.  First, reporting on the critiques increased as media references to Enron
receded, although the term “Enron” has entered the vernacular and its newspaper presence
dwarfs that of the SOX critiques.  Second, market competitiveness issues tend to receive
greater media attention than small firms’ costs, although these concerns are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.  This reporting pattern is consistent with three of the four commissioned
reports’  emphasis  on market  competitiveness  issues.   Third,  and most  intriguing from a
political economy standpoint, regional newspapers and the Washington Post devoted equal
attention to small firm compliance costs and capital market competitiveness issues and hence
provided greater relative coverage of small firm costs than did the New York-based national
press.586  
Reasons for Passage of the Act and Its Main Components 
This section is to give a brief overview of the ongoing debate in the literature concerning the
main  thrust  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act,  as  well  as  different  angles  on  its  effect  on  the
corporate  sector  in  the  US and whether  the  issues  that  it  is  meant  to  remedy are  being
addressed.  The driver for the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the desire to
address issues of insufficient  corporate governance processes in the US corporate sector,
which  had  been  brought  to  light  shortly  before  by  the  corporate  scandals  involving
companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen and others.  Bergen describes the
situation at the time: in the wake of the 2001-2002 Arthur Andersen accounting scandal and
collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the government, the investors and the American public
demanded corporate reforms to prevent similar future occurrences.  
Viewed to be largely a result of failed or poor governance, insufficient disclosure practices,
and a lack of satisfactory internal controls, in 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
seeking to set standards and guarantee the accuracy of financial  reports.  Romano states:
“SOX was enacted in a flurry of congressional activity in the run-up to the midterm 2002
congressional elections after the spectacular failures of the once highly regarded firms Enron
and WorldCom”.   In  her  examination  of  the  Act  and  the  proceedings  leading  up to  its
passage Romano was critical of some of the law’s components, as well as its make-up as a
whole.   An example  for  Romano’s  criticism is  her  opinion of  section  301 of  SOA that
requires all  listed companies to have audit  committees composed entirely of independent
directors: there are fewer studies of the relation between audit committee composition and
firm performance.   One  proponent  of  this  school  of  thought  is  Bumgardner  who  states
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regarding the very same provision.  The audit committee of the board of directors at any
public  company gains  new power  and responsibilities,  and there are  more  safeguards  to
ensure that audit committee members are not controlled by top management. (Bumgardner,
2003).   In evaluating  the Act in  terms of  it  preventing  future scandals  Ribstein broadly
dismisses its  utility  and would rather see an unimpeded response by the market itself  in
addressing the problems.  Markets are capable of responding more quickly and precisely
than regulation to corporate fraud, as long as regulation does not impede or mislead them.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a landmark piece of legislation as far as disclosure, enhanced
corporate accountability and responsibility, independence of audit committees and financial
reporting  is  concerned.   It  was  created  as  a  means  to  prevent  fraudulent  behaviour  in
financial  statements  and to  restore investors’  confidence  after  the hurricane  of corporate
scandals that razed the corporate governance construction to the ground.  This divergence
goes beyond the self-evident division between supporters and critics.  There are critics who
have reservations about its effectiveness and draw attention to the compliance costs.587  They
consider the Act to be nothing more than a patchwork and codified response by Congress to
widely  publicized  financial  scandals’,  with  no  direct  impact  on  improving  corporate
governance and financial disclosures, at least beyond those of market-based mechanisms.588
Other critics concluded that the Act‘s costs are substantial, while the benefits are small, and
have described the Act as quack corporate governance.589  Like Bainbridge,  focus on the
political motivation behind it and the quality of its content.  Congress and the regulators have
implemented a set of reforms that are deeply flawed.  They have adopted policies that have
no empirical  support  or  economic  justification.   Worse  yet,  they  have  eviscerated  basic
federalism rules that have long served us well.590  He concluded that the Act sacrificed the
American economy at the altar of short-term political gain.591  
There are scholars who have suggested that the Act’s importance has been overstated and
predicted its effect to be modest.592  Perino asserts that the Act was in reality a response to
the increased political  fire storm and the pressure on the Congress,  as the new criminal
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liability provisions criminalized little conduct that was not criminal under existing statutes.593
The reform measures reflected previously accumulated policy positions that were based on
experience,  anecdotes,  general  policy  arguments,  and  the  outcome  of  long-running
competitive posturing by good corporate governance proponents and their targets.594  There
are  supporters,  who  are  convinced  that  the  Act  will  improve  corporate  governance  and
strengthen financial markets in the long-run.  Wiesen suggested that it is as broad an attempt
to correct free market externalities as any legislation passed by the federal government in
memory,  it  deals with what  people do,  not where securities  go.595  A study of the early
evidence  of  the  SoX found that  it  has  served as  a  stimulus  to  encourage  initiatives  for
rebuilding the public confidence in corporate governance, the financial  reporting process,
and audit functions.  The SoX had a positive effect on the accuracy of financial disclosure, as
the increasing number of restatements among all types of companies, but particularly larger
ones, since its adoption has indicated.596  The early evidence in 2006 showed that the over-
valuation that resulted from the inaccurate financial statements was estimated at $63 billion
on an adjusted basis.597 
Companies had to meet higher standards not only due to the SoX coming into force, but also
pursuant to the updated listing rules adopted by the stock exchanges.  Regarding the costs,
new legislation  created  new incentives  for  companies  to  spend more  money on internal
audits,  above  and  beyond  the  significant  increase  in  audit  costs  after  the  scandals.   In
exchange for these higher costs, SoX promised a variety of long-term benefits, such as a
lower risk for investors of losses from fraud and theft, more reliable financial reporting, and
greater transparency and accountability, while the American economy would benefit from a
better  allocation  of  resources  and  faster  growth.598  The  Listing  Rules  were  helpful  to
companies  as  additional  guidance  for  improving  their  organization  and  their  function,
because these rules were constructed in such a way as to be compatible with the spirit of the
SoX.  
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Moving to auditors, auditing companies were also affected by the SoX, because there were
many academics, who were talking about failure of the gatekeepers599 as one of the causes of
the corporate failures.  For instance, Coffey Jr and Tomasic have stressed the critical role of
these  gatekeepers  in  corporate  law  and  their  responsibility  in  the  context  of  corporate
scandals.600  A number of auditing failures revealed the cracks in the foundations of the
auditor’s system of self-regulation long before Enron and the passing of the SoX.  Ernst &
Young had to pay a record $335 million for the settlement of a single shareholder lawsuit in
2000.  Apart from the normal auditing services, the Big Four, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP and Deloitte & Touche LLP, were providing lucrative
consulting  services,  and  in  certain  occasions  some auditors  ceased  being  the  emperor’s
gadfly and became his compatriot.  As Healy and Palepu argued, auditing had for a long
period been suffering from a deprofessionalization – a loss in the capacity of auditors to
detect  fraud  -  because  of  increased  competition,  diminishing  audit  fees,  and  persistent
liability risks, which reduced long-term rewards for auditing and increased incentives for
rule-based accounting requiring little discretion or professional expertise.601  
DeFond and Francis noted that the SOX has transformed the auditing industry from a self-
regulated industry to one industry controlled by a quasi-government agency, the PCAOB.602
Post-SoX auditors  are  expected  to  be more  vigorous and more  dynamic  in  their  role  as
gatekeepers.  Despite that SoX forced them to change their operation and their relationship
with their clients, the Big Four can be characterized as the principal financial beneficiaries of
section 404, due to the lucrative revenue stream from internal control audits.603 
One of the big flaws of SoX that is  not related to the wording of the provisions or the
enforcement strategy is that it does not focus on the source of the real problem: the pressure
placed on managers  by the  disclosure of  the  quarterly  results.604  The shareholder  value
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theory  was  not  applied  correctly  and  failed  to  guide  managers  and  directors  in  their
decisions.  A closer look at the SoX provisions shows that no reference was made to this
problem and no relevant  arrangement  was  made.   New legislation  did  little  to  alter  the
incentives for corporate leaders to take excessive risks,  as corporate  culture continues  to
reward managers, who are willing to take risks and do not second guess the genius of their
decisions.605  The SoX has been profoundly influenced by the shareholder value theory and
in this way instead of attacking the root of the evil, fertilizes it.606  
Supervision was indeed defective and gate-keeping mechanisms were malfunctioning, but
the crisis was deep and it penetrated to the very foundations of the corporate governance
system.607  The struggle to keep the stock prices up, to maximize profits, and to achieve high
returns through stock options and bonuses led to irrational choices and fraudulent activity.
Companies  became vulnerable,  and the  rest  is  history.   The United States  has  the  most
diverse and efficient capital markets in the world, Thomas Friedman wrote in 1997, which
reward, and even celebrate, risk-taking.608  A lot seems to have changed since then, the days
of euphoria belong to the past and memories from the distant 1930s have returned in the US
stock markets.  But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been
defrauded  by  offerings  of  dubious  quality  securities,  in  the  new  millennium,  investors'
perception  is  that  they  have  been  defrauded  by  managers  who  are  not  accountable  to
anyone.609  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act lacks a provision that would serve as a reminder  to
everyone that,  apart  from following the rules and avoiding conflicts  of interest,  business
people should try to inspire an ethical corporate culture, because only in an ethical business
environment  will  disclosure,  independence,  accountability  and diligent  oversight  achieve
their goals.  The need for a radical change in the internal culture of all companies should
have been highlighted and the spirit of the SoX should have led CEOs and CFOs to a u-turn:
back to an ethical model of entrepreneurship.  Emphasis on the admittedly broad principles
of ethical compliance and monitoring, and the clearly articulated demand and expectation
that  managers  behave ethically,  will  reduce risks,  protect  investors  and slowly eliminate
corporate malfeasance.610  
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Starks  said  that  during  the  1990s,  it  seemed  as  though  CEOs  were  being  generously
rewarded for having the good fortune of riding the economic boom.  Sherron Watkins, the
Enron whistleblower said compensation plans such as Grasso's are unnecessary as well as
excessive.  She suggested that a dozen competent candidates would line up for Grasso's old
job if it paid a mere $2 million a year.  During a CEO response panel, EDS Chief Executive
Michael Jordan said that institutional investors have been pressuring corporate boards to tie
salaries more closely to the company's performance.  He said compensation might be the
best method to pay top executives.  Dell Inc. Chairman and CEO Michael Dell, in a Q-and-A
segment with Business Week Managing Editor Mark Morrison, said that Congress cannot
legislate ethics.  Sometimes, team players not involved in running the organization provide
the best examples of doing the right thing.  
The UK governance framework for bank executive remuneration 
Prior to the banking crisis, there was no legal or regulatory rule specifically targeted at bank
executive remuneration matters, albeit the FSA (later the FCA) Handbook implicitly covered
bank executive remuneration by way of requiring responsible and effective organisation and
control  of  bank  affairs,  adequate  risk  management  system,  and  robust  governance
arrangements.611  As a  corollary,  banks’  executive  remuneration  practices  were in  effect
subject  to  the  same  remuneration  rules  and  guidance  as  those  designed  for  generic
companies, possibly in the belief that bank executive remuneration matters were no different
from those of non-financial firms.612 
The  governance  framework  for  executive  remuneration,  focusing  upon  directors’
remuneration  matters,  is  designed  to  align  executive  remuneration  with  the  long-term
interests  of  shareholders613 and  to  manage  the  conflicts  of  interest  in  setting  executive
remuneration.   The remuneration issues below the board level are usually not within the
regulatory remit, the reason for which may lie with the very heart of the conventional theory
of corporate  governance.   The conflicts  of interest,  derived from the Companies  (Model
Articles) Regulations 2008614 (SI 2008/3229), which allows executive directors to set their
own remuneration,615 are nothing but equity governance problems.  In fixing this  market
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failure,  courts  have  been  reluctant  to  make  a  judgement  on  the  substance  of  directors’
remuneration for fear of risking a distorting effect on the market force in setting appropriate
director remuneration.  The court will not determine directors’ remuneration in a company,
provided the articles of association of the company have specified how director remuneration
is  determined.616  Where  a  director’s  remuneration  is  paid,  the  court  does  not  assess
remuneration levels and compare the market value of the director’s services with the amount
of  remuneration  paid.617  The  court  must  be  satisfied  that  the  payment  is  genuinely
remuneration  and  not  a  transaction  disguising  an  illicit  return  of  capital  to  the
shareholders.618  
UK company  law  instead  manages  the  conflicts  of  interest/equity  governance  problems
involved in the setting of directors’ remuneration by enhancing market discipline through
public disclosure of a directors’ remuneration report619 and a mandated advisory vote on the
report  by  shareholders  at  an  annual  general  meeting.620  The  conflicts  of  interest/equity
governance problems matter is further dealt with by the Corporate Governance Code, which
recommends  delegating  directors’  remuneration  matters  to  an  independent  remuneration
committee  composed  exclusively  of  non-executive  directors  and  bars  self-interested
directors from presenting or voting on their own remuneration.621  These three interlinked
governance  mechanisms,  i.e.  independent  Board/remuneration  committee  monitoring,
disclosure and shareholder  voice,  which were set  under  the Companies  Act 2006 (c.46),
UKLA Listing Rules, the Corporate Governance Code and institutional investors’ (e.g. the
Association  of  British  Insurers  (ABI))  guidelines,  constitute  the  generic  governance
framework  for  executive  remuneration.   Due  to  the  UK banking  crisis,  the  governance
framework for bank executive remuneration has been transformed.  For the purpose of fixing
the debt governance problems, it has been extended beyond the generic framework’s three
governance mechanisms to include the FSA’s supervision and stakeholder monitoring, and
embodies remuneration-related rules and guidance under the FSA Handbook (in particular
its  Remuneration  Code622)  and the  Financial  Services  Act  2010 (c.28),  apart  from those
applicable to generic companies.  In particular, the Financial Services Act 2010 (c.28) and
the Executives’ Remuneration Reports Regulations 2010, explicitly entitle debenture holders
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to  the  right  to  receive  copies  of  the  report.   The  framework  regards  the  bank
board/remuneration committee as central  to executive remuneration governance, the FCA
has  been  given,  under  the  Financial  Services  Act  2010  (c.28),623 the  power  to  veto  the
board’s decisions on remuneration.  
The remuneration committee of a quoted bank 
The remuneration  committee  of  a  quoted bank,  having delegated  responsibility  from the
board  with  respect  to  executive  remuneration,624 is  at  the  centre  of  a  bank  executive
remuneration  governance  framework.   In  the  UK,  remuneration  committees  have  been
established in quoted companies since the early 1990s in response to the Cadbury Report
(1992).625  Their  role is discussed in the Greenbury Report (1995),626 the Hampel Report
(1998)  and  the  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance  (1999;  2003;  2006).   The
Combined  Code  (2003;  2006)  gives  a  greater  prominence  and  empowerment  to  non-
executive directors on the remuneration committee with a particular emphasis on them being
independent.627  Due to the banking crisis, the Combined Code has been replaced by the
Corporate  Governance  Code  without  amendment  to  the  requirements  in  respect  of  a
remuneration  committee.   In  view  of  the  various  detrimental  incentives  which  bank
executive remuneration may create and the past deficiencies in bank executive remuneration
governance,628 a remuneration system in a UK bank is called for which is actively controlled
and monitored by independent remuneration committees with the necessary expertise in risk
management, risk governance and remuneration and extended responsibilities.
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Remuneration  committees  are  put  forward as  the  logical  solution  to  the  problem of  the
conflicts of interest within the board, and are designed to objectify the pay setting process.629
Bank corporate governance framework in the UK is, arguably, based upon the assumption
that sound bank governance can be buttressed by independent non-executive directors who
act in the interests of the bank and its shareholders as well as the wider public to the extent
that is required by law and financial regulation.  An independent remuneration committee
can  help  narrow  the  information  and  monitoring  gap  to  which  shareholders  and  bank
supervisors are exposed due in part to the information asymmetry and resource constraints.630
As  was  evident  in  the  banking  crisis,  even  an  apparently  independent  remuneration
committee may be conflicted.  The remuneration committee of a quoted bank in the UK is
comprised  of  at  least  three  independent  non-executive  directors.631  This  procedural
requirement  may  not  by  itself  be  adequate  in  eradicating  a  conflicted  remuneration
committee,  which  may  use  the  pay-setting  process  to  set  executive  remuneration  to  the
detriment of the bank, its shareholders,632 and the wider public.  A case in point is that of Sir
Fred Goodwin’s bonus and pension payments.  Too often the board and their remuneration
committee in UK banks appear to have operated as cosy cartels, with non-executive directors
yielding  to  pressure  from executives,  reluctant,  as  the  ABI  notes,633 to  avoid  excessive
remuneration arrangements for executives by setting relatively undemanding performance
targets, and, as the FSA observes,634 to eliminate excessive risk-taking incentives. 
A bank non-executive director is likely to have a strong interest in keeping his directorship
in the bank, which promises benefits, in the form of business opportunities, prestige, and
social ties.635  A dominant chief executive may prejudice the appointment of independent
non-executive directors and the independence of the pay-setting process.636  A bank non-
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executive  director  may  not  be  willing  to  challenge  a  dominant  chief  executive’s
remuneration  arrangements  in  order  to  protect  his  directorship  at  the bank.637  As a  US
lawyer  says,  only  a  small  number  of  directors  would  take  up  a  post  without  receiving
wholehearted  approval  from  the  CEO.638  There  is  a  concern  regarding  mutual  back
scratching between bank directors who hold cross-directorships.639  Bank directors seeking
executive positions may have incentives to adopt executive-friendly remuneration policies
and  arrangements.640  The  true  independence  of  bank  non-executive  directors  may  be
adversely  affected  by  a  number  of  social  and  psychological  factors.   A  non-executive
director  may  have  close  personal  relationships  with  an  executive.641  Team  spirit  may
encourage  a  board/remuneration  committee  to  avoid  direct  conflict  over  executive
remuneration  issues,642 in  particular  when  the  downsides  of  making  executive-friendly
remuneration decisions are relatively low and executive remuneration arrangements can be
effectively camouflaged.643  
A  remuneration  committee  consisting  exclusively  of  independent  members  may  not  be
ideal.644  Some studies suggest that there is no specific  relation between increased board
independence and improved remuneration policies645and between board independence and
long-term performance of a company.646  An empirical study focusing on banks produces
even more surprising findings.  Adams finds that banks supported by bailout funds had more
independent  boards  and  the  bank  directors  earned  significantly  less  remuneration  than
directors of non-financial  institutions, indicating that formal board independence may not
necessarily benefit banks and that independent directors may not always have the expertise
necessary to adequately oversee complex banks.  One way to address this issue, as the FSA
Remuneration  Code  requires,  may  be  to  make  sure  that  an  independent  remuneration
637
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committee  has  appropriate  resources  and  assistance  to  make  informed  remuneration
decisions.647  
The responsibilities of remuneration committees of UK listed banks and banking groups can
be  listed  as  follows:  regulatory  responsibilities  required  by  the  FCA648 in  respect  of
information disclosure649 and accountability to the FCA, risk alignment of remuneration and
risk management  consistency of remuneration,650 documenting procedures,  and approving
and reviewing of the remuneration policies on a firm-wide basis and more specifically in
respect of approved persons with significant influence functions651; criminal responsibilities
for producing, and submitting to the general meeting for advisory vote, an annual directors’
remuneration  report  under  the  Companies  Act  2006  (c.46);  comply  or  explain
responsibilities under the Corporate Governance Code, including: disclosure responsibility -
to disclose the responsibilities of the committee and explain the role and power conferred
upon by the board,652 and to disclose the other relations between remuneration consultants
and  the  bank;653 responsibilities  for  appointing  a  remuneration  consultant  in  respect  of
executive  directors’  remuneration;654 responsibilities  for  setting  the  remuneration  of  all
executive  directors  and  board  chairman  but  not  the  remuneration  of  non-executive
directors655, and for recommending and monitoring the level and structure of non-executive
directors and of executives below board level;656and, informal responsibilities under the ABI
remuneration guidelines, which have certain impacts upon remuneration practices at listed
647
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banks, for establishing disclosure and shareholder communication procedures,657 see also the
Financial  Services  (Banking Reform)  Act  2013 and the  Bank of  England and Financial
Services Act 2016.
Failure  by  a  relevant  director  to  ensure  that  the  board/remuneration  committee  fixes
affordable  remuneration  may  show  the  director’s  unfitness  and  be  a  ground  for  a
disqualification order.658  The difficulties associated with ensuring that bank remuneration
committees  adequately  undertake  their  responsibilities  are  immense.   Among  those
responsibilities, there are two conflicting objectives of shareholder wealth maximisation and
financial  stability.   Due to this,  the remuneration  committees  of banks have to strike an
appropriate balance between shareholder interest maximisation and avoidance of systemic
risks  inherent  in  remuneration  arrangements,  between  risk  appetite  and  risk  controls,
between short term and longer-term performance, and between individual business unit goals
and  firm-wide  objectives.   Company  law  has  been  weak  in  encouraging  non-executive
directors to balance shareholder interests with the wider public interests.  It is argued that
directors’  fiduciary  duty  to  promote  the  success  of  the  company  for  the  benefit  of  its
shareholders as a whole, and in doing so have regard to stakeholder interests659may serve to
encourage box-ticking and lip-service to the enlightened shareholder value factors.660  
The Corporate Governance Code requires the remuneration committee to set remuneration
with  a  significant  proportion  of  a  director’s  remuneration  package  being  dependent  on
individual/corporate  performance.661  The  FCA  Remuneration  Code  requires  the
remuneration  committee  to  set  executive  remuneration  with  salary  being  a  sufficient
proportion of total remuneration to allow bonuses to be fully flexible.662  A careful balance is
called  for.   The  remuneration  committee  may  face  great  difficulties  in  properly
implementing the complex risk-based approach to executive remuneration adopted by the
FSB  Principles  and  FCA  Remuneration  Code,  which  focuses  upon  risk  adjustment  of
executive remuneration, symmetry between remuneration and risk outcomes, and sensitivity
to  short-  and  long-term  risk.   It  is  required  to  design  remuneration  that  takes  into
657
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consideration all types of risk, that is, prospective risks and risk outcomes that are realised.663
This difficulty may lead to unexpected side effects due to inaccurate risk-adjustment.  Critics
argue that imposing unduly extensive responsibilities on non-executive directors sitting on
the remuneration committee may overly burden them and compromise the chief executive’s
ability to manage incentive structures for the whole management team.664  
As required by the FCA, at least one member of the bank remuneration committee should
have  practical  skills  and  experience  of  risk  management.665  It  is  accepted  that  the
competence of bank remuneration committees can be further strengthened by inputs from
risk  and  audit  committees666 and  from  outside  of  the  board,  for  example  multiple
remuneration consultants and employee representatives.  The Walker Review recommends
that the remuneration committee should seek advice on an arms-length basis from the risk
committee to prevent inappropriate incentives in performance measures.667  Lord Myners has
emphasised that remuneration committees need to have a substantial number of inputs and
has argued that employees should be allowed to air their views on the understanding, that is,
that  only  directors  could  make  the  actual  decisions.668  Some  suggest  improving  the
remuneration  committee’s  competence  by  bringing  employee  representatives  onto  the
committee.669  It is argued that this approach may risk changing the structure and approach of
the  unitary  board.670  It  may  even  risk  compromising  the  remuneration  committee’s
competence by effectively mixing the notion of social justice and wealth distribution into the
committee’s  decisions,  jeopardising  the  very  purpose  of  bringing  their  views  to  the
committee.  An adequate regime of public disclosure as opposed to supervisory disclosure is
essential in fixing the agency problems in the pay-setting process in banks and to supporting
effective bank executive remuneration governance.671  The board of directors of a publicly
663
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quoted  bank  is  required  to  prepare,  approve  and publish  both  a  directors’  remuneration
report, under Companies Act 2006 (c.46) (Sections 420, 421 and 422) and Regulations 2008
(SI 2008/410),672 and an executives’ remuneration report under the Financial Services Act
2010 (c.28).673  These disclosure rules  have their  UK-specific  historical  background.   In
response to widespread concern about excessive remuneration in the then privatised utilities,
the Greenbury Report of 1995 called for rather extensive reforms in executive remuneration
disclosure,  especially  in  respect  of  share  options,  thereby  enabling  investors  to  better
understand  the  economic  costs  of  equity  grants.674  Due  to  the  continuing  widespread
dissatisfaction concerning the issue of directors’ remuneration, especially over the levels of
severance payments, often termed rewards for failure, the UK Government decided in 1999
that voluntary disclosure was no longer adequate or appropriate and mandatory disclosure
was required.675  
The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/1986) were introduced in
the UK and were absorbed into the Companies Act of 2006.  Quoted companies are required
under  the Companies  Act  2006 (c.46) and Regulations  2008 (SI  2008/410) to  publish a
directors’ remuneration report as part of the company’s annual reports and to disclose within
that  report  comprehensive  details  of  each  individual  director’s  remuneration  package.
Information that should be disclosed in tabular form contains the total amount paid to or
receivable from salary and fees, bonuses, expense allowance, compensation for loss of office
and for termination of qualifying services, and non-cash benefits.676  Regulations 2008 (SI
2008/410) requires disclosure of the company’s remuneration policy, the role of the board
and  the  membership  and  role  of  the  remuneration  committee.677  In  response  to  the
shortcomings  that  emerged  in  the  financial  crisis  in  respect  of  bank  executives’
remuneration,  a bank is  required under  the Financial  Services Act 2010 (c.28)  and draft
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672
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Regulations  2010  to  disclose  an  executives’  remuneration  report.   There  is  no  need  to
duplicate  information  that  is  disclosed  in  the  directors’  remuneration  report  or  in  the
accounts  but,  subject  to  that,  the  executives’  remuneration  report  must  disclose  detailed
information  on  an  executives’  remuneration  policy  with  particular  focus  on  risks  and
deference,  a  remuneration  committee  report  with  an  explanation  of  compatibility  with
effective  risk  management,  and  the  number  of,  and  the  aggregate  amounts  earned  by,
executives in each specified band.678 
In terms of rationales, given the legitimate interest of stakeholders in the remuneration of
bank directors and executives in order to independently gauge the bank’s continued financial
health and stability, comprehensive public disclosure is vital.  It enables bank shareholders
and other stakeholders to evaluate  the linkage of executive remuneration to risk-adjusted
long-term  performance,  to  detect  the  extent  to  which  a  problem  with  bank  executive
remuneration exists, and to understand and take control of the agency costs associated with
the two-tier principal-agent relationships.  It may help curb certain types of inappropriate
remuneration practices.679  Disclosure can encourage bank executives and boards to reduce
agency  costs;680 buttress  board  monitoring  and  independence  by  enhancing  the  board’s
ability to withstand the pressure coming from executives and directors;681 and, by way of
publicity  dynamics,  incentivise  shareholders  and  stakeholders  to  take  actions.682  It  can
facilitate constructive engagement of the board with shareholders and other stakeholders.683
Disclosure of remuneration information is, as a key indicator of bank corporate governance
practices,  valuable  for  the  market  and  bank  supervisors.   It  signals  sound  and  safe
remuneration practice to the market684 and may strengthen all market forces aligning interests
in  the  two-tier  principal-agent  relationships.   It  can  be  argued  that  the  disclosure  of
confidential business information may be effectively prevented by means of exceptions and
in practice performance measures using such information are relatively rare.685  
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In view of the wide benefits of comprehensive disclosure and the belief that most of the
information needed for disclosure has been collected in the pay-setting process, disclosure
costs are arguably small.  Inadequate and inaccurate disclosure can feed envy686 and serve to
camouflage remuneration,687 misleading shareholders and stakeholders.  Certainly, without
clear and effective disclosure, the potential herd mentality of institutional shareholders and
the  market  may  become  destructive.688  It  is  acknowledged  that  the  disclosure  of
remuneration information will not be effective without necessary disclosure of information
on risk management and internal controls so as to allow stakeholders to gauge the robustness
of  support  for  a  bank’s  strategy  and  risk  appetite  as  well  as  to  enable  the  bank’s
counterparties to make an appropriate decision on their business relations with the bank.689
Disclosure must be made in a comprehensive, clear, accurate, and timely manner and allow
for  easy  assessment  of  the  pay-performance  linkage  and  risk  alignment.   Effective  and
standardised disclosure can reduce information costs to institutional shareholders and other
interested stakeholders, by sharpening shareholder engagement and stakeholder monitoring
and focusing board attention  more closely  on inappropriate  incentives  that  remuneration
policies and arrangements may create.690  
In order for bank stakeholders to gauge the bank’s continued financial health and stability,
disclosed information should be comprehensive and individualised to the level at which they
can effectively evaluate  the linkage of executive remuneration to risk-adjusted long-term
performance.  The auditable information in respect of the remuneration of bank executives
immediately below board level is disclosed in aggregate fashion rather than individualised
and only on the number of, and the aggregate amounts earned by them in each specified
band.  Among other things, auditable information on the remuneration of bank executives
immediately below board level may be disclosed under the Regulations of 2010 in the way
in  which  directors’  remuneration  is  required  to  be  disclosed  under  Regulations  2008691.
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These 2010 Regulations may require an individualised disclosure of auditable information
on bonuses of executives immediately below board level.  A non-auditable individualised
explanation may be provided concerning the way in which each bank executive director’s
remuneration performance criteria are linked to the bank’s long-term interests and risks.  The
regime may require a sufficiently detailed description of the manner of risk adjustment as
required  by  the  FSB  Principles.692  It  is  reasonable  that  banded  disclosure  should  be
accompanied by an analysis that gives stakeholders and the market an understanding of how
remuneration is divided across business segments, presuming that those exposed to greater
risk would have greater remuneration.693  It  is  recognised that unduly onerous disclosure
requirements may have detrimental effects, such as driving talented executives and senior
traders away.694  Requirements should be nuanced to be proportional to the size, complexity,
structure and risk profile of different banks.  
Disclosure itself may contribute to the ratcheting-up of pay due to common labour market
practice.695  Disclosure policy and regulation must be nuanced, clear and effective if it is to
avoid,  or  at  least  effectively  ameliorate,  this  side-effect.   The  government  outlined  new
proposals to  strengthen  corporate  governance,  including  measures  designed  to  reduce
excessive executive pay and make large privately-owned businesses meet the same standards
as listed firms.696
Mandated advisory shareholder vote and shareholder empowerment
In the UK, directors’ and executives’ remuneration reports of a publicly quoted bank are
subject to an advisory, non-binding ordinary resolution at the bank’s annual general meeting,
with no entitlement of a director or an executive to remuneration being made conditional on
the  resolution  being  passed.697  This  mechanism  complements  compulsory  shareholder
approval  requirements.   Where  shareholder  agreement  is  required  for  a  change  in
remuneration policy, such as the introduction of, or material amendment to, employees share
schemes,  long-term  incentive  plans  or  discounted  option  arrangements,698 specific  prior
692
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approval by an ordinary resolution of shareholders in a general meeting is sought.  These
requirements do not aim at controlling executive remuneration but at protecting the rights
attached to existing shares from dilution.699  The provisions of the Companies  Act 2006
(c.46)  specify  that  shareholder  approval  is  required  for  any  exceptional  payments  to  a
director on loss of office700 and for a guaranteed term of employment for more than two
years.701  Whilst the compulsory vote on option and share reward schemes covers important
remuneration  components  which  are  susceptible  to  poor  design,  this  is  not  sufficient.
Second, say on pay offers a flexible and non-interventionist way in which shareholders can
influence boards on remuneration matters where they may have legitimate concerns.702  It is
argued that a high level of shareholder approval in UK companies since the introduction of
the  mandated  advisory  vote  mechanism  in  2002703 may  indicate  effective  shareholder
influence over board behaviour.704  
Critics may call the mandated advisory shareholder vote mechanism a hybrid with an unclear
legal effect.705  It is argued that its strength does not lie with legal force but derives from the
market force associated with the voice mechanism conferred upon shareholders.  Evidence
shows that  board decision-making is  influenced by the prospect  of a mandated  advisory
shareholder  vote  and  boards  tend  to  respect  the  result  of  the  advisory  vote.706  This
mechanism may encourage boards to actively consult with major shareholders on sensitive
remuneration  matters.707  With  appropriate  disclosure,  it  may  help  reduce  the  equity
699
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governance problems by way of strengthening the independence of a board remuneration
committee.708  Because  institutional  shareholders  may react  strongly  to  outlier  executive
remuneration arrangements, which do not conform to shareholder-friendly best practice,709
this mechanism may facilitate the implementation of shareholder-friendly best practice on
bank executive remuneration.  With regard to UK executive remuneration, there is evidence
that advisory shareholder voting may be an effective mechanism to reduce alleged egregious
executive  remuneration  arrangements  from  the  perspective  of  shareholders;710 that
shareholders disapprove of higher salaries, weak pay-for-performance sensitivity in bonuses,
and greater potential dilution from share-based remuneration;711 and that it effectively puts to
an  end  the  UK  version  of  the  golden  parachute,  i.e.  long-term  executive  employment
contracts, with almost no large UK companies entering into senior executive contracts of
more than one year or providing for accelerated share options upon a change in control.712
The shortening of executives’ contract periods to one year or less may cause executives to
feel less secure and become more opportunistic and inclined to take higher risk.  An advisory
shareholder vote is not without downsides even from the perspective of shareholders.  It does
not require prompt adjustments to inappropriate remuneration arrangements in the current
financial  year.713  Its  effect  over  the level  and design of executive  remuneration may be
limited.714  Since disclosure is an essential part of an advisory vote, a company with a no vote
may attribute the no vote to not clearly explaining and justifying its remuneration policy to
shareholders.  It may lead to the one size fits all and box-ticking approach by shareholders to
executive remuneration, resulting in a homogeneity in executive remuneration practices and
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the suppressing of value-enhancing innovative remuneration structures,715 attributable in part
to the role of proxy advisors.  Few negative recommendations from proxy advisors over the
period of 2003 to 2007 may contribute to the fact that only 9 say-on-pay resolutions in UK
companies were rejected between 2003 and 2009.716 
Mandated voting for shareholders eliminates the barrier of the initial impulse.  The technical
work  is  undertaken  by  the  remuneration  committee,  with  the  assistance  of  professional
advisors.   The  publication  of  the  details  of  remuneration  policies  and  arrangements,
necessary for a mandatory advisory shareholder vote, reduces rational apathy due to the costs
of  obtaining  information.717  Shareholders  may  make  uninformed  decisions  because  of
insufficient  expertise.   General disclosure can help to establish benchmarks.   A vote can
involve all shareholders whilst the costs to the individual are marginal.718  Votes can either
concern remuneration policies prospectively or remuneration reports retrospectively.719  A
shareholder  vote on remuneration  policies  only accommodates  privacy concerns.720  It  is
important  for shareholders  to  express  views on how a remuneration  policy is  applied  in
practice.  
The fact that large remuneration packages were received by executives and senior traders of
banks  which  thereafter  collapsed  or  survived  only  through  government  bailouts  has
energised  shareholder  empowerment  supporters.   Some  propose  a  binding  shareholder
resolution in respect of the remuneration report as a whole.721  The Walker Report argues that
it  is  difficult  to  implement  such a  proposal.722  Binding votes  can create  problems with
715
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contractual  entitlements  negotiated  and  approved  beforehand  within  the  framework  of  a
specific  policy implicitly  or explicitly  approved by shareholders.723  Qualified executives
may avoid jurisdictions subjecting them to uncertainties of provisional contracts.  But certain
remuneration  components  based  upon  share  issues  are  subjected  to  binding  shareholder
approval in the UK without insuperable practical difficulties.724  The Walker Report instead
proposes that if fewer than 75 percent of the votes are cast on resolutions by remuneration
committees then its chairman should be obliged to stand for re-election at the next AGM
regardless of the time left on his term.725  This proposal seems designed to help mitigate the
equity  governance  problems  in  the  context  that  remuneration  policies  have  attracted
enormous shareholder concerns, together with wider political  and media attentions.   Paul
Myners,  the  UK’s  City  minister,  goes  further  and  suggests  giving  bank  shareholders
mandatory  power  to  vote  on  individual  remuneration  arrangements  before  they  are
approved.726  Franks instead favours indirect regulation that makes it easier for shareholders
to  nominate  directors  in  tackling  bank  remuneration  problems.   This  is  rejected  by
Montagnon,  as he argues  that  this  may undermine  the proper  functioning of  the unitary
board.727
There is still room for improvement in terms of say on pay.  This is reflected in the case of
the  disputed  pension  award  by  the  RBS  board  to  its  former  chief  executive,  Sir  Fred
Goodwin.728  Aligned  with  the  view expressed  by  shareholders  that  no  executive  board
member who leaves early should have a contractual right to retire on full pension, the UKFI,
RBS’s  biggest  shareholder,  rejected  RBS’s  2008  remuneration  report  at  its  annual
shareholder meeting in protest over its controversial pension award.  The formal shareholder
rebuke had no legal effect upon his £703,000 annual pension and his employment contract
meant RBS was legally obliged to pay him a full pension if he had been asked to leave the
company early.729  These proposed reforms do not adequately address the excessive risk-
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taking  nature  of  bank executive  remuneration  arrangements.   Shareholder  empowerment
cannot be relied upon to address inappropriate incentives that create or exacerbate systemic
risks.  There is evidence that bank shareholders in the UK failed to exercise effective control
over remuneration policies so as to prevent excessive risk-taking or activities inconsistent
with corporate wellbeing.730  On the contrary, shareholder empowerment would give an air of
legitimacy  to  systemic  risk-free  remuneration  structures  at  banks.   In  terms  of  the  link
between  pay  and  long-term  performance,  risk  policies  and  system  advocated  in  the
Corporate Governance Code,731 undue promotion of shareholder empowerment may do more
harm than good if problems such as short-termism, widely exhibited in the market, are not
properly resolved.732
During  the  five-year  period,  growth  in  UK  banks  continued  based  on  high-powered
incentives  with bonuses for bank executives  accounting  for at  least  a third of their  total
remuneration  packages.   The remuneration  structures  for  investment  bankers  were  more
centred  on  incentives,  which  allowed  bankers  to  pocket  50%  of  trading  revenues
generated.733  UK bank shareholders were content with aggressive risk-taking fostered by
high-powered incentives.  This is not surprising since they were doing very well from it.
Over  the  five-year  period  from  2003  to  2007,  FTSE  350  Banks  index  (NMX8350)734
increased by more than 80% from 6500 to 11800.  This equated to a 16% annualised return.
An increasing  percentage  of  shareholdings  at  banks  were  held  by  hedge  funds735 which
tended to demand even higher returns, usually at the cost of future profitability and stability,
than conventional institutional shareholders such as insurance companies, banks and pension
funds.  As Ferrarini et al. observe, it appears that the mandated advisory vote brought about
widespread  approval  of  remuneration  policies  in  real  terms  and  more  increases  in
remuneration.  Only eight rejections were logged from 2002 to mid 2009, and no rejections
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were made over bank executive remuneration.736  As the Walker Report observes,737 before
the banking crisis broke out, there appeared to have been a widespread shareholder consent
in the increasing expansion and leverage738 of banks’ balance sheets in order to boost ROE.
Some major fund managers appeared to have been slow to act where problems in investee
banks were identified, and rarely sought to fix them.  A Treasury Select Committee report
comes to a similar conclusion.739 
Even if bank shareholders have incentives to oversee systemic risks generated by executive
remuneration,  they  do  not  seem  to  be  capable  of  appropriately  gauging  systemic  risks
because these are generated at the level of the interlinking and complex financial system and
are hard to detect at bank level.740  Systemic risks accumulate in the form of safe financial
instruments and products, which makes it difficult to argue, if not in retrospect, that these
risks have exceeded the pre-set risk tolerance level.  Last but not least, in terms of the design
of the mandatory advisory shareholder vote mechanism, it is an approach reliant on the self-
interest  of  shareholders  as  a  means  of  validating  the  board’s  power  over  senior  officer
compensation and of mitigating concerns that executive remuneration arrangements are not
designed in the shareholders’ best interests.741  It has been devised to address the conflicts of
interest between executives, the board and shareholders rather than to induce the board to
take into consideration the interests  of stakeholders.742  It  is used to improve the linkage
between  pay  and  performance,  to  empower  shareholders  and  improve  shareholder
democracy, to give greater focus to remuneration committees when carrying out their duties
as custodians of shareholder interests, and to encourage shareholders to take a more holistic
view on remuneration.  
With the possibility  of the market  being driven by short-termism, it  is  doubtful whether
shareholder empowerment per se can effectively address the issue of short-termism so as to
736
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strengthen the linkage of pay to long-term performance and risk policies and system.  It is
argued that short-term focused remuneration arrangements are reflections of myopic investor
preferences.743  Shareholders do not want executives to focus upon the long term any more
than they already do.  Samuelson and Stout argue that institutional and individual investors
have both become concerned with quarterly earnings forecasts and short-term share price
changes.744  Empirical evidence regarding the existence of market myopia is mixed.  It has
been  suggested  that  the  growth  of  private  equity  buyouts,  which  free  companies  from
focusing upon long-term gains,  is  some evidence  of  market  myopia.745  Others  point  to
positive stock market reaction to long-term investment as evidence against market myopia.746
Stakeholder involvement
Regulations 2010 fails to provide debenture holders with an effective channel for stakeholder
voice  to  counter-balance  shareholders’  risk-shifting  self-interest  but  leaves  it  solely  to
market forces.  This leads to doubts about the practical effectiveness of this requirement.
The  FCA’s  regulation,  supervision  and  enforcement  in  respect  of  bank  executive
remuneration.  Rather, regulation of remuneration governance complements direct regulation
of remuneration contents and is more flexible and less susceptible to over-regulation than is
direct regulation of remuneration contents.  A draconian regulatory intervention in executive
remuneration at  banks may lead to an unhealthy homogeneity in  remuneration practices,
stifle innovation and beneficial risk-taking.747  It may disincentivise the board/remuneration
committee from actively taking responsibility for assessing the link between pay and long-
term performance748 and between pay and effective risk-management.   They may lead to
banks employing talented lawyers to find ways to circumvent complex and onerous rules.
Where  a  system  is  based  upon  principles,  avoidance  becomes  far  more  difficult.   The
principles-based approach has its  own shortcomings,  one of which is that it  may lead to
complacency and an unduly light-touch regulation and supervision in the boom years.749  In
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terms of supervision, the FCA has included remuneration practices in their risk assessment
of banks.750  As the FSB argues, a supervisory review of remuneration practices should be
meticulous and uninterrupted, with any weaknesses being dealt with swiftly.751  
Apart  from conventional  enforcement  tools,  the  FCA has  been given express  powers  to
prohibit a bank from remunerating its staff in a specific way, to render void any provision of
an  agreement  that  contravenes  such  a  prohibition  and  to  provide  for  the  recovery  of
payments made, or property transferred, in pursuance of a void provision.752  It is recognised,
as  the  FCA  claims,  that  these  powers  will  only  be  of  useful  where  the  effect  of  the
prohibition can be seen before they are applied.753  In acknowledgement of that, the FCA
proposed to limit this power to deferral arrangements and guaranteed bonuses.754  As the
FCA states, where a coherent case has been put forward that the voiding powers of banks
apply to a specific  contract  it  will  be forced to recover  any payments  made or property
transferred.755  Banks would be denied from granting variable remuneration components to
executives  unless  a  legal  advice  assures  that  the  grant  complies  with  the  Remuneration
Code.756  
US banking regulators,  such as the FDIC, have long been actively disputing unsafe and
unsound remuneration practices.757  The types of incentive remuneration arrangements which
FDIC has targeted include: remuneration arrangements of loan officers to incentivise them to
underwrite loans without regard for their credit quality;758 and the termination provisions of a
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remuneration  contract  which  do  not  allow  the  bank  to  terminate  the  employee’s
remuneration  for  failure  to  perform.  The enforcement  cases  are  based on the excessive
claims that the remuneration paid impacted the bank’s capital or liquidity, i.e. its financial
condition.759  The  FDIC  in  some  cases  did  not  explicitly  consider  whether  or  not  a
remuneration  arrangement  was  excessive  but  was  concerned that  the  large  remuneration
arrangement  may  undermine  the  public’s  confidence.760  The  trade-off  for  the  FCA  in
relation to bank executive remuneration is to balance financial  stability  with the need to
preserve the banking sector in its role as an important contributor to the economy761 and the
banking sector’s need to attract and retain talented executives.  This argues that the FCA’s
attention should be directed at the underlying causes of inappropriate remuneration, i.e. the
two-tier  agency  problems.   Direct  regulation  of  the  structure  of  executive  remuneration
arrangements and the use of the FCA’s veto power have the advantage of potentially shifting
the  decision-making  function  away  from  self-interested  directors  and  the  influence  of
executives and placing it in the hands of the FCA.  
A bank’s need to attract, motivate and retain talented executives is arguably most crucial
when the bank is under financial  stress, whilst  executives  concurrently have the greatest
incentive  to  seek  employment  elsewhere.   This  paradox  sets  the  FCA’s  heightened
supervision  and  instinct  to  intervene  against  the  bank’s  need  to  maintain  maximum
flexibility during crisis management.  It is unrealistic to believe that the FCA’s requirements
on remuneration practices can be reconciled with the bank’s pending needs.  The FCA’s
intention is not to threaten the long-term viability of healthy banks.762 
Corporate governance reforms
Corporate governance reforms have concentrated on the following: strengthening the role
and function of the board of directors; strengthening the independence and the role of market
intermediaries,  including the oversight of auditors, credit rating agencies, market analysts
and IPO sponsors; improving the quality and integrity of public disclosure to provide more
transparency  and  strengthening  the  ability  of  investors  to  take  care  of  their  interests.
Corporate  governance  problems  differ  in  various  parts  of  the  world.   Having  enough
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another  common  challenge.  Improved  transparency  resulting  from  better  corporate
governance practices means shareholders are better able to exercise ownership function.763  
Regulators and governments having instituted regulations and structures designed to promote
good corporate  governance  must  guard against  complacency and strengthen enforcement
efforts to improve standards.  Markets are an intersection of supply and demand.  The supply
of good corporate governance practices by management must match the investor demand for
better practices, as well as the transparency of performance.  To conclude, the regulators
have to work out an infrastructure that promotes good corporate governance and to enforce
breaches  of  the  relevant  rules  or  regulations,  but  the  delivery  of  performance  and  the
willingness  to  conform to  best  practices  must  come from the  drive  and action  of  good
corporate management.  It appears that Sarbanes-Oxley in the US does not appear to be able
to  deter  corporate  governance  flaws  in  banking  and  in  addition,  the  CA 2006  and  the
corporate governance codes appear not to work too much in the UK and this is why updated
corporate governance were launched in the UK and this is also why Dodd-Frank came about
after it.
Dodd–Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act (US  and  UK
regulatory responses to the 2007 global financial crisis)
After the 2007 global financial crisis, the  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act  (Dodd-Frank) was signed into federal law by president Barack Obama on
July 21, 2010 in Washington, DC.764  Passed as a response to the 2000s recession, it brought
the most significant changes to financial regulation in the United States since the regulatory
reform that followed the great depression.765  It made changes in the American financial
regulatory environment that affect all federal financial regulatory agencies and almost every
part of the nation's financial services industry.766  As with other major financial reforms, a
variety of critics have attacked the law, some arguing it was not enough to prevent another
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financial crisis or more bail outs, and others arguing it went too far and unduly restricted
financial institutions.767  The law was proposed by the Obama Administration in June 2009,
when  the  White  House  sent  a  series  of  proposed  bills  to  Congress.   A  version  of  the
legislation  was  introduced  in  the  House  in  July  2009.   On  December  2,  2009,  revised
versions were introduced in the house of representatives by Financial Services Committee
Chairman Barney Frank, and in the Senate Banking Committee by Chairman Chris Dodd.
Due to their involvement with the bill, the conference committee that reported on June 25,
2010, voted to name the bill after the two members of Congress.768  The financial crisis of
2007–2010 led to widespread calls for changes in the regulatory system.769  In June 2009,
President  Obama  introduced  a  proposal  for  a  sweeping  overhaul  of  the  United  States
financial  regulatory  system,  a  transformation  on a  scale  not  seen  since  the  reforms that
followed the Great Depression.770 
As the finalized bill emerged from conference, President Obama stated that the bill included
90 percent of the proposals.771  Major components of Obama's original proposal, listed by
order in which they appear in the "A New Foundation" outline, include: the consolidation of
regulatory agencies, elimination of the national thrift charter, and new oversight council to
evaluate systemic risk; comprehensive regulation of financial markets, including increased
transparency  of  derivatives; consumer  protection  reforms  including  a  new  consumer
protection agency and uniform standards for plain vanilla products as well as strengthened
investor protection; tools for financial crises, including a resolution regime complementing
the existing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation authority to allow for orderly winding
down  of  bankrupt  firms,  and  including  a  proposal  that  the  Federal  Reserve  receive
authorization from the Treasury for extensions of credit in unusual or exigent circumstances;
various  measures  aimed  at  increasing  international  standards  and  cooperation  including
proposals related to improved accounting and tightened regulation of credit rating agencies.
At  Obama's  request,  Congress  later  added the  Volcker  Rule  to  this  proposal  in  January
2010.772  
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The 2008 financial crisis will be known as the modern financial system’s annuls horribilis.
A natural consequence of a crisis is that citizens are asking how this happened and who is to
blame.773  This  invites  the  enquiry  that  amidst  this  wreckage,  as  legislators  consider
proposals for sweeping regulatory reforms, prosecutors and regulatory agencies have begun
the arduous and time-consuming process of determining whether any criminal wrongdoing
led to the credit crisis.774  The introduction to Dodd-Frank makes clear what the legislation’s
intentions to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial  system, to end too big to fail,  to protect  the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,
and for other purposes.775  One particular aspect of Dodd-Frank, the Volcker Rule, which
prohibits a bank from engaging in proprietary trading, and from acquiring or retaining an
ownership interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund.776  The intent of the Volcker Rule
was to endeavour to replicate the US Banking Act of 1933, called the Glass Steagall Act
after its sponsors, which separated investment banking from retail banking by limiting the
range  and  volume  of  securities-related  transactions  that  the  commercial  entities  could
perform.777  This rule does not merely affect US entities but also applies to foreign banks and
entities  which  have  a  branch  or  agency  in  the  US  and  demonstrates  the  reach  of  US
legislation.778  An additional outcome of the review of the financial crisis was that the SEC
recognised that more information on breaches of securities law was required and has caused
it to promote the role of the whistleblower.779  Dodd-Frank encourages whistleblowers to
report  suspected  violations  direct  to  the  SEC Office  of  the  Whistleblower,780 which  will
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reward781 such suppliers of information who are eligible to receive between 10 percent and
30 percent of any enforcement penalty in excess of $1 million that the agency recovers as a
result of the report.782  The largest reward was $30m in 2014.783  Dodd-Frank was not the first
attempt at encouraging informers to come forward with information about fraud against the
government  in  return for a  share of the damages recovered.784  In 1863, pre-dating both
conspiracy  to  defraud  (1867)  and Mail  Fraud  (1872),  the  False  Claims  Act  empowered
citizens to sue on behalf of the government for fraud against the government and share in the
fruits of litigation since 2009, the DoJ has recovered more than $13.3 billion in False Claims
Act  cases.785  In  2012,  the  DoJ  brought  an  all-time  high of  647 whistleblower  cases,786
demonstrating the economic value of an incentivised whistleblower.  The rewards from SEC
make it all the more likely that employees who notice such wrongdoing will take steps to
bring  it  to  light.   This  may be  at  the  expense  of  reporting  through companies’  internal
corporate risk management or governance channels.  The SEC reported receiving one to two
high value tips per day, up from about a dozen a year prior to enactment’ of Dodd-Frank.787
There is the risk of repeat bad faith claims as in a 2014 case where the SEC banned an
individual who had knowingly made 196 award applications which were false, fictitious or
fraudulent in pursuit of an award.788 
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The effect of Dodd-Frank is clear that the US has a long history of providing incentives.
This is not a feature of UK culture and legislation, including the UK Bribery Act 2010, does
not provide for these rewards.789  The UK regulators FCA/PRA have announced proposals to
make  regulatory  changes  necessary  to  require  firms  to  have  effective  whistleblowing
procedures,  and  to  make  senior  management  accountable  for  delivering  these,790 but
concluded that financial incentives to report would not be adopted.791  This area is outside the
scope of this  thesis  but would warrant further research because of the risk of regulatory
arbitrage where, for UK companies falling within the purview of the SEC, whistleblowers
may be tempted to report wrongdoing in the US rather than either the UK authorities or
through internal procedures, where no rewards exist.792  
Some years before Dodd-Frank, in the wake of a spate of financial / accounting scandals,793
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 was enacted to protect investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability  of  corporate  disclosures  made  pursuant  to  the  securities  laws,  and  for  other
purposes.794  This  was  a  Congressional  response  to  revelations  of  several  high  profile
accounting fraud cases including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, that resulted in mass destruction
of investor value and loss of investor confidence in the integrity of the financial markets.795
As  Yeager  notes,  these  cases  led  to  criminal  charges  of  company  officials  and  the
bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen LLP, at the time arguable the most prestigious independent
auditing firm in the world.796  A feature of Sarbanes-Oxley was increased sentences: the
maximum penalty for wire and mail fraud from five years to twenty years imprisonment.
Then, we will examine the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
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Financial crisis of 2007–2008
The  financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the  global financial crisis and the  2008
financial crisis, is considered by many economists to have been the worst  financial crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.797  It began in 2007 with a crisis in the  subprime
mortgage market in the US, and developed into a full-blown international banking crisis with
the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008.798  Excessive
risk-taking  by  banks  such  as  Lehman  Brothers  helped  to  magnify  the  financial  impact
globally.799  Massive  bail-outs of  financial  institutions  and other  palliative  monetary and
fiscal policies were employed to prevent a possible collapse of the world's financial system.
The crisis was nonetheless followed by a global  economic downturn, the  Great Recession.
The European debt crisis, a crisis in the banking system of the European countries using the
euro, followed later.  The Dodd–Frank Act800 was enacted in the US in the aftermath of the
crisis to "promote the financial stability of the United States".  The  Basel III capital  and
liquidity standards were adopted by countries around the world.801 
High mortgage approval rates led to a large pool of home-buyers, which drove up housing
prices.  This appreciation in value led large numbers of homeowners to borrow against their
homes  as  an  apparent  windfall.   This  bubble  would  be  burst  by  a  rising  Single-Family
Residential Mortgages Delinquency Rate (beginning in August, 2006 and peaking in the first
quarter,  2010).802  The  high  delinquency  rates  led  to  a  rapid  devaluation  of  financial
instruments.  Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. Merrill Lynch,
AIG,  Freddie  Mac,  Fannie  Mae,  HBOS,  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland,  Bradford  & Bingley,
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Fortis,  Hypo and Alliance & Leicester  were all  expected to follow – with a US federal
bailout announced the following day beginning with $85B to AIG.  In spite of trillions803
paid out by the US federal government, it became much more difficult to borrow money.
The resulting decrease in buyers caused housing prices to plummet.  While the collapse of
large financial institutions was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments,
stock  markets still  dropped  worldwide.   In  many  areas,  the  housing  market  suffered,
resulting  in  evictions,  foreclosures,  and  prolonged  unemployment.   The  crisis  played  a
significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in
trillions of US dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the Great Recession
of 2008–2012 and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis.804  The active phase of
the crisis, which manifested as a  liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when
BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation
of liquidity".805
The bursting of the  US housing bubble,  which peaked at  the end of 2006,806 caused the
values of securities tied to US real estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions
globally.807  The  financial  crisis  was  triggered  by  a  complex  interplay  of  policies  that
encouraged  home  ownership,  providing  easier  access  to  loans  for  subprime  borrowers,
overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would
continue to escalate,  questionable trading practices  on behalf  of both buyers and sellers,
compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation,
and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the
financial commitments they were making.808  Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in
credit availability, and damaged investor confidence affected global stock markets, where
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securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009.  Economies worldwide slowed
during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined.809  Governments and
central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and
institutional  bailouts.810  In  the  US,  Congress  passed  the  American  Recovery  and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.  In the United States President Barack Obama and key advisers
introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009.  The proposals address consumer
protection,  executive  pay,  bank  financial  cushions  or  capital  requirements,  expanded
regulation of the  shadow banking system and  derivatives, and enhanced authority for the
Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others.811
In January 2010, Obama proposed additional  regulations  limiting the ability  of banks to
engage  in  proprietary  trading.   The  proposals  were  dubbed  "The  Volcker  Rule",  in
recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.812 
The US Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House, which passed a bill
in December 2009.  The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features
of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama
administration.813  The Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation,
though in the Senate bill  regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit
these trades.  European regulators introduced Basel III regulations for banks.814  It increased
capital ratios, limits on leverage, narrow definition of capital, limit counter-party risk, and
new liquidity requirements.815  Critics argue that Basel III does not address the problem of
faulty risk-weightings.  Major banks suffered losses from AAA-rated created by  financial
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engineering that required less capital according to Basel II.  Lending to AA-rated sovereigns
has a risk-weight of zero, thus increasing lending to governments and leading to the next
crisis.816  Johan Norberg argues that regulations (Basel III among others) have indeed led to
excessive  lending to  risky governments  and the  ECB pursues  even more lending as  the
solution.817  When the bubble bursts, reactions are fairly imminent, and they take the shape of
legislations enacted to correct what are the perceived malfunctions.  That was the case with
the Bubble Act 1720818 as a response to the South Sea Bubble, as well as a decade ago with
the very prompt launch of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.819  The global meltdown has
been followed by similarly prompt reactions in the UK, in the US and at EU level most
prominently.  These interventions did not necessarily reflect the full gravity of the crisis and
most  importantly  the  depth  of  regulatory  flaws  that  became  apparent  in  its  aftermath.
Despite the global crisis having been rightly compared to the 1929 Great Crash, the 2008
panic has not been followed by the same drastic regulatory corrections implemented eighty
years earlier.820 
While  a  more  radical  revision  of  the  financial  system has  been  advocated  within  some
circles821, reforms so far have somewhat remained timid attempts to cure a chronic disease
without eradicating its very source.  There is a clear willingness to cling to a business model
that the crisis unveiled as fundamentally flawed.822  Not only the global meltdown, but as
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evidenced  in  these  case  studies,  a  whole  decade  of  corporate  and financial  failures,  all
pointed  at  similar  corporate  governance  malfunctions  and  at  the  dangers  and  abuses  of
overdeveloped capital markets.823  It is worth stressing on this point that while developed
capital  markets  are  instrumental  to  the  life  of  industrial  enterprises,  the  age  of
financialisation  in  Anglo-American  economies  has  brought  about  a  model  that  clearly
departed from the social role of financial markets.  This resulted in a huge apparatus that
exists to serve its own purposes of extracting value from society, rather than creating value
for it.824  The growth of the global financial system along these lines led to critical shifts in
many countries that forsook traditional industrial economies to embrace financial ones based
on inflated financial services sectors.825  The legal mechanisms underpinning this new model
are scrutinised for their dubious rationale.  Innovative products like CDOs and CDSs have
come to light as being largely speculative tools that did not encompass any economic or
social function, but rather contributed to the emergence of a hidden universe of risks, losses
and liabilities.  Countering the axioms of prevailing neoliberal ideologies, it was suggested
that the end-stage of large financial  markets was represented by a high level of leverage
whereby the debt burden keeps increasing and firms continue borrowing to pay interests.826
This theorised scenario is close to representing what triggered the credit crunch in 2007.  The
same neoliberal propositions that are embraced as conventional wisdom in most financial
circles, led in the years before the crisis to theorise through quantitative models that certain
events could only happen once in a thousand years.  In August 2007 those events happened
for three days in a raw.827
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The considerations are a statement to the need to reconsider the role that financial systems
play  in  society.   This  is  the  lesson  to  draw from the  global  meltdown  and  it  is  worth
reiterating the view that reforms have not fully reflected it as they are rather directed at
trying  to  perpetuate  a  system  by  correcting  some  of  its  manifestations,  whereas  its
foundations are hampered by a flawed ideology.  The global financial system resulting from
the  age  of  financialisation  is  characterised  by  a  sheer  lack  of  democratic  process
underpinning  its  governance.828  Problems  of  legitimacy  and  accountability  have
progressively  been  exacerbated  by  an  industry  that  was  internalising  its  gains  while
externalising  its  losses,  thanks  to  connections  that  from the  1980s  onwards  have  linked
financial  circles  to political  ones,  resulting in  the deregulation process in the undisputed
application of neoliberal  free-market  principles.829  The ensuing free-market  anarchy that
permeated large sections of the financial  services industry could fit  into an “Hobbesian”
scenario,  where  the  lack  of  legitimate  governance  may  lead  according  to  the  English
philosopher to a condition where individuals would have a right to do anything, that being
well  synthesised in the Latin maxims “homo homini lupus” and “bellum omnium contra
omnes”.830  These are arguably the stages that regulators should prevent from occurring.  
While  the  Dodd-Frank  did  tackle  some pressing  issues,  namely  the  urgency to  regulate
speculative derivatives, the public agency established in the Act is not empowered to face
the lobbying power of Wall Street investment banks.  Some of the propositions underlying
EU initiatives present a more negative approach towards regulating the market. CRD IV831
for instance reflected a sense of resignation that regulation cannot prevent disintermediation
of capital flows, and that the shadow banking system is not well enough defined to apply
onerous regulation upon firms.832  If on paper ESMA represents a more fundamental change
in the centralisation of cross-border financial markets’ supervision, some of its powers are
constrained by formal triggers and its institutional status risks to diminish its activity to that
of a collective actor.833  
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In order to examine more about crises and regulation, we are now moving onto the next
chapter as it is considered that topic is one of an important topics in this thesis, besides, we
may know more clearly about the reforms and the Basel Committee on banking supervision.
Besides, we go to chapter four to look into the relative importance of internal  corporate
governance controls and external corporate governance controls.
The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 
The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was the piece of legislation passed in the UK as
a response to the financial crisis.  It was designed to assist in the rescue of Northern Rock.
The long title of the act states its purpose as an act to make provision to enable the Treasury
to make an order relating to the transfer of securities issued by, or of property, rights or
liabilities belonging to, an authorised deposit-taker; to make provision in relation to building
societies; and for connected purposes.  It received Royal Assent on 21 February 2008 and
under this act, Order SI2008/432 was made.  
The powers granted under the Act were used for the nationalisation of Northern Rock, the
Act was drafted generically.  It allowed for the creation of statutory instruments to enable the
rescue of Northern Rock and future bank failures.  Alistair Darling, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer  made  the  comment  at  the  reading  that  the  Government  have  no  intention  at
present  to  use  the  Act  to  bring  any  institution  other  than  Northern  Rock  into  public
ownership.  This reflected politicians’ opinion, it was to be overtaken by the events that
followed.  The powers granted under this Act have been used for government interventions
in the banking sector, which, given the crisis that was going on, must have been foreseen
with some degree of certainty.  The powers were used to nationalise the mortgage and loan
books of Bradford and Bingley, which was part-nationalised and part transferred to Abbey
National  under  SI2008/2546  on  the  29th  September  2009.   They  were  used  to  transfer
deposits from Heritable Bank, part of the Icelandic Landsbanki, and from Kaupthing Edge to
ING Direct, part of the Dutch financial conglomerate ING Group, under a range of statutory
instruments  SI2008/2644,  SI2008/2646  and  SI2008/2674  on the  7th  and 8th  of  October
2009.  The Act became a tool for the UK government to handle bank failures.  Sections 3 and
6 of the Act describe the powers granted to the Treasury.
Northern Rock was transferred to a nominee of the Treasury, in this case UKFI.  In support
of  the  powers  granted  under  section  3,  the  Treasury  is  allowed  under  section  4(2)  to
extinguish the subscription rights associated with the securities.  Section 3(1) is the core of
the  rescue  operation.   In  establishing  this  mechanism,  it  is  recognised  that  allowing  an
authorised UK deposit-taker, such as a bank or building society, to fail has the potential to
create a detriment to the economy and society.  In establishing section 3(1), one could say
that the importance of the public as an external stakeholder is recognised in statute.  
The exercise of the powers granted by the Act is subject to the constitutional checks and
balances.  The check on the power given is that the Treasury Ministers and the Chancellor,
whilst acting on advice of the FCA and the Bank of England as per the Memorandum of
 P. Schammo “The European Securities and Market Authority: Lifting the Veil on the Allocation of Powers”, Common Market Law
Review 48 1879, 2011. 
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Understanding, are accountable to Parliament.834  Parliament as well as the parliamentary
committees can scrutinise decisions to exercise the powers.  The Icelandic bank Kaupthing
Bank HF applied for judicial review of the Treasury’s decision to make the order to transfer
deposits held by its subsidiary.835  The Treasury had used the powers under section 6 of the
Act to make this order after the then FSA had judged the subsidiary to be in serious financial
difficulty.  The order was made because of the threat to the stability of the UK financial
system as per the purpose set out in section 2(2)(a).  The two grounds of the challenge were
that the purpose of the Treasury was not to maintain the financial stability but to protect the
depositors and that HM Treasury had failed to identify the threat to financial stability in the
UK posed by the financial difficulties of the subsidiary.  The application was refused.  It was
held that  the objective was the financial  stability,  whilst  the second ground was deemed
artificial and unreal.  It is the first ground which is most interesting as it demonstrates the
difficulties under which the Treasury has to operate.836  HM Treasury needs to formulate its
reasons for exercising its powers in precise terms for when it is scrutinised by courts and
lawyers.  
In  another  example  of  a  challenge  by  way  of  judicial  review,  the  applicants,  former
shareholders of Northern Rock, argued that  the compensation payable to them following
nationalisation was unfair and incompatible with their rights under the ECHR Protocol 1
Article 1.837838  It was held that the assumptions that the independent valuer had to make for
the Northern Rock shares were not contrary to the shareholders’ right of possession pursuant
the Human Rights Act 1998.  The claims by SRM for a judicial review were dismissed.  The
court held that 3 principles, as established by the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights, were all in place: the need for a fair balance to be struck between public interests and
private rights, the principle of proportionality and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.
The  compensation  scheme  required  putting  shareholders  in  the  same  situation  as  if  the
intervention had not taken place.  The regulators did not owe a duty to shareholders.  On
appeal  to  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  the  Court  found  that  the  applicants’
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol 1 was manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible.839  The
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compensation arrangements for the transfer of securities under section 3 are set out under
section 5.  Compensation is to be decided by an independent valuer.  The Chancellor, Mr
Alistair Darling, said of the compensation, that the valuer must assume that financial support
provided by the Bank of England and the Treasury has been withdrawn and that no further
public financial support will be given, apart from the ordinary market support provided by
the Bank of England.840  The argument for this principle is that the bank would go bankrupt
without government support.  
There have been various challenges brought in respect of the compensation measures.  An
application to this extent was brought in relation to Bradford & Bingley before the Upper
Tribunal (Tax and Chancery).  It was refused on the grounds that the tribunal did not have
the  authority  to  question  the  manner  in  which  the  valuer  was  appointed  nor  the  rules
governing his approach to the valuation of the compensation.841  An earlier case before the
same tribunal was heard, concerning the valuation of Northern Rock on nationalisation and
the reading of has been withdrawn in section 5(4).842  The point the claimants made was that
financial support never was withdrawn or it was withdrawn over a longer period and in any
event not as intended under section 5(4).  The result would have been that share prices and
compensation would have been higher.  This argument was rejected by the court, a decision
upheld by a majority in the Court of Appeal.843  
The Banking Act 2009 
The  Banking  Act  2009 replaced  the  Banking (Special  Provisions)  Act  2008.   This  was
necessary as the 2008 Act contained a provision that limited the power to the Treasury to
only one year after passing of the Act.  It was not introduced with the same urgency as the
previous Banking Act and went through the consultation process.  This new Banking Act is
much larger  and more  complex than Banking Act  2008.   The objective  of  the  act  is  to
establish a framework for handling the insolvency of a bank in the UK through the use of a
Special  Resolution  Regime.   The passing of  the  Act  was accompanied  by two statutory
instruments coming into force.  The first is the Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Partial
Transfers) Order This statutory instrument gives a bank protection from interference when it
is  placed in  the Special  Resolution Regime.   The other is  the Banking Act  2009 (Third
Parties  Compensation)  Regulations,  which  makes  provisions  for  compensation  of  third
parties left behind in a failing bank.  The Bank Insolvency part provides for the windup of a
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failing  bank  and  facilitates  rapid  payments  from  the  Financial  Services  Compensation
Scheme (“FSCS”) or a transfer of relevant accounts to another financial institution.  
As with the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2009, the new Banking Act 2009 can be said
to  recognise  the  importance  of  the  public  at  large  as  an  external  stakeholder,  see  also
Financial  Services and Market Act 2000  As with its  predecessor,  the new Act contains
provisions to arrange what is effectively a rescue or an orderly wind-down of an authorised
deposit holder.  The beneficiary of this is the general public.  
The Special Resolution Regime – Current State 
The Objectives and the Code of Practice 
The Banking Act 2009 ss5,6 require HM Treasury to set out a Code of Practice.  This Code
of Practice must contain the guidelines the authorities will use the powers under the Special
Resolution Regime844 and is updated to include changes to the Banking Act 2009 and related
legislation.845  The Code of Practice covers the 3 stabilisation options, the bank insolvency
procedure and the bank administration procedure.  The authorities are obliged to have regard
for the Code under section 5(4).  Some of its main points include how the special resolution
regime’s  objectives  are  to  be  understood  and  achieved,  the  choice  between  different
resolution options, compensation, and how the Bank of England will determine the public
interest  test  for  the use of the bridge bank and private  purchaser  stabilisation  options is
satisfied.  
The Code provides the interpretation and explanation.  The stability of the financial systems
of the UK is defined to include capital  raising,  risk-transfer,  facilitation of domestic and
international commerce, and the continuity of the banking system and systemic impact.  A
broad definition is given for public confidence in the stability of the banking system.  It
includes the expectation that deposits will be repaid, that banking services will continue to be
available, that problems in one institution will not extend to another, and that if an institution
fails, a system exists to protect the interests of depositors.  All other objectives of the regime
are defined.  
The Main Powers
The Special Resolution Regime, the first part of the Act, is the UK’s statutory toolkit for
resolving failing banks and building societies.  At the time when the Act came into force, the
three  authorities,  namely  the  then  FSA,  the  Bank  of  England  and  the  Treasury,  could
exercise  the  powers  granted.   First,  the  FSA  determined  whether  a  bank  had  met  the
conditions to be placed under the Special Resolution Regime.  Either the Bank of England
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would take over implementing and running the Special Resolution Regime.  Only in the case
of transfer to temporary public ownership would the Special Resolution Regime be run by
the Treasury.  
The  situation  is  different  as,  following  the  Financial  Services  Act  2012,  the  FSA  was
replaced as the financial  services regulator.   In its  place came the Prudential  Regulation
Authority  (“PRA”) and the  Financial  Conduct  Authority  (“FCA”).   The provisions  have
become complicated.  There are 4 conditions under section 7 that need to be satisfied before
a bank is to be placed in the Special Resolution Regime.  The first condition is that the PRA
needs to be satisfied that the bank is failing or is likely to fail.  The Bank of England needs to
be satisfied of three conditions.  The first is that, it is not likely action will be taken by or in
respect of the bank that will result in the PRA’s condition ceasing to be met.  The second
condition is that the exercise of the power is necessary having regard to the public interest in
the advancement of one or more of the special resolution objectives.  The third condition is
that one or more of the special resolution objectives would not be met to the same extent by
the winding up of the bank.  There are provisions under section 7 which apply to these
conditions.  Although one of the regulators must determine whether a condition is met, the
others are to be consulted.  The Special Resolution Objectives are relevant to the Bank of
England’s second and third conditions.  It is worth noting that provisions are included on the
relation between failure and financial support.  When the Banking Act 2009 came into force,
there were three options available for resolving a failing institution.  The Bank of England
had the power to sell all or part of a failing bank to a commercial purchaser.  This was the
private  sector  purchase  option  and  could  be  executed  by  share  or  property  transfer
instruments.  In the second option, the Bank of England can transfer all or part of the failing
bank to a bridge bank.  The third option is a transfer by the Treasury of the institution into
public ownership.  This has changed since January 1, 2015, when the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Order 2014/3329 came into force.  This was one of several Statutory Instruments
that form the transposition of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive846 (“BRRD”) into
UK law.  
Depositor Protection 
The  Financial  Services  Compensation  Scheme  (“FSCS”)  was  introduced  through  the
Banking Act 2009 Part 4, sections 169 to 180.  This is a part of the Act for retail customers
as it changes the insolvency hierarchy and gives preference to depositors.  FSCS covered
deposits  rank  with  other  preferential  debts,  whilst  those  not  covered  are  preferred  over
unsecured debt but rank below other preferential debts.  This reduces the likelihood that the
FSCS will need to contribute to the resolution.  Worth noting is the case of a bail-in, where
the FSCS is required to contribute up to the amount it would have had to pay out in the
alternative of an insolvency.  In case of an insolvency, the bank liquidator is required to work
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together with the FSCS to facilitate prompt pay outs to eligible depositors or to facilitate the
transfer  of deposits  as a  whole to  another  institution.   This  is  important  considering  the
procedures involved in the liquidation of a bank.  It would be unrealistic to expect customers
to wait for months if not years to get their deposits back.  
Critical Analysis of the Banking Acts 
The Banking (Special  Provisions) Act 2008 and the nationalisation of Northern Rock are
praised as perhaps the measures taken by any country to deal with a bank failure during the
crisis.  Even if this is exaggerated, it must be accepted that the handling of Northern Rock
provided a blueprint for handling the smaller failures and, for the much larger failures of
RBS and Lloyds HBoS.  The lesson is that the focus of policymakers should not be on trying
to prevent a crisis, but also on managing a crisis when one arrives.  If risktakers are protected
from the negative outcomes of the risks undertaken, they may in future engage in greater
risk.847  There is pressure on policy makers to take action, as inaction will lead to disastrous
outcomes.  
The Banking Acts are necessary steps towards such a resolution system in the UK.  It may be
adequate for smaller national  institutions,  the financial  institutions that are deemed to be
important have adopted a complex corporate structure.  This makes the application of such
Acts difficult in practice; the suggestion is made that important financial institutions should
be required to write and update a winding-down plan together with their business continuity
plans.  If this winding-down plan is deemed to be inadequate, supervisors should be given
the power to force through changes in the corporate structure of the important institution.
The requirement to draft these plans has made its way into law via the BRRD, and the plans
form the basis of conversations between the regulator and the banks, it remains an untested
tool for important  institutions.   The Banking Act 2009 and the BRRD reflect this in the
objectives set to the liquidator in the Special Resolution Objectives discussed: the priority
goes  to  safeguarding  deposits.   Third  Parties  Compensation  Regulation,  which  makes
provisions for third parties left behind in case of a failure, as well as the FSCS designed to
protect  deposit  holders.   The predecessor of the 2009 Act,  namely the Banking (Special
Resolutions) Act 2008, has been demonstrated that the safeguarding of wider public interests
and of depositors does not please all parties involved.  It is difficult to balance the right of
shareholders with such a form of regulation,848see also Henry VIII clauses,  Theresa May is
taking a lead from a frequently divorced former monarch in preparing the way for life after
the Brexit break-up.  In order to deal with tens of thousands of EU laws, regulations, treaties
and directives that must be incorporated into UK law on Brexit Day, the British government
wants to invoke controversial powers that date back 500 years to the time of King Henry
VIII.   The  so-called  "Henry  VIII  clauses" in  the  will  give  ministers  and  civil  servants
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sweeping authority to comb through the vast EU legislative soup and decide which bits to
keep, which to amend, and which to repeal in their entirety.  Crucially, ministers can wave
the decisions through without recourse to the House of Commons.849
Other Jurisdictions 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2009, or the
Dodd-Frank Act, was the comprehensive piece of legislation to be passed as a response to
the  financial  crisis.   It  covers  the  supervision  of  financial  institutions;  a  new resolution
procedure for large financial companies; more stringent rules on banking capital; the creation
of a new agency for enforcing consumer financial laws; the Volcker rule and regulation of
over-the-counter derivatives.  
The EU has implemented a range of regulations and directives in response to the crisis.850
The BRRD for recovery and resolution and the FSCS have been discussed.   The Credit
Requirement Directive IV851 (“CRD IV”), which goes together with the Credit Requirements
Regulation852 (“CRR”),  are  the  implementation  into  EU legislation  of  Basel  III.   These
include  the  requirements  in  relation  to  the  capital  that  institutions  are  required  to  hold.
Where the CRR is applicable, CRD IV has been transposed by the PRA and the FCA into
their handbooks for their firms.  For the Eurozone countries, the responsibility lies with the
European Central Bank (“ECB”).  The European Supervisory Bodies, such as the European
Banking Authority (“EBA”), are tasked with drafting delegated legislation.  This involves
drafting the technical standards to support some of the articles.  CRD IV and the CRR came
into force on 1 January, 2014, although full compliance with Basel III is not a requirement
until  1  January,  2019.   The  difference  between  CRD IV and the  CRR is  that  the  CRR
focusses on the requirements for capital, liquidity and leverage.  
Apart from differences and specifications of the capital requirements, the difference between
CRD IV and Basel III is that CRD IV sets restrictions on the remuneration.  There will be a
ratio of fixed and variable pay of one on one.  Subject to shareholder approval, this can be
increased to one on two.  Those within scope would include senior management, risk takers,
staff engaged in control functions or anyone else whose remuneration is of such a level that
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they should be in those categories.  There are some technical requirements around it, it is fair
to say that anyone who has worked in an investment bank in London for over five years is
likely to be caught under this definition.  
Conclusion
This chapter discusses the UK and US regulatory response which took place in the UK and
in US.  Despite a lack of large-scale corporate collapses in the UK, proposed UK reforms
have been strongly influenced by the corporate scandals in the US.  The Sarbanes-Oxley has
been called the most sweeping corporate regulation measure in decades.  Congress intended
to assure that auditors would point out financial shenanigans by their corporate clients before
fraud or conflicts of interest can hurt a company, its employees and its investors.  A brief
examination of executive pay and corporate integrity and corporate governance reforms give
us a more complete picture of the corporate governance reforms.  Starks said that during the
1990s,  it  seemed as though CEOs were being generously rewarded for having the good
fortune  of  riding  the  economic  boom.   Sherron  Watkins,  the  Enron  whistleblower  said
compensation plans such as Grasso's are unnecessary as well as excessive.  In discussing
with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, after the 2007 global
financial crisis, the  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  (Dodd-
Frank)  was  signed  into  federal  law  by  president  Barack  Obama  on  July  21,  2010  in
Washington, DC.  Passed as a response to the 2000s recession, it brought the most significant
changes to financial regulation in the United States since the regulatory reform that followed
the great depression.  Finally, the Banking Acts are necessary steps towards such a resolution
system  in  the  UK.   It  may  be  adequate  for  smaller  national  institutions,  the  financial
institutions that are deemed to be important have adopted a complex corporate structure.
To conclude, it appears that Sarbanes-Oxley in the US does not appear to be able to deter
corporate  governance  flaws  in  banking and in  addition,  the  CA 2006 and the  corporate
governance codes appear not to work too much in the UK and this is why updated corporate
governance were launched in the UK and this is also why Dodd-Frank came about after it.
The  insights  of  this  chapter  stated  why the regulatory  response,  key implications  of  the
regulatory responses especially linking to pertinent corporate governance issues is that the
regulators have to work out an infrastructure that promotes good corporate governance.  This
leads to the question of the general effectiveness of these financial regulations in addressing




Monitoring by the board of directors: with its legal authority to hire, fire and compensate top
management, safeguards invested capital.  Regular board meetings allow potential problems
to be identified, discussed and avoided.  Whilst non-executive directors are thought to be
more independent, they may not always result in more effective corporate governance and
may not increase performance.  Different board structures are optimal for different firms.
Besides,  U.S.  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  and  the  Basel  Committee  is  also
important and is examined in this chapter.
Crises and Regulation  
The relative importance of internal and external corporate governance controls 
Internal  control  procedures  and internal  auditors:  internal  control  procedures  are  policies
implemented  by an  entity's  board  of  directors,  audit  committee,  management,  and other
personnel to provide reasonable assurance of the entity achieving its objectives related to
reliable financial reporting, operating efficiency, and compliance with laws and regulations.
Internal  auditors  are  personnel  within  an  organization  who  test  the  design  and
implementation of the entity's internal control procedures and the reliability of its financial
reporting.  Performance-based remuneration is designed to relate some proportion of salary
to  individual  performance.   In  the  United  States,  the  problem is  the  conflict  of  interest
between widely-dispersed shareholders and powerful managers.  In Europe, the problem is
that the voting ownership is tightly-held by families through pyramidal ownership and dual
shares.  This can lead to  self-dealing, where the controlling families favor subsidiaries for
which they have higher cash flow rights.853  These tend to be small companies, with some
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exceptions. The legal implications for the corporate governance in this thesis are to focus on
US and UK banking sector.  Despite there are some difference between the US and UK
institutions  failure,  their  failure are due to the similar reasons namely poor management,
inadequate regulations and no regulators who can execute the regulations in a proper way.
We need to look into global financial regulations and norms explaining particular on how
they could help the strengthening of corporate governance practices.  History has shown that
regulation  emerges  after  periods  of  crisis.   Such regulation  has  rarely  come about  as  a
consequence  of  rational  deliberation,  but  it  takes  the  form of  panic  stricken  short-term
responses to the crisis that has passed.854  A series of new laws and rules is being introduced
aiming at restoring the public’s confidence and preventing a similar crisis from happening
again.  
Financial markets are unpredictable and prone to extremes, but this does not mean that there
is  no  time  for  a  more  thoughtful  and  comprehensive  approach  in  order  to  address  the
financial issues and problems.  There is an inherent instability in our sort of economy and
argued that the processes that generate financial fragility are natural or endogenous to the
system.855  He was one of the first to discuss financial instability more than 50 years ago and
he  argued  that  crises  are  part  of  the  economy’s  evolutionary  process:  when  crises  are
successfully  contained,  then  risky  practices  are  validated  and  this  sets  the  stage  for
subsequent crises.  The periods between two crises, the tranquillity periods’856, are the most
crucial, because they encourage not only more innovative behaviour, but more risk-taking as
well.857  Tranquillity  is  disrupted  by  excessive  risk-taking  and  market  instability,  the
economy moves away from equilibrium and an atmosphere of uncertainty is created in the
markets.   Disclosure  systems  that  are  founded  on  high-quality  standards  give  investors
confidence in the credibility of financial reporting - and without investor confidence, markets
cannot thrive.858  There are so many people that are affected and so many vulnerable parties
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involved that total absence of regulation is inconceivable.  A well-designed legal framework
with clear and effective rules is essential to replace fraudulent practices and insecurity and
contribute to the harmonious operation of the financial  markets.   President  Lincoln once
wrote  that  the  legitimate  object  of  a  government  is  to  do  for  a  community  of  people,
whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all or cannot so well do for themselves - in
their separate and individual capacities.859  
In relation to corporate governance in Europe, there has been a trend towards the application
of reflexive modes of governance in the EU.  Reflexive harmonization can be seen as the
latest in a series of developments, which have seen the emergence of more reflexive modes.
It will be treated as an informal’ mechanism, complementary to the formal legal mechanisms
associated with lawmaking via directives and Court judgements.860  Regulation can reinforce
the foundations of the system and support any attempt for economic growth.  Compliance
and enforcement play a central role for the overall assessment of a regulatory initiative.  An
example supporting the argument is the Satyam Computer Services fiasco.  On the 7 th of
January 2009, Ramalinga Raju, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company,
resigned after admitting that Satyam's accounts had been falsified.  It was the second time
within a year that the company’s name was in the headlines  of the business newspapers
within  the  same  year.   The  paradox  is  that  the  first  time  was  when  Satyam Computer
Services was the winner of the Golden Peacock global award for 2008.  Penalties and fines
can have an intimidating effect, but they do not solve the problem in the long run.  If an
event  with widespread and severe economic and social  consequences keeps on repeating
itself, the onus is surely on the authorities to change something.861  It is time for corporate
governance to move forward, away from traditional regulatory solutions, because none of
them so far seem to be successful in preventing similar crises from happening again.  The
focus of any post-crisis reform should be dual to reverse the negative effect, dealing with the
existing implications of a crisis/scandal, by supporting the market, strengthening the legal
framework and restoring the public trust and confidence; and to prevent similar events in the
future,  by identifying  the  gaps  in  the  current  regime,  assessing the  potential  threats  and
protecting vulnerable groups.  Past experience can be used as a guide for the future, but not
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exclusively, because if regulation is only targeted at specific types of failures, it runs the
danger of becoming myopic.862  
In the USA, the SoX introduced stricter liability accompanied with severe penalties and fines
in an attempt to build a protective wall against fraud.  There were statements suggesting that
the SoX may be increasing accountability and reducing risk-taking in a way that could be
construed as positive863and that it has the capacity to reward truthful corporations and their
management.864  The reform failed to make legislation proactive and align the remuneration
with the sustainability of a company’s performance.  The establishment of an ethics culture’
was not encouraged, although a few years earlier unethical business conduct evidently led
several companies to the brink of bankruptcy or collapse.  It could be argued that in Rule 33-
8177865 the SEC defined the term code of ethics’ and introduced written standards designed
to  deter  wrongdoing and to  promote ethical  handling  of  conflicts  of  interest,  disclosure,
compliance with applicable laws, prompt internal reporting of violations, and accountability
for adherence to the code.  There is not yet any solid empirical evidence to suggest that the
requisite  societal  environment  for  an  ethical  corporate  culture,  including  appropriate
situational constraints on behaviour,  has developed or is developing in such a way as to
support  SoX’s  ethical  mission  or  that  the  SoX  encourages  the  kind  of  behaviour  and
transparency that is exhibited by ethical role models.866  Even the certification requirements
in sections 302 and 906 do not really contribute to the reinforcement of ethical behaviour,
because  senior  executives  are  overwhelmed  by  compliance-related  activities  for  fear  of
criminal liability and strict penalties, affording them little time to engage in the kind of open,
transparent interactions with each other and others in the corporation that will enable the
establishment, transmission, and internalization of ethical values in the company.867 
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It is not possible to legislate people into good and ethical behaviour.868  The existence of
codes  of  conduct  or  codes  of  ethics  is  not  sufficient  without  the  involvement  of  the
management team in the active implementation, effective monitoring, and enforcement of
these codes.  The role of the board of directors and executives is to set the appropriate ethical
tone for the company and act as role models for all employees, demonstrating credibility and
integrity on a daily basis.869  Ethical leadership is connected with compliance.  The more
managers behave as ethical leaders’ and role models, the more likely they are to influence
the employees and gradually establish ethical behaviour.870  Executives and directors must be
role models whose behaviour mirrors the company’s code of ethics.  Ethics and values are
matters of the feet and the heart, not just matters of the mouth.871  Since the ethical culture
starts at the top and is conveyed by example, directors and executives have a duty and the
unique opportunity to reinforce their company’s protection against fraud, mismanagement,
and corruption.  They must introduce and support a model that will influence operational
practices in creating and sustaining an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct
and  a  commitment  to  compliance  with  the  law.872  Since  ethics  exists  in  corporate
governance structures, an attempt will be made to define the concept of ethics in the context
of  corporate  governance  regulation  and  to  outline  the  nature  of  an  ethical  corporate
governance framework.  The discussion will turn to examine the role of financial regulation.
The role of financial regulation
The general effectiveness of the key financial regulations in the US, UK, and international
initiatives should be reinforced, and the definition of regulatory models has become an issue
in  the  analysis  of  financial  scandals  and  is  recognised  as  a  theme  of  this  theoretical
background.   The  occurrence  of  the  financial  crisis  raised  concerns  because  of  the  re-
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emergence of legal issues that had caused corporate and financial collapses during the last
decade.  A number of legal features put the events of the last decade in a league of their own.
These can be identified with financial innovation and the abuse of capital market finance,
premised in turn on a regulatory edifice shaped by the deregulation of the financial services
industry.873  Discussions following the 2008 crisis have pointed at regulatory failures and
most importantly at the type of new infrastructure that should be in place.874  This debate led
to a deeper reflection on the role and rationale of regulation and on the politico-economic
underpinnings  that  characterise  different  regulatory  systems.875  The  debate  results  in  a
dichotomy  reflected  in  two  main  ideological  strands  corresponding  to  a  market  system
approach  on  one  hand  and  a  collectivist  system  approach  on  the  other.876  The  former
postulates that individuals should be left free to pursue their own welfare goals; regulation
under this paradigm should have no significant role because the legal system can resort to
instruments of private law to be implemented.  The latter in contrast envisages the state to be
better  positioned to  direct  behaviours which,  it  is  argued,  would not occur without state
intervention, because of intrinsic deficiencies in the market system to consider collective and
public interests.877  
Under market models, the law has a facilitative function as it provides individuals with a set
of arrangements finalised at  emphasising their  welfare activities,  whereby obligations are
incurred voluntarily by individuals who can enforce their rights autonomously.878  The scope
of regulation can be defined as social, as opposed to economic.  Social regulation finds its
rationale in the public interest justification and it purports to protect society at large from
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market  failures.879  This  form of  protection  is  guaranteed  through  a  range of  regulatory
instruments  which  correspond  to  different  degrees  of  state  intervention.   Economic
regulation tends to have a more limited scope because its underlying assertion is that markets
are  more  efficient  than  governments  in  imposing  discipline  and  providing  surveillance,
without the costs associated with state intervention.880  The friction between two diverging
regulatory ideologies is reflected in the context of financial regulation, where the global and
inter-connected character of financial markets and the lack of a concerted regulatory regime
have magnified the centrality  of the issue.881  It is fair  to say that the last  quarter of the
century has seen the emergence of liberal economists who advocated the benefits of a free-
market regulatory system by identifying regulation as the source of financial crises of the
1980s and 1990s.  It has been argued that regulatory interference into free-market contexts
harms due diligence and monitoring incentives among market players because it creates an
expectation that supervisors should provide control for institutions.882  
Social regulation prioritises social welfare and in doing so it rejects assumptions upon which
economic  regulation  is  based,  notably  adequate  information,  competition,  absence  of
externalities.   The  fact  that  these  circumstances  are  not  fulfilled  leads,  according  to  the
theory,  to  market  failures  and this  justifies  a priori  a  case  for  regulatory  intervention.883
Within this regulatory context the different set of social goals flows into what is referred to
as paternalistic regulation, premised on the assumption that information is insufficient and
beyond  that  the  decision-making  process  is  affected  by  bounded  rationality.884  Such
regulatory mechanism is based on the prescription of uniform directions and controls over
879
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certain activities which would lead to market failure and to harm for society at large.  From a
regulatory perspective, the endorsement of a free-market ideology entailed the unrestrained
application of market discipline mechanisms.  These resulted in the self-regulatory character
of the industry and in particular of certain regulatory agencies and international fora885; the
incentive within the industry to innovate in order to adjust the risk profile of both assets and
liabilities  on  the  balance  sheet886;  and  the  employment  of  disclosure  as  regulatory  tool.
Arguments surrounding these models have become particularly887intense in the aftermath of
the global crisis.  
Self-regulation 
Under market discipline, market forces would be sufficient to direct and correct behaviours,
without the need for external regulatory intervention.  This proposition has been reflected in
self-regulation, a regulatory technique that implemented the principle of subsidiarity which
allowed state intervention only if market participants were not able to find adequate solutions
within the market itself, and pushed states out of the regulatory scene.888  Self-regulation can
be  understood  as  a  system  of  private  governance,  where  the  self-interest  of  market
participants in a capitalist system allows the invisible hand to work as they devise acceptable
rules  and  behaviours.889  From  the  perspective  of  market  participants,  self-regulation
represents a cost-effective technique and a prospect  of avoiding burdensome government
regulation.   Expertise  of the industry from which rules  underpin is  another  element  that
enhances  the  quality  of  this  regulatory  process.   The  strength  of  self-regulation  is  the
applicability  of  the  resulting  rules  across  national  borders,  because  they  are  defined  by
contracts and are not restricted by jurisdictional limits.890  The weaknesses of self-regulation
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are associated with the danger of ceding too much to market participants’ discretion in a way
that could favour their own interests over the public good.891  Above and beyond intrinsic
conflicts of interest that can affect the legislative process, self-regulatory systems suffer from
the lack of adequate enforcement,  because the industry may not be effective at enforcing
rules.  This derives from the very character of these rules, which are not binding, as they
result  from negotiation  among industry members,  who adopt  these  rules  on a  voluntary
basis.892  Self-regulation has been a central feature in the financial industry, both in the City
of London and in the US, where securities regulation enacted after the 1929 Great Crash set
a regulatory framework that relied on and recommended self-regulation.893  In the UK, the
Financial  Services  Authority  (FSA)  established  in  2000894 similarly  set  a  regulatory
infrastructure based on both binding rules and principles,  complemented through industry
guidance.895  Many countries adopt self-regulatory arrangements of their stock exchanges,
whereby self-regulatory organisations have been established in order to set standards and
govern  members’  activities,  while  providing  mechanisms  for  sanctioning  members  for
violations.896  
Corporate Governance Regulation  
Failures in corporate governance practices were considered responsible for the Russian debt
default  and  the  Asian  financial  crisis  in  1998  according  to  World  Bank’s  Reports  on
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).897  After experiencing the systemic effects of
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such failures, the G7 leaders added the corporate behaviour and incentives to their priority
list.898  Shortly  after  that  (mid-1999),  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and
Development (OECD) adopted a set of principles which were updated in 2004.899  
Corporate Governance Regulations and Guidelines
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework
The  corporate  governance  framework  should  protect  and  facilitate  the  exercise  of
shareholders’  rights.   It  is  expected  that  different  countries  experience  the  agency  and
corporate governance problems differently.  Using the legal system find that countries with
better legal protection for shareholders tend to have more dispersed ownership.  From this it
can  be  deduced  that  large  shareholders  are  a  market  response  to  weak  legal  protection
provided by law.  It is identified as a potential corporate governance problem the risk of
outsiders being expropriated by insiders.  This means that managers and large shareholders
can collude and jointly exploit minority shareholders.  It can be argued the following OECD
principle was devised.  The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders.  All shareholders
should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.  It is far
more  complex  exercise  involving  employees,  suppliers,  general  public,  environment  and
many more which are considered to be the stakeholder group.  Involving a single stakeholder
in  this  process,  even  if  this  stakeholder  represents  employees900,  will  add  a  lot  to  the
complexity of governing the corporations.  Weil et al. (2002) report states that the largest
difference  in  corporate  governance  practices  among  European  Union  member  states  is
related to the position of employees in corporate governance, a difference often embedded in
law.  
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established
by  law  or  through  mutual  agreements  and  encourage  active  co-operation  between
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially







 Or miners, if one wants to be consistent with the previous example. 
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2001 and 2003 respectably,  is said to have been caused by the lack of transparency and
disclosure.  
The Responsibilities of the Board
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company,
the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the
company and the  shareholders.   The OECD principles  are  designed to guide companies
regarding their corporate governance practices.  A similar approach but aimed at countries is
used by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  In September of
1997 EBRD published their  guidelines  for  corporate  governance  named Sound Business
Standards and Corporate Practices.901  Helping companies and governments understand the
broader concerns of lenders and investors is the objective of these guidelines.902  In the same
year,  EBRD  published  10  core  principles903 which  evaluate  the  corporate  governance
framework (CGF).   These principles  which are based on international  best  practices  and
standards can help in assessing a country’s CGF in estimating the need for reform.  The
EBRD principles  are  designed as guidelines  with the purpose to identify the aims to be
achieved  rather  than  outlining  the  process  by  which  to  achieve  these  aims.   Another
document  produced  by  EBRD,  ‘principles  of  corporate  governance  and  corporate
governance  checklist’,904 offers  countries  a  tool  to  evaluate  and  improve  their  corporate
governance practices through 70 questions divided into five groups.905  EBRD has gathered
data  using  this  checklist  in  all  transition  countries  and  rated  the  results  from  fully-
conforming,  strongly-,  weakly-  to  non-conforming.   The  Legal  Transition  Programme
Review906 -  report  published  in  June  2012  presents  the  impact  of  the  legal  transition
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Reform monetary policy
With so many market-driven methods of debt financing available, it can be argued that the
Federal Reserve Board has much less power these days- as it raises and lowers its overnight
discount  rate  to  member  banks  –  upon  financial  markets.   The  Fed  is  an  independent
agency.907  The flurry of asset-consuming mergers and acquisitions is being funded by this
gap.  The board are going to have to justify it to the shareholders.  The net cost of corporate
borrowing,  after  corporations  deduct  interest  expense  on their  tax  returns,  is  below four
percent.  The average earnings/price yield on the S&P is about six percent.  When people
invest in these deals, without borrowing the money to do so, it is harmless enough.  A dollar
moves from a less productive investment to, one would hope, a more productive investment.
Because they may lend a multiple of their deposits, their loans create more dollars in the
marketplace.  They expand the credit markets.  While a weaker dollar helps exports, credit
expansion is really an expensive way to subsidize those exports.  
Duties of Directors 
Acting within their powers908: directors are strictly charged to exercise their powers only for
a proper purpose.  In duties of directors, there are not all breaches of duty can be ratified, as
some are not capable of being ratified.  The members of the company are permitted to ratify
transactions.  It is largely accepted in most jurisdictions that this should be capable of being
abrogated by the company's constitution. 
Directors must exercise their  powers for a proper purpose.   While  in many instances an
improper purpose is readily evident, such as a director looking to feather his or her own nest
or divert an investment opportunity to a relative, such breaches usually involve a breach of
the director's duty to act in good faith.909  An incidental result that a shareholder lost his
majority,  or a takeover bid was defeated would not itself make the share issue improper.
Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent
manner.   The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate  control  in  the
capital  markets,  and extraordinary  transactions  such as  mergers,  and sales  of  substantial
portions of corporate assets, should be articulated and disclosed so that investors understand
their rights and recourse.  A director of a company must in any given case act in the way he
decides, in good faith, would be the most likely to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole; and in deciding what would be most likely to promote
907
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that success, take account in good faith of all the material factors that it is practicable in the
circumstances  for  him  to  identify.910
To impose liability on directors for making awrong business decision would cripple their abil
ity  to  earn returns for investors by taking business risks.  This kind of judicial
guessing is what the business judgment rule was designed to prevent.911  
Directors’ duties under the common law can be divided into a duty to act carefully and with
a certain degree of skill.     The courts may permit the company, acting by a majority in
general meeting,  to forgive directors who have acted in any of the ways.  The ease with
which this will be allowed depends on the view taken by the court of the seriousness of the
behavior.    The court has a power to release a director from the consequences of a breach of
duty where he has acted honestly and reasonably and ought, in all the circumstances of the
case, to be excused.912  Directors owe their duties to the company and the company is the
proper  plaintiff  in an action to  enforce such duties.913  If  such a rule  were absolute,  the
majority would have an absolute right to defraud the minority.  Exceptions to the rule have
been  made.   Whether  the  individual  shareholders  can  sue  or,  whether  the  majority  can
prevent the action and forgive the directors depends on the depravity of the wrongdoing in
question.   An oppressed minority  have a wide and flexible  action  which is  procedurally
simpler.914  
Regulatory Regime
Having discussed some of the common origins of banking distress, we turn to consider a set
of principles to reduce the future probability of crises.  In the analysis, regulation is about
changing the behaviour of regulated institutions.  One of the key questions is the extent to
which behaviour is to be altered by externally imposed rules, or through creating incentives
for firms to behave in a particular way.915  
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Regulation is the set of rules and standards that govern financial institutions; their objective
is to foster financial stability and to protect the customers of financial services.  Supervision
is the process designed to oversee financial  institutions  in order to ensure that  rules and
standards  are  properly  applied.916  The  case  for  regulation of  banks depends  on various
market imperfections and failures, which in the absence of regulation, produce sub-optimal
results and reduce consumer welfare.  In other words, the objective of regulation should be
limited to correcting identified market imperfections and failures:
(1) The objectives of regulation need to be defined and circumscribed.  Financial regulation
should have a limited number of objectives.  In the analysis the objectives are to sustain
systemic stability and to protect the consumer.  
(2)  The  rationale  of  regulation  and  supervision  should  be  limited.  The  rationale  for
regulation lies in correcting for identified market imperfections and failures; incorporating
externalities; the economies of scale in monitoring, breaking a grid lock, and limiting moral
hazard associated with safety nets.  
(3)  Regulation  should  be  seen  in  terms  of  a  set  of  contracts.   Laws,  regulations,  and
supervisory  actions  provide  incentives  for  regulated  firms  to  adjust  their  actions  and
behaviour,  and to control their own risks internally.   There need to be incentives for the
regulator to set appropriate objectives, to adopt well-designed rules, not to over-regulate, and
to  act  in  a  timely  fashion.   If  incentive  contracts  are  well-designed  they  will  induce
appropriate  behaviour by regulated firms.  Conversely,  if  they are badly constructed and
improperly designed, they might fail to reduce systemic risk or have undesirable side effects
on the process of financial intermediation.917  
(4) The form and intensity of regulatory and supervisory requirements should differentiate
between  regulated  institutions  according to  their  relative  portfolio  risk and efficiency  of
internal control mechanisms.  One of the hazards of a detailed and prescriptive rulebook
approach is that it may fail to make the necessary distinctions between non-homogeneous
firms  because  the  same  rules  are  applied  to  all.   It  reduces  the  scope  for  legitimate
differentiations to be made.  The adoption of an internal model’s approach, such has been
introduced  by  G-20  countries  after  the  Market  Risk  Amendment  of  the  Basle  Accord,
recognises this point.918  
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(5) In some areas the regulator could offer a menu of contracts to regulated firms requiring
them to self-select into the correct category.  There is an information, and possibly efficiency
loss, if a high degree of conformity in the behaviour of regulated firms is enforced.  
(6) Capital regulation should create incentives for the correct pricing of absolute and relative
risk.  
Incentive structures
Emphasis has been given to the central importance of incentives within banks and the role
that  regulation can have in positively creating appropriate  incentives.   As banking crises
frequently occur when there are weak incentives to act prudently, a necessary ingredient of a
robust and stable financial system is the creation of appropriate and efficient incentives and
disciplining mechanisms for all market participants and most especially bank owners, bank
managers and financial system supervisors.919 
(1) There should be appropriate incentives for bank owners
Bank owners have an important role in the monitoring of bank management and their risk-
taking.  It is bank owners who absorb the risks of the bank.  There are several ways in which
bank owners can be appropriately incentivised.  
(2) There should be appropriate internal incentives for management 
Creating the right incentive structures for the managers of financial institutions is equally as
important as those for the owners.  In the analysis, all aspects of the behaviour of a firm are
corporate governance issues.  There are several procedures, processes and structures that can
reinforce internal risk control mechanisms.  Supervisors can strengthen the incentives for
these by, for instance, relating the frequency and intensity of their supervision and inspection
visits  to  the  perceived adequacy of  the internal  risk control  procedures,  and compliance
arrangements.920  
 Other considerations that should govern the setting of minimum capital adequacy requirements for individual banks include the
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Specific measures designed to create correct incentive structures include:  
a.  Strong  and  effective  risk  analysis,  management  and  control  systems  in  place  in  all
financial  institutions for assessing risks ex ante,  and asset values ex post.  This includes
systems and incentives  are  required  for  timely  and accurate  provisioning against  bad  or
doubtful debts.  Regulatory agencies have a powerful role in promoting, and insisting upon,
effective systems of internal management and risk control in financial institutions by strict
accountability of owners, directors and senior management.   Managers should lose if the
bank fails.921  
b. Mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that loan valuation, asset classification, loan
concentrations,  inter-connected  lending,  and  risk  assessment  practices  reflect  sound  and
accurate  assessments  of  claims  and  counterparties.   This  requires  mechanisms  for  the
independent verification of financial statements and compliance with the principles of sound
practice  through  professional  external  auditing  and  on-site  inspection  by  supervisory
agencies.  Ownership structures that foster shareholder monitoring and oversight should be
encouraged.   This  includes  private  ownership  of  banks  to  strengthen  the  monitoring  of
management performance and to reduce distortions in incentives for managers.  Large banks
should be required to establish internal audit committees.  The key is that there needs to be
appropriate  internal  incentives  for  management  to  behave  in  appropriate  ways,  and  the
regulator  has a role in ensuring internal  incentives are compatible  with the objectives  of
regulation.  
Corporate governance matters are covered in the Dodd-frank legislature in the United State
including new SEC rules pertaining to various corporate governance issues as well as some
changes  in  banking  regulations.   New corporate  governance  and  Corporate  Stewardship
Codes are introduced in the United Kingdom including some changes in banking regulations
affecting corporate governance matters.  
Legislative response and passage  
The bills that  came after Obama's proposal were largely consistent with the proposal, but
contained some additional  provisions and differences  in implementation.922  The Volcker
Rule was not included in Obama's initial June 2009 proposal, but Obama proposed the rule
later in January 2010, after the House bill had passed.  The rule, which prohibits depository
banks  from  proprietary  trading  similar  to  the  prohibition  of  combined  investment  and
commercial  banking in the Glass-Steagall Act, and the conference committee enacted the
921
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rule in a weakened form, Section 619 of the bill, that allowed banks to invest up to 3% of
their Tier 1 capital in private equity and hedge funds923 as well as trade for hedging purposes.
The version of the bill passed the House along party lines in December by a vote of 223–202,
and passed the Senate with amendments in May 2010 with a vote of 59–39 along party lines.
The bill moved to conference committee, where the Senate bill was used as the base text924
although  a  few  House  provisions  were  included  in  the  bill's  base  text.925  The  Durbin
Amendment gave the Federal Reserve the power to regulate debit card interchange fees, and
the Fed proposed a maximum interchange fee of 12 cents per debit card transaction, which
cardhub.com estimated would cost large banks $14 billion annually.  On June 29, 2011, the
Fed issued its final rule, which holds that the maximum interchange fee an issuer can receive
from a debit card transaction is 21 cents plus 5 basis points multiplied by the amount of the
transaction.  This rule allows issuers to raise their interchange fees by as much as one cent if
they implement certain fraud-prevention measures.  An issuer eligible for this adjustment,
could  receive  an  interchange  fee  of  as  much  as  24  cents  for  the  average  debit  card
transaction,  according to the Federal Reserve.  This cap which took effect on October 1,
2011, rather than July 21, 2011, as was announced will  reduce fees roughly $9.4 billion
annually.  As a result of the government limiting their revenue from interchange fees, banks
made  plans  to  raise  account  maintenance  fees  to  compensate.926  The  New York Times
published a comparison of the two bills prior to their  reconciliation.   On June 25, 2010,
conferees finished reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bills and four days later
filed a conference report.  The conference committee changed the name of the Act from the
"Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010."  
Prior to the passage of Dodd–Frank, investment advisers were not required to register with
the SEC if the investment adviser had fewer than 15 clients during the previous 12 months
and did not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser.  The act eliminates that
923




 "Senate  Passes  Landmark  Financial  Reform  Bill" (http://washingtonindependent.com/91650/senate-passes-landmark-financial-
regulatory-reform-bill). Washington Independent.
925
 "Congress  Starts  to  Merge  Financial  Reform  Bills" (http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/congress-starts-to-merge-
financial-reform-bills). New York Times.
926




exemption,  thereby rendering numerous additional  investment  advisers,  hedge funds,  and
private equity firms subject to new registration requirements.  Certain non-bank financial
institutions and their subsidiaries will be supervised by the Fed in the same manner as if they
were a bank holding company.927  It is suggested that that Dodd–Frank is not strong enough,
arguing that it fails to protect consumers adequately, and does not end too big to fail.928  The
Securities  Industry and Financial  Markets  Association  -  the top  Wall  Street  lobby -  has
expressed support for the law, and has urged congress not to change or repeal it in order to
prevent a stronger law from passing.929  Bankruptcy expert David Skeel concluded that the
law has two major themes which are government partnership with the largest Wall Street
banks and financial institutions and a system of ad hoc interventions by regulators that are
divorced from basic rule-of-law constraints.  While he states that the overall pattern of the
legislation is disturbing, he concludes that some are clearly helpful, such as the derivatives
exchanges and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.930  
In terms of the impact on the federal budget, the CBO estimates that deficits would reduce
between 2011–2020,  but  in  part  due to the risk-based assessment  fees levied  to  initially
capitalize the Orderly Liquidation Fund; after which, the majority of revenue for the fund
would  be  drawn  primarily  from  interest  payments.   The  CBO  points  out  that  the
reclassification of collected fees by various government agencies has the effect of boosting
revenue.  The cost estimate raises questions about the time-frame of capitalizing the Fund -
their estimate took the projected value of fees collected for the Fund weighed against the
expected expense of having to deal with corporate defaults until 2020.  Their conclusion was
it would take longer than 10 years to fully capitalize the Fund, although no specifics beyond
that were expressed.  The projection was a $5 billion or more deficit increase in at least one
of the ten-year periods starting in 2021.  As of the beginning of June 2013, 175 of 279 passed
Dodd-Frank deadlines  have  been missed,  while  only  104 deadlines  have  been met  with
finalized  rules.   Of  the  398  total  Dodd-Frank  rulemaking  requirements,  regulators  have
927
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missed 70.1 percent of rulemaking deadlines and 99.6 percent of 280 rules with specified
deadlines.  Regulators have to release proposals for 64 of the 175 missed rules.931  
The Dodd-Frank legislation makes it harder for banks to avoid liability under state law by
making it more difficult for them to raise the preemption argument.  The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law in 2010, seeks to tighten the
reins on national banking institutions by strengthening the legal standards for the preemption
of state laws, thereby making it harder for banks to avoid liability under state law.  When the
defense of preemption is asserted and found applicable, the effect is dismissal of the entire
claim at issue.  Dodd-Frank has added various obstacles that must be overcome before a
bank can claim the protection of preemption.  In order to minimize the harsh effect of Dodd-
Frank’s new rules, banks should make an effort to frame their preemption arguments before
courts in ways that result in favor of preemption.  However, global regulatory co-operation
would be threatened if the US dismantled its regime for failing banks.932
The 2008 financial  crisis, as Ceresney comments, will be known as the modern financial
system’s annus horribilis.125  A natural consequence of a crisis is that citizens are asking
angrily how this happened and who is to blame.933  This invites the enquiry that amidst this
wreckage, as legislators consider proposals for sweeping regulatory reforms, prosecutors and
regulatory  agencies  have  begun the  arduous and time-consuming process  of  determining
whether  any  criminal  wrongdoing  led  to  the  credit  crisis.934  The  outcome  of  this  soul
searching  was:  The  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act
[DoddFrank]935 which set out to reshape the U.S. regulatory system in a number of areas
including  but  not  limited  to  consumer  protection,  trading  restrictions,  credit  ratings,
regulation of financial products, corporate governance and disclosure, and transparency.936
The  introduction  to  Dodd-Frank  makes  clear  what  the  legislation’s  intentions  were:  to
promote  the  financial  stability  of  the  United  States  by  improving  accountability  and
transparency in the financial system, to end too big to fail, to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for
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other purposes.937  One particular aspect of Dodd-Frank, the Volcker Rule, which prohibits a
bank from engaging in proprietary trading, and from acquiring or retaining an ownership
interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund.938  The intent of the Volcker Rule was to
endeavour to replicate ‘The US Banking Act of 1933, called the GlassSteagall Act after its
sponsors, which separated investment banking from retail banking by limiting the range and
volume of securities-related transactions that the commercial entities could perform.’939  This
rule does not merely affect US entities but also applies to foreign banks and entities which
have a branch or agency in the US and clearly demonstrates the reach of US legislation.940  
An additional outcome of the review of the financial crisis was that the SEC recognised that
more information on breaches of securities law was required and has caused it to promote the
role  of  the whistleblower.941  Dodd-Frank encourages  whistleblowers  to  report  suspected
violations  direct  to  the  SEC ‘Office  of  the  Whistleblower’,942 which  will  reward943 such
suppliers of information who are eligible to receive between 10 percent and 30 percent of
any enforcement penalty in excess of $1 million that the agency ultimately recovers as a
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result of the report.’944  The largest reward was $30m in 2014.945  Dodd-Frank was not the
first attempt at encouraging informers to come forward with information about fraud against
the US government in return for a share of the damages recovered.946  In 1863, pre-dating
both conspiracy to defraud (1867) and Mail Fraud (1872), the False Claims Act empowered
citizens to sue on behalf of the government for fraud against the government and share in the
fruits of litigation: since 2009, the DoJ has recovered more than $13.3 billion in False Claims
Act cases.947  In 2012, the DoJ brought an all-time high of 647 whistleblower cases,948 thus
demonstrating the economic value of an incentivised whistleblower.  The rewards from SEC
clearly make it all the more likely that employees who notice such wrongdoing will take
steps  to  bring it  to  light.   This  may be at  the expense  of  reporting  through companies’
internal corporate risk management or governance channels.  The SEC reported receiving
one to two high value tips per day, up from about a dozen a year prior to enactment of Dodd-
Frank.949  There is the risk of repeat bad faith claims as in a 2014 case where the SEC banned
an individual who had knowingly made 196 award applications which were false, fictitious
or fraudulent in pursuit of an award.950  In noting the effect of Dodd-Frank, it is clear that the
US has a long history of providing incentives.   This is not a feature of UK culture and
legislation, including the UK Bribery Act 2010, does not provide for these rewards.951  The
UK regulators FCA/PRA have announced proposals to make regulatory changes necessary to
require firms to have effective whistleblowing procedures, and to make senior management
944
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accountable for delivering these,952but concluded that financial incentives to report would not
be adopted.953  This area is outside the scope of this thesis but would warrant further research
because  of  the  risk  of  regulatory  arbitrage  where,  for  UK companies  falling  within  the
purview of the SEC, whistleblowers may be tempted to report wrongdoing in the US rather
than either the UK authorities or through internal procedures, where no rewards exist.954
Some  eight  years  before  Dodd-Frank,  in  the  wake  of  a  spate  of  financial  scandals,955
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 was enacted to protect Investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability  of  corporate  disclosures  made  pursuant  to  the  securities  laws,  and  for  other
purposes.956  This  was  a  congressional  response  to  revelations  of  several  high  profile
accounting fraud cases including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, that resulted in mass destruction
of investor value and loss of investor confidence in the integrity of the financial markets.957
As Yeager notes, these cases led to criminal charges of company officials and the bankruptcy
of Arthur Andersen LLP, at the time arguable the most prestigious independent auditing firm
in the world.958  A key feature of Sarbanes-Oxley was provision for whistleblowers: firstly,
anti-retaliation  measures,  which  involves  protecting  whistleblowers  from  employer
retaliation  after  they  disclose  wrongdoing;154 secondly,  reporting  arrangements  which
requires  that  corporations  provide  employees  with  a  standardized  channel  to  report
organizational misconduct within the corporation.155  A further feature of Sarbanes-Oxley
was increased sentences: the maximum penalty for wire and mail fraud from five years to
twenty years imprisonment.156  This can be compared with the UK Fraud Act 2006 maximum
of ten years.157
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The  U.S. Securities  and  Exchange Commission (SEC) is  an  agency of the United States
federal  government.  It  holds  responsibility  for  enforcing  the  federal  securities laws  and
regulating  the  securities  industry,  the  nation's  stock  and  options  exchanges,  and  other
electronic securities markets in the United States.959  The  enforcement authority given by
congress allows the SEC to bring civil enforcement actions against individuals or companies
alleged  to  have  committed  accounting  fraud,  provided  false  information,  or  engaged  in
insider trading or other violations of the securities law.  Corporation Finance is the division
that  oversees  the  disclosure  made  by  public  companies,  as  well  as  the  registration  of
transactions, such as mergers, made by companies.  The division is responsible for operating
EDGAR.  The Trading and Markets division oversees self-regulatory organizations such as
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and MSRB and all broker-dealer firms
and  investment  houses.   This  division  interprets  proposed  changes  to  regulations  and
monitors  operations  of  the  industry.   The  SEC  delegates  most  of  its  enforcement  and
rulemaking authority to FINRA.  All trading firms not regulated by other SROs must register
as a member of FINRA.  Individuals trading securities must pass exams administered by
FINRA to become registered representatives.960  
The  Investment  Management  Division  oversees  registered  investment  companies,  which
include mutual funds, as well as registered investment advisors.  These entities are subject to
extensive regulation under various federals securities laws.961  The Division of Investment
Management  administers  various  federal  securities  laws,  in  particular  the  Investment
Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  The SEC's staff may seek
voluntary  production  of  documents  and  testimony,  or  may  seek  a  formal  order  of
investigation from the SEC, which allows the staff to compel the production of documents
and witness testimony.  The SEC can bring a  civil  action in a  U.S. District  Court, or an
administrative proceeding which is heard by an independent administrative law judge (ALJ).
The  SEC does  not  have  criminal  authority,  but  may  refer  matters  to  state  and  federal
prosecutors.  The director of the SEC's Enforcement Division Robert Khuzami left the office
in February 2013.962 
Regulatory action in the credit crunch  
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The SEC announced on September 17, 2008, strict new rules to prohibit all forms of naked
short selling as a measure to reduce volatility in turbulent markets.963  The SEC investigated
cases involving individuals  attempting  to manipulate  the market  by passing false rumors
about certain financial institutions.  The Commission has investigated trading irregularities
and abusive short-selling practices.  
International Framework 
The reports focussed on default prevention, through the reduction of systemic risk, and the
handling of an actual default.   The reduction of systemic risk can be achieved in several
ways.  An important step has been to create more transparency in the derivatives market
through the introduction of clearinghouses.  Another important step has been the design of
measures to improve the stability of important  financial  institutions.   With all  these new
measures, it is important to keep in mind that the risk one tries to reduce can be known,
unknown or unknowable.964  Basel’s economic capital  and its  requirement  is  based upon
known risks only.  Starting with the international  responses, one of the global responses
came from the G20 leaders.  It was clear where the G20 thought the responsibility for the
crisis lies: major failures of regulation and supervision, plus reckless and irresponsible risk
taking by banks and other financial institutions, created dangerous financial fragilities that
contributed to the current crisis. 965  
Responses from the Senior Supervisors Group 
The Senior Supervisors Group published a report in March 2008 on the events of 2007,966
which was followed by a second report in October 2009 as a consequence of the continuing
and deepening of the crisis.967  The Senior Supervisors Group, which is composed of the
regulators of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the US, combines
the opinion and expertise  of some of  the most  powerful  and most experienced financial
supervisors worldwide.  Their report examines how different banks were responding to the
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financial crisis and what distinguishes those that are successful from those that are not.  The
Group identifies four key areas in which risk management practices made a difference to a
bank’s performance.968  First, the successful banks had an effective risk management system
in place that could share valuable information throughout every level of the organisation,
including  the  board  and  the  Chief  Risk  Officer.   Second,  firms  that  had  rigorous  and
independent valuation practices were better prepared to revalue and write down the complex
credit structures that they had on their books.  Third, the banks that did well had aligned their
capital  management,  liquidity  management  and  balance  sheet  management,  thereby
controlling their balance sheet rather than providing incentives to balloon it.  Fourth, banks
that did well had much better risk information systems, allowing management to assess their
risk positions and change underlying assumptions.  Better systems were able to integrate
their market risk, i.e. the risk of changing share prices, interest rates and exchange rates, with
their counterparty risk, i.e. the risk of default of the counterparty.  Engagement of senior
management played an important role in how the bank fared so far.  Banks where senior
management was able to implement its balance between risk appetite and its desire to do
business, where it could identify, understand and act upon risks and where there was a good
flow of  information  throughout  the  structure  aided by cross-disciplinary  communication.
The second report by the Senior Supervisors Group969 adds to this by adding ten areas of
continued improvement.  
The Basel Committee 
The Basel Committee wrote the leading Basel II report, which advocated the structure of
three  pillars:  minimum  capital  requirements,  supervisory  review  process  and  market
discipline.  In the aftermath of the crisis, the Committee drew up a program of reform of the
banking  sector  addressing  the  issues  raised  by  the  G20.   The  Committee  describes  the
objective  for  reform following  the  crisis  as  to  better  protect  consumers,  depositors  and
investors.970  In  its  report  to  the  G20  the  Committee  outlined  elements  to  improve  the
resilience  of  the  banks and the  global  banking system.   On a firm-level,  the  committee
looked  at  capital,  liquidity,  risk  management  and  market  discipline.   This  approach
corresponds with the three pillar approach of Basel II.  Several improvements to capital were
suggested.  Firstly, the definition of tier 1 and tier 2 capital, which represents the different
quality levels of capital that a bank can hold, was improved.  A greater emphasis was placed
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on common equity, which is regarded as the highest quality of capital.  Secondly, the risk
that this capital needs to cover was extended to include those risks that were not covered
previously.   This  resulted  in  several  reports,  such as  the  report  on  sound compensation
practice971 and  the  report  on  enhancing  corporate  governance  of  banks.972  The  points
represent  a  recurring  theme  throughout  most  of  the  reports  that  were  written  by  other
organisations.  In relation to the third of the three pillars, market discipline, the Committee
concluded that the disclosure provided by the banks, both of the risk and of the capital base,
was inadequate.  An increased disclosure of remuneration practice has been proposed.  On a
macro-level, the two concerns raised by the committee are procyclicality, or the increase in
risk as the economy grows, and systemic risk, or the risk arising from interconnectedness of
markets and its participants.  The capital ratios will be strengthened during a good period to
provide a buffer during bad years.  A countercyclical capital buffer is introduced for this
purpose.973  To reduce systemic risk, the Committee proposed an overhaul of the over-the-
counter  derivative  markets,  extra  capital  requirements  for  inter-financial  exposure  and
limitations to overreliance on short-term interbank funding.  Dealing with the default of a
bank remains a difficult problem.  One suggestion is to have contingent capital, which allows
capital instruments to be written off or converted to common shares.974  
Critique on the Basel Reports 
Basel I had its shortcomings, partly for political reasons in that it represented the most that
the parties  involved could agree at  the time.  It  is worth highlighting some of its  major
deficiencies so that the progress and changes of Basel II can be better understood.  It may be
argued that Basel I had made the financial system less stable, not more.975  That conclusion is
reached  on the  basis  of  several  shortcomings.   There  is  the  arbitrary  categorization  and
weighting of risk which is a far cry from the real world.  In order to gain higher returns on
their capital, banks started to take larger risks without having to increase their capital. There
were  also  problems  with  all  loans  within  certain  categories,  eg,  residential  lending  for
property all receiving the same risk weighting.  It is claimed that Basel I led to an increase in
lending to Asian banks as the capital required for interbank loans with a maturity less than a
year  is  far  less  than  that  required  for  lending  to  non-banks.   At  1997 over  60% of  all
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international bank lending to Asia had a maturity of less than a year; this has contributed to
the Asian crisis, surely the opposite of what Basel I had set out to achieve.  Others are more
positive about Basel I,  claiming that  it  has achieved its  objectives of improving stability
whilst providing a level playing field amongst banks, despite its simplicity.976  
Basel II sought to address some of the issues of Basel I by allowing the banks to use their
sophisticated internal methodologies to measure the risk of their assets and portfolios.  Since
the development of Basel I, large banks have invested resources into developing better ways
of assessing their risk.  Their systems were more sophisticated than the crude methods of
Basel I and Basel II sought to use these improved techniques.  It would allow a better link
between risks, capital required and reward as return on capital.  This raises two questions.
What would stop banks from gaming this system by designing their internal methodology in
way favorable to them and will this give an unfair disadvantage to smaller banks that do not
have the capability or resources to invest in their methodology?977  In the US, the scope of
application of Basel II has been reduced to the large banks.  They have a greater need for a
sophisticated way to measure their risks due to the scale of their operations.  The smaller US
banks, which are the majority of the US banks, are considered to be capitalized according to
Basel I standards.978 
The  coming  into  force  of  Basel  II  had  significant  consequences  for  areas  of  banking,
including project finance.  Unless the bank would qualify to use the internal rating-based
approach, the loans would attract a weight beyond the 100% set by Basel I.  Apart from
qualifying for using an internal methodology, banks had other options: to use securitization,
to use monoline insurance, or to merge with competitors.979  
The Basel III report is an important report produced in the wake of the crisis.  Although that
statement holds true from a regulatory perspective and it may present the banks with a great
amount  of  work  in  the  coming  years  to  implement  it  in  full.   If  one  regards  corporate
governance as a system by which companies are controlled.980  The proposals will have an
impact  on  shareholders  as  the  amount  of  capital  that  is  required  to  undertake  the  same
banking activities will be higher.  Basel III consists of the framework to manage liquidity
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risk981 and the second to outline a global regulatory framework.982  Many of the proposals
contain  implementations  of  the  response  made  to  the  G20.983  The  emphasis  is  on
strengthening capital  and liquidity  requirements  to improve the resilience in the banking
sector.  Basel III requires banks to improve the quality of capital; in particular tier 1 capital,
the highest quality  of capital,  and to increase the risk that capital  needs to cover and to
increase the capital requirement ratio itself.  Increasing capital ratios includes increasing the
level tier 1 capital hold against risk weighted assets (“RWAs”) to 4.5% and the building up
of both a conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer.  To protect liquidity, something
that proved disastrous during the crisis, two new ratios are introduced: the liquidity coverage
ratio and the net stable funding ratio.  A timeline has been drawn up for the introduction of
these new ratios.  All these combined individual measures show an underlying trend towards
a much stronger and more integrated form of risk management.  The bringing together of the
different  parts  of the organisation  is  crucial  in  forming this  integrated  risk management.
Compared with Basel II, the conclusion can be that the level of risk management that is
required is raised.  The integration of a stronger risk management into the system by which
companies  are  controlled  can  be  identified  as  a  unifying  objective  of  all  the  measures
outlined in Basel III and as its biggest influence on corporate governance of banks.  This
should  not  be  surprising,  as  risk  management  is  seen  as  such  an  element  of  corporate
governance for banks.984  Risk management is an element of corporate governance for any
company  is  acknowledged  through  the  UK  Corporate  Governance  Code985 and  by  the
Financial Reporting Council.986 
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The Committee has published reports on corporate governance of banks in 1999987 and in
2006.988  Both  reports  appeared  after  the  OECD had published their  updated  reports  on
corporate governance, in 1999989 and 2004.990  Following the crisis, and taking into account
various  other  reports  that  have  been  published  since,  including  those  by  the  Senior
Supervisors Group on risk management during991 and after the crisis,992 and by the OECD,993
the committee has updated its report on corporate governance of banks in 2010994 and in
2015.995  The October 2010 version is relevant as it contains the responses to the financial
crisis.  Given the importance of the committee, this report is an aid in answering the research
questions.  Among some of the failures of corporate governance of banks, the Committee
mentions  explicitly  and  upfront  insufficient  board  oversight  of  senior  management,
inadequate risk management  and complex organisational  structures and activities.996  The
committee  identifies  fourteen principles  that  represent elements  of an effective  corporate
governance development process for banks.  These principles address the areas listed above
where the Committee believes the focus for improvement should be.  In the version of July
2015,  the  eleven  principles  are  reworded  but  remain  in  essence  much  the  same.   The
Committee is the influential organisation worldwide shaping financial regulation, it is worth
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going  through  each  of  the  fourteen  principles:  they  are  likely  to  shape  the  debate  on
corporate governance of banks for the coming years.  Rather than discussing each principle
in turn they are discussed where they are placed in the context of the weaknesses they seek to
address.   Some of them relate  to board effectiveness,  whilst  others relate  to culture  and
remuneration.   Each  principle  is  matched  to  the  corresponding  weaknesses  in  corporate
governance at UK banks.  The July 2015 version of the principles of corporate governance
adds a new principle, Principle 13 in its new system, which includes the role of supervisors
in corporate governance at banks.  Supervisors should provide guidance for and supervise
corporate governance at banks, should require improvement and remedial action, and should
share information on corporate governance with other supervisors.997  Although the board
and senior  management  are  responsible  for  the  governance  of  the  bank,  the  supervisors
should  assess  their  performance  in  this  context.   Some  include  that  supervisors  should
evaluate whether the board and senior management have processes in place for the oversight
of  the  bank’s  strategic  objectives,  including  risk  appetite,  financial  performance,  capital
adequacy, capital  planning, liquidity,  risk profile and risk culture, controls,  compensation
practices,  and the selection and evaluation of management.  This expands the role of the
supervisor.  Under these guidelines, the supervisor becomes responsible for supervising the
internal processes at the bank and areas such as culture and compensation.  The supervisor
should get increased powers over  the composition  of the board and senior management:
supervisors should evaluate the processes and criteria used by banks in the selection of board
members and senior management and obtain information about the expertise and character of
board members and senior management.  
Changing the Culture 
One of the weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks is the culture within the banks.
There is an emphasis on growth and profit over risk management and the interests of external
stakeholders.   This  is  evidenced  by  a  large  number  of  scandals,  such  as  the  LIBOR
manipulation and the PPI mis-selling, and the problems at Barclays and the Co-operative
Bank.  This section contains an overview of the recommendations made to address these and
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of the measures taken.  These include restrictions on remuneration; increase in competition;
restructuring the financial regulator to increase focus on conduct; and measures to address
the manipulation of benchmarks such as LIBOR.  The Basel Committee defined various
principles of good corporate governance.  Two are related to culture as they seek to provide
guidance on the remuneration practices and their alignment with the bank’s risk appetite.
Principle 10: The board should oversee the compensation system’s design and operation, and
should monitor and review the compensation system to ensure that it operates as intended.998
Principle  11:  An  employee’s  compensation  should  be  aligned  with  prudent  risk  taking:
compensation should be adjusted for all  types of risk; compensation outcomes should be
symmetric with risk outcomes; compensation payout schedules should be sensitive to the
time horizon of risks; and the mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation should be
consistent with risk alignment. 
The Senior Supervisors Group named remuneration as an example of an area where the risk
appetite  of  an  organisation  determined  by  the  board  was  ignored  in  practice.999
Remuneration in banks is an area of much controversy attention.  In a separate report, the
commission argues for more transparency and disclosure on remuneration practices.1000  It
can be traced back to principles of fairness and integrity within an organisation as outlined
by Cadbury.  The point is that bringing in staff from another organisation with the agreement
of a large guaranteed bonus may not only be contrary the risk appetite of the organisation, it
may  cause  grievance  with  existing  members  of  staff.   The  FSA had made  an  effort  to
improve the connection between risk and rewards.  It had done so via its handbook by way of
SYSC 19.  The aim was to try and make the remuneration risk neutral.  This part of the
handbook has been updated following the implementation of EU legislation.1001  The UK
government  in  fact  resisted  the  EU  regulation  on  bankers’  remuneration:  it  sought  to
challenge it through the court only to abandon it when the adviser to the European Court of
Justice rejected its arguments.1002 
Independent Commission on Banking 
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The Independent Commission on Banking, which was established by the UK government in
June 2010 and was chaired by Sir John Vickers, wrote a report to consider structural and
related non-structural reforms to the UK banking sector to promote financial stability and
competition.1003  The recommendations have three aims to reduce the probability and impact
of systemic financial crises in the future; to maintain the efficient flow of credit to the real
economy; and to preserve the functioning of the payment  system and guaranteed capital
certainty for small savers and small businesses.  The report is divided in two parts: the first
part concerns financial stability whilst the second part concerns competition.  
Benchmarks 
In the wake of the LIBOR scandals, the Financial Services Act 2012 contains provisions on
misleading  statements,  misleading  provisions  and  misleading  statements  in  relation  to
benchmarks.   Traders  who deceived their  rate  setting colleagues  by amending their  own
prices of assets would fall under section 91(2).  A person (“C”) who does any act or engages
of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression as to the price or value of any
investment or as to the interest rate appropriate to any transaction commits an offence if— 
(a) C intends to create the impression, 
(b)the impression may affect the setting of a benchmark, 
(c) C knows that the impression is false or misleading or is reckless as to whether it
is, and 
(d)C knows that the impression may affect the setting of a relevant benchmark. 
It is note that section 91(3) provides a justification for such actions as it may occur in a
financial crisis.  In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is a defence for the
person charged (“D”) to show that the statement was made in conformity with— 
(a) price stabilising rules, 
(b)control of information rules, or 
(c) the provisions of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 of 
22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and stabilisation
of financial instruments. 
The purpose of these provisions is to give the regulators the most convenient tools for these
situations and an attempt to clean up and re-establish public trust in the banking sector.
Increasing Board Effectiveness 
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In RBS and Barclays, the board could not challenge a dominant CEO sufficiently.  The rapid
expansion at Northern Rock and at HBoS was not challenged by the board.  The boards
lacked experience in banking and could not provide adequate oversight and challenge.  It
allowed  a  culture  to  be  established  within  the  banks  placing  growth  and  profit  before
anything else.  The case study of the Cooperate Bank provided a persuasive argument for
increasing  board  effectiveness.   This  section  sets  out  the  most  important  responses  and
measures taken to address these weaknesses.  The principles on corporate governance set out
by the Basel Committee relate to board effectiveness.  It starts with the principle, which is an
overriding  objective  of  what  the  board’s  responsibility  is  principle  1:  The  board  has
responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing the implementation of the
bank’s strategic objectives, risk strategy, corporate governance and corporate values.  
This goes back to Cadbury who states that the boards of directors are responsible for the
governance  of  their  companies.   The risk management  function  has  been highlighted  as
important.   The oversight  of  senior  management  is  presumably  as a  consequence of  the
failure of board members to challenge senior executives at several banks.  Principle 2: board
members should be qualified, including through training, for their positions.  They should
have an understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound
and objective judgement about the affairs of the bank.  Directors should be knowledgeable
on  banking  and  finance:  commercial  skills  and  experience  may  be  sufficient  in  other
organisations, but banks require specialist knowledge.  This conclusion has been drawn by
lessons from failed banks.  The Senior Supervisors Group noted that boards are trying to
expand their knowledge base and financial expertise as a response to the crisis.  Principle 3:
the board should define governance practices for its own work and have in place the means
to ensure that such practices are followed and reviewed for improvement.  Principle 4: in a
group  structure,  the  board  of  the  parent  company  has  the  responsibility  for  adequate
corporate governance across the group and ensuring that there are governance policies and
mechanisms appropriate to the structure, business and risk of the group and its entities. 
Integrity and accountability are aided by the internal information and control systems as set
out in the Turnbull Guidance and by the IMF and OECD.  The quality and the integrity of
the  information  are  crucial  for  transparency  and  accountability.   Principle  5:  under  the
direction  of  the  board,  senior  management  should  ensure  that  the  bank’s  activities  are
consistent with the business strategy, risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the
board.   The  Senior  Supervisors  Group  expressed  its  dissatisfaction  with  the  lack  of
consistency between the risk appetite defined by the board and that implemented at lower
levels.  The board may agree on a risk appetite and strategy may be one thing, but overseeing
that this is implemented and adhered to throughout the bank is a different matter.  It requires
clear lines of communication and information both from the board into the business but also
the other way; this is outlined in the next principles.   Principle 6: banks should have an
effective internal controls system and a risk management function with sufficient authority,
stature,  independence,  resources  and  access  to  the  board.   Principle  7:  risks  should  be
identified  and  monitored  on  an  ongoing  firmwide  and  individual  entity  basis,  and  the
sophistication of the bank’s risk management and internal control infrastructures should keep
pace with any changes to the bank’s risk profile, and to the external landscape.  Principle 8: 
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effective risk management requires robust internal  communication  within  the  bank
about  risk,  both  across  the  organisation  and  through  reporting  to  the  board  and  senior
management.   Principle  9:  the  board  and  senior  management  should  utilise  the  work
conducted by audit functions, external auditors and internal control functions. 
Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9 build upon principles 3 and 4 providing detail on the internal controls
and systems.  It is emphasised that the information on the bank’s risks must be accurate and
of high integrity.  But these systems need to be flexible so that in a time of rapidly changing
markets they can be adapted to the new situation.  Keeping these large information structures
flexible within a bank is no simple task.  As per the first and fourth point noted by the Senior
Supervisors Group, banks with a good and adaptable risk management system in place that
shared information at every level of the organisation, including the board, found it easier to
stay  on  top  of  things  during  the  financial  crisis.   Principle  12:  the  board  and  senior
management should know and understand the bank’s operational structure and the risks that
it poses.  Principle 13: where a bank operates through special-purpose or structures or in
jurisdictions that impede transparency or do not meet banking standards, its board and senior
management should understand the purpose, structure and unique risks of these operations.
These  in  essence  come  back  to  the  principle  of  transparency  and  to  the  educational
requirement of the board.  Principles 12 and 13 have been dropped in the July 2015 version
of the report.  It lists the next Principle 14 as the Principle 12.  Principle 14: the governance
of  the bank should  be transparent  to  its  shareholders,  depositors,  other  stakeholders  and
market  participants.   It  is  remarkable  that  only in  the  last  of  its  fourteen  principles  the
Committee mentions shareholders and stakeholders.  It mentions these in the third pillar of
Basel II, disclosure.  It does not just mention shareholders, but the Committee acknowledges
that there is a range of stakeholders, including depositors and other market participants, who
need to be involved and informed.  It uses an enlarged group of actors in the system of
corporate governance, as was done by the OECD1004 globally and the Winter report1005 within
the EU, and in reports by the Committee.1006  
The Walker Review noted that some boards were far more effective than others at creating
solutions and implementing these at the time of the crisis than others, despite that they had
the  same obligations  to  their  shareholders.1007  This  difference  was  noted  by  the  Senior
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Supervisors Group1008 and allows for some comparison between good and bad practices.  The
Walker Review seeks to investigate this difference by answering several questions, notably
by  questioning  whether  to  extend  the  statutory  responsibility  of  the  board  to  include
depositors or society as a whole and by examining the role of non-executive directors.  The
review considered  extending the responsibilities  beyond those to  shareholders  to  include
employees, depositors and taxpayers, and the creation of a non-executive director for public
interest, it recommends focussing on the accountabilities rather than expanding on these.1009
The  argument  presented  in  support  of  not  expanding  the  responsibilities  is  that  the
Companies  Act  2006 s172-174,  which  describes  the  duties  of  the  director,  is  sufficient:
damaging public confidence and not meeting obligations to depositors is not the long-term
interests  of  the  company.   These  sections  in  the  Company  Act  2006  have  been  called
enlightened shareholder value as it goes somewhat further than plain shareholder value.1010
Instead of amending the statutes, the review concludes that a great deal can be achieved
within this framework.  The requirement of specialist knowledge concerning the financial
industry for the directors is greater than in other sectors.  It requires a specialised set of skills
and knowledge as the impact of the lack of it on society is far greater than in other industries.
This observation corresponds with principle 2 of the Basel Committee1011 and observations
made by the Senior Supervisors Group on how board members are selected.1012  It presents
the  problem  of  independence  of  non-executive  directors  as  the  best  place  to  build  this
knowledge is from within the industry itself.  This would ask for scrutiny to be placed on the
selection  process.1013  But  the  knowledge  and  understanding  of  the  financial  sector  and
training is essential for the optimal functioning of each non-executive director.  Because of
this specialist aspect, the time commitment of a non-executive director will be far greater
than in other industry sectors.  
The FCA would ensure that the directors are knowledgeable and engaged, which is essential
for the proper functioning of the board.  The executive needs to be challenged and tested on
the proposals that he puts forward.  The non-executive directors need to be satisfied that the
risk assessment is done properly and that the outcome is in line with the risk strategy.  
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Shareholders and the Stewardship Code 
There are two types of shareholders, distinguished by the time horizon of their investment.
Fund managers may hold the stock only for a short period, deciding to sell it if they do not
like the direction the company is going.  There are the investors who intend to hold on to the
stock for a long period of time.  This group of investors may seek to influence the decisions
of the board if they do not like the direction that the company is going in.  
Some fund managers may be hesitant  to  subscribe to such a code,  the least  that  can be
expected in the governance process is that they are involved in the selection of the board and
in holding it to account on their performance.  The Institutional Shareholders’ Committee,
renamed the Institutional Investor Committee on the 18th of May 2011, published the Code
on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors.1014  The Code has to enhance the quality of
the dialogue of the institutional investors with companies to help improve long-term returns
to shareholders, reduce the risk of catastrophic outcomes due to bad strategic decisions, and
help with the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities.  The code is made up of seven
principles.   The  investors will  need to  monitor  their  investee  companies.   They need to
satisfy that the board and its commissions are effective.  They need to maintain an audit trail
of the monitoring activities.  Investors may escalate their activities of required but should do
so in line with guidelines that they have set out themselves.  Investors should have a policy
on voting and report on their stewardship and voting activities.  The Financial  Reporting
Council is responsible for the UK Corporate Governance Code.1015  All companies with a
Premium Listing in the UK are required under the Listing Rules to report on how they have
applied the UK Corporate Governance Code.  The Walker Review suggests that it should be
placed  within  the  remit  of  the  Financial  Reporting  Council  to  design  principles  of  best
practice in stewardship by institutional investors and fund managers.1016  
Governance of Risk 
For any business, the management of financial risk and many other types of risk is important
and  subject  to  constraints.   For  large  financial  institutions,  it  is  part  of  their  strategic
objectives.  They take on financial risk and a much higher form of leverage than is in other
types  of industries.   The consequences of these risks are  larger  in terms of social  costs,
exceeding the downside risk to shareholders.  The board would need to make decisions on
whether new complex structures or overseas operations would give sufficient return taking
into account the regulatory costs rising from the associated risks.  The Senior Supervisors
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Group1017 has emphasised that banks with good and flexible risk management systems that
reached up to board level were able to deal with the crisis much better; the Basel Committee
has included this in, principles 1 and 5 of its report on corporate governance.1018 
The Review is concerned by how the governance of risk by the board can be made more
effective alongside the regulation.1019  It  summarises,  that ‘the obligation of the board in
respect  of  risk  should  be  to  ensure  that  risks  are  identified  and assessed;  that  risks  are
effectively controlled; that strategy is informed by and aligned with the board’s risk appetite;
and that a supportive risk culture is embedded so that all employees are alert to the impact on
the whole organisation of their actions and decisions’.  This is in line with what the Basel
Committee has dictated, in this case in principles 4 to 8.1020  The new regulation that is being
developed should aim to eliminate the risk of a crisis reoccurring, but the Review notes that
it must not be the job of the regulator to sit on the board of the banks.  The regulators must
stand back to allow for new developments, products and inventions whilst satisfying itself in
the capabilities and effectiveness of the board to discharge its obligations in relation to the
associated  risks.   Not  only  is  the  audit  committee  loaded  with  the  demanding  task  of
financial  reporting  and  internal  control,  the  task  of  risk  management  for  a  financial
institution is so large that it may overload the audit committee.  The review recommends
establishing a separate board risk committee which should focus on the prudential risks of
the institution.1021  These risks include leverage,  liquidity  risk and market  risks including
interest rate and currency risk, credit risk and counterparty risk.  The Board Risk Committee,
which as any board committee should consist of nonexecutive directors, should be supported
by a Chief Risk Officer (CRO).  The requirement of a Chief Risk Officer within the bank
emphasises a small but important part of principle 6 of the Basel Committee, where this role
is mentioned.1022  The Chief Risk Officer should operate at board level risk governance but
be independent of any business unit.1023  Besides the daily tasks, the Board Risk Committee
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due diligence has been conducted and to assess the consequences of the risk profile of the
company after the transaction.  It needs to take into account whether it falls within the risk
tolerance and appetite as defined in the risk strategy.  This is principle 5 as defined by the
Basel Committee.1024  Note that the risk strategy, tolerance and appetite should be included in
a risk report, which must form part of the annual report and accounting obligations.1025 
The  literature  supports  the  view  that  corporate  governance  for  financial  institutions  is
different  from that  of  nonfinancial  ones  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  principal-agent
problem is more complex for banks and other financial institutions than it is for non-financial
ones.   At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  there  are  those  who  consider  that  corporate
governance should not be different for financial  and non-financial  companies.  The main
studies in the field mention more or less the same basic elements distinguishing financial
from non-financial firms and those are: opaqueness of bank operations, heavy regulation, and
higher moral hazard opportunities by managers.1026  The literature review showed a lack of
consensus  among  the  academia  on  which  performance  indicators  and  which  corporate
governance indicators are the most adequate ones for testing this relationship.  Some studies
showed that a higher frequency of board meetings combined with higher director fees and
ownership stake and better attendance rates translates to higher profit efficiency of banks.
There are studies that find that the lower the proportion of internal directors and an external
chairperson will produce higher return on assets and return on equity for the bank.  There are
some studies that find that the board size and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q are
positively related.  The financial sector in United States has seen thirteen relevant pieces of
legislation spanning from 1913 to 2010 which have shaped the behaviour of financial firms.
The regulation was intensified after  the financial  crisis which was blamed on failures of
corporate  governance  practices  of  banks and other  financial  institutions.   The regulation
addressing corporate  governance practices such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Basel II,  and
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision are discussed.1027 
Risk management, internal controls and governance 
Banks’ lax internal governance and risk management lie at the root of the financial crisis
since they are the first  level of protection for individual institutions and the system as a
whole.  They were items of primary concern in the post-crisis agenda.  Pillar 2 revision in
the  enhanced  Basel  II  framework  intends  to  strengthen  risk  management  practices  and
overcome the loopholes in internal controls and risk models in order to better capture risks in
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internal assessments of capital adequacy.  Under Pillar 2 banks must apply stress testing that
will play a leading role in strengthening bank’s governance and the resilience of individual
banks and financial system.  Stress tests should keep banks management alert for potential
shocks as a result of market reversal.  This way banks have an indication how much capital
they would need in order to absorb losses in times of adverse market conditions, i.e. they can
plan their capital levels in the long-run so as to be prepared for such conditions and control
their solvency risk.  Stress tests are intended to supplement the other risk management tools
and  help  overcome  the  limitations  of  historical  data  used  in  measurement  methods  and
particularly the shortcomings of VaR models.  Stress tests will allow a broader view over
bank’s total risk profile by including a wider range of risk scenarios.  
Basel II enhancements require that board and management have an understanding of risk
exposures on a firm-wide basis and are duly informed about the capital market activities and
products in which their bank is involved.  With respect to new products and activities- such
as securitization and off-balance sheet activities and complex products- senior management
should understand the underlying assumptions in the business models and establish sound
and effective valuation and risk management practices in order to assess the fair value of the
financial  instruments  and  control  the  associated  risks.   A  sound  and  resilient  valuation
system will allow banks to produce a fair value of their assets at any time even when markets
disrupt and there is not a reliable price benchmark anymore.  In addition to the strengthened
internal  controls  by  the  enhancements,  in  October  2010  BCBS  issued  Principles  for
Enhancing Corporate Governance which aim to address main deficiencies in bank corporate
governance  revealed  by the crisis.   The  Principles  recommend that  supervisors establish
guidance or rules requiring banks to have sound corporate governance strategies, policies
and procedures1028. 
Transparency  
The crisis of 2007-2008 was to a large extent a crisis of confidence.  The inconsistent and
insufficient information disclosure in banking sector before the crisis led to a mutual luck of
trust  among  banks  and the  related  credit  crunch  in  interbank  lending  as  well  as  to  the
investors’ withdrawal from securities trade and the subsequent market break down.  One of
the main and most important achievements of the new regulation is the establishment of
uniform disclosure rules in order to improve transparency, promote better market discipline
and avoid uncertainty in decision making in the future.  
Financial accounting1029 
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Financial accounting rules created incentives for regulatory arbitrage before the crisis and
became a reason for huge financial losses banks with large securitization exposures suffered
during the crisis because of the fair value measurement.  BCBS in collaboration with the
International  Accounting  Standard  Board  (IASB)  is  advocating  changes  in  accounting
standards which promote more forward-looking dynamic provisioning based on expected
losses approach that recognizes credit losses earlier and is less procyclical than the current
incurred loss approach.  
The UK Stewardship Code 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has issued the UK Stewardship Code which aims to
enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies to help
improve  long-term  returns  to  shareholders  and  the  efficient  exercise  of  governance
responsibilities.  The  UK  Corporate  Governance  Code  has  emphasised  the  value  of  a
constructive dialogue between institutional shareholders and companies based on a mutual
understanding of objectives.  
The principles of the UK Stewardship Code are: principle 1: institutional investors should
publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities;
principle  2:  institutional  investors  should  have a  robust  policy  on managing conflicts  of
interest in relation to stewardship and this policy should be publicly disclosed; principle 3:
institutional  investors  should  monitor  their  investee  companies;  principle  4:  institutional
investors should establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities
as  a  method  of  protecting  and  enhancing  shareholder  value;  principle  5:  institutional
investors  should  be  willing  to  act  collectively  with  other  investors  where  appropriate;
principle 6: institutional investors should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of
voting activity;  principle  7: institutional  investors should report  on their  stewardship and
voting activities.  The Stewardship Code is to be applied on a comply or explain basis.   The
UK Stewardship Code is addressed in the first instance to firms who manage assets on behalf
of institutional shareholders such as pension funds, insurance companies, investment trusts,
and  other  collective  vehicles.   The  FRC encourages  all  institutional  investors  to  report
whether  they have complied  with the Stewardship Code.  Monitoring and review of the
application of the Stewardship Code will  be in two phases.  As an interim measure, the
Investment Management Association (IMA), will carry out its regular engagement survey
which will cover adherence to the Stewardship Code in 2010.  The FRC points out that there
are a number of significant issues which were raised during the consultation phase which are
not  addressed  in  the  UK  Stewardship  Code.   These  include  disclosure  by  institutional
investors of their policies in relation to stock lending; arrangements for voting pooled funds;
and the information to be disclosed in relation to voting records.   The FRC will undertake
additional work in relation to these areas prior to the monitoring exercise in 2011.  A EU
Green Paper ‘Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies’ may
have ramifications for the UK Stewardship Code as in section 5.5, the Green Paper mentions
that  the Commission intends  to  carry out  a  review centred  around institutional  investors
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adherence to stewardship codes of best practice.  It is apposite to conclude with a comment
from Bob Campion in his article ‘Managers on alert to comply or explain’.  The new code is
a  timely  opportunity  for  pension  trustees  to  get  to  grips  with  their  role  as  institutional
shareholders.  If they do, it will be up to fund managers to demonstrate their own expertise in
this area or risk losing business.1030 
In  2002  the  ISC  issued  guidance  on  shareholders  activism  which  indicated  that  an
institutional  shareholder  should  monitor  the  performance  of  their  investee  companies
through regular dialogue where appropriate, intervene where necessary, as well as evaluate
the impact of their activism and report to their beneficial owners.  The ISC transformed these
guidelines  into  its  code:  the  Code  on  Responsibilities  of  Institutional  Investors  2009.
Myners Report (2001) proposed that a duty should be imposed on the UK based pension
funds like their US counterparts owe.  The Myners’ proposal endorsed through legislative
reforms  that  enable  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Treasury  to  make  regulations  for
institutional investors and to require them to disclose information regarding the exercise of
their voting-rights.1031  The financial and corporate crisis (2007-09) led to the commission of
the Walker  Review (2009) that  examined the issues  of corporate  governance  in the UK
banks and other financial  industry entities.   The Review pointed out that the perfunctory
behaviour  of  institutional  investors  in  performing  their  expected  role  in  corporate
governance is one of the reasons of corporate failure.  The Walker Review emphasised the
role of institutional investors and proposed stewardship obligations for institutional investors
and  their  fund  managers  in  the  British  model  of  corporate  governance.   The  Review
recommended the conversion of the ISC principle into the Stewardship code that will operate
on the basis of the comply or explain model.  
The  FRC having  oversight  of  the  review  process  to  ensure  its  purposed  operation  will
sponsor and maintain the Stewardship Code.  The proposed recommendations are included
in the Stewardship Code by incorporating the guidance given to the institutional investors
previously contained in section 2 of the Combined Code (i.e. E. Institutional Shareholders).
This development led to the Code on Corporate Governance (2010), comprises on section 1,
rather than Combined Code, and the UK Stewardship Code (2010).  In reply of Walker‘s
recommendations,  the  FRC  formulated  the  following  policy  objectives  to  judge  a
Stewardship Code1032:  the Code should set standards of stewardship to which mainstream
institutional  investors  should  aspire,  and  maintain  the  credibility  and  quality  of  these
standards through independent input on the content and monitoring of the Code; the Code




 The Companies Act 2006, s. 1277 to 1280 
1032
 Financial Reporting Council, Consultation on a Stewardship Code for Institutional Investors, London, (FRC 2010) at
page 5 
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encourage  UK and foreign  shareholders  to  apply  and report  against  it;  the  Code should
ensure that engagement is closely linked to the investment process within the investment
firm and the Code should contribute towards improved communication between shareholders
and the boards of the companies in which they invest; and the Code should secure sufficient
disclosure  to  enable  institutional  shareholders’  prospective  clients  to  assess  how  those
managers are acting in relation to the Code so that this  can be taken into account when
awarding and monitoring fund management mandates.
The focus of the Stewardship Code is on the UK-based institutional investors and their fund-
managers.   The  code  requires  that  institutional  investors  should  publicly  disclose  their
monitoring policy.1033  For instance, how they will monitor their investee companies through
an active dialogue; what will be their strategy on intervention, policy on responsible use of
voting-rights and on evaluation of the reasons given by their investee companies in relation
to depart from Corporate Governance Code.  They should have a robust policy on managing
conflicts of interest  by acting in the interests of all clients or beneficiaries at the time of
meaningful  engagement  and  responsible  use  of  their  voting  rights.   The  institutional
investors’ monitoring requires them to determine when it is necessary to enter into an active
dialogue with the board of their investee companies.1034  This monitoring process should be
regular,  clearly  communicable,  and  examined  periodically  for  its  effectiveness.   The
compliance  with  the terms  of  their  investment  mandate  should  ensure active  monitoring
through  their  meaningful  engagement  with  investee  companies.   The  institutional
shareholders  are  free  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  engage  but  their  choice  should  be  a
considered  one  based  on  their  investment  approach.   Their  managers  or  agents  are
responsible for ensuring that they comply with the terms of the mandate as agreed.1035  The
fund  managers’  regular  contact  and  their  engagement  with  investee  companies  have  an
impact on the quality and quantity of corporate monitoring.  The disclosure statements made
by  institutions  under  the  Stewardship  Code  should  assist  their  investee  companies  to
understand the approach and expectations of their major investors.  These statements should
assist those issuing mandates to institutional investment managers to make a better-informed
choice  for  improving  the  functioning  of  the  market  and  facilitating  the  exercise  of
responsibility to end-investors.1036 
The Walker report focused on the behaviour of institutional shareholders and recommended
that they should be less passive and prepare to engage earlier if they suspect weaknesses in a
1033
 The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 1 
1034
 The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Principle 3 
1035
 The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Preface at p. 1  
1036
 The UK Stewardship Code (FRC 2010), Preface at p. 1 
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companies’ governance.  The Walker report examined the role of institutional shareholders
in corporate governance in the light of the UK banking industry and its failure rather than
considering  the  issues  of  financial  investment,  role  of  investment  intermediaries  and
weaknesses  of  corporate  monitoring  in  the  existing  security  investment  structure.   The
investment management industry recognised the monitoring role of fund-managers and the
need to ensure that  better  outcomes resulted from the engagement  process,  and that  this
required changes in behaviour from both companies and assets managers’.1037  The better
outcomes relating to fund-managers’ monitoring responsibility could be achieved through
their strong commitment to the notion of company stewardship to achieve better governance
outcomes, recognising the need of their responsible engagement and having a belief in the
engagement benefits.  The institutional investors’ stewardship responsibility require them to
maintain a clear audit trail e.g. their private meetings with boards and voting records, and to
attend  the  companies’  AGM,  where  appropriate  and  practicable.   Their  monitoring
responsibility  not  only  requires  them to consider  carefully  explanations  provided by the
board of their  investee  companies  against  departure  from the UK Corporate  Governance
Code but also to make reasoned judgement in each case and give a written explanation to the
companies and enter into dialogue if they do not accept the company position.1038  
The  monitoring  responsibility  requires  that  shareholders  and  their  investment  managers
should actively  intervene  in  relation  to  their  concerns  about  the company’s  strategy and
performance, and assess the outcome of doing so.  The collaborative engagement may be a
most  effective  manner  of  institutional  investors’  engagement  at  the  time  of  significant
corporate or economic stress that pose a threat to the ability of the company to continue.1039
The institutional  investors should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting
activity.1040  In case of an unsatisfactory outcome of active engagement, they are required to
register an abstention or vote against the resolution proposed by the board but in both cases
the company should be informed in advance with reasons.  The institutional investors should
have to report  on their  stewardship and voting activities,  to their  clients  or beneficiaries
relating to details of how they have discharged their responsibilities.1041  The operation of the
Stewardship Code is voluntary on the bases of the comply or explain approach in which the
institutional  investors  are  required  to  comply  with  the  principles  of  the  code  for  the
monitoring  of  their  investee  companies  or  in  case of  departure  from the  code,  they  are
1037
 The IMA Annual Survey, “Asset Management in the UK 2009-2010” IMA, London, (2010) at p. 75  
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required to provide meaningful reasons of non-compliance.  The FRC will keep oversight on
the  operation  of  the  Stewardship  Code.   Stewardship  is  a  collective  responsibility  of
investors and directors.1042 & 1043  Their first responsibility is to provide a clear mandate that
should  cover  corporate  purpose,  value,  strategy,  relationships,  roles  and  responsibilities.
Secondly, they should focus on corporate performance, risks and opportunities, and planting
for the future by ensuring that the right investment  are being made in innovation,  plant,
reputation and talent.1044  
The operation  of  the Stewardship Code is  self-regulatory  on the basis  of the comply  or
explain principle like the ISC Code that required a voluntary commitment to the institutional
investors  to  disclose the operation  of  the  Code’s  principle  on their  website  in  the  same
manner as the FRC drafted the Code of Stewardship.  There are many concerns behind the
operation of the Stewardship Code 2010 in the achieving of the objectives of responsible
corporate monitoring:  
First, the operation of the comply or explain principle as a requirement of listing rules is not
encouraging in case of the Combined Code where institutional investors, who have a large
stake, have failed to evaluate the veracity of the appliance statement and the reasons of the
explanatory statements in case of non-compliance.1045  
Secondly, in the absence of a monitoring authority what is the difference between the ISC
Code and the Stewardship Code 2010?  
Thirdly, the institutional investors’ insufficient expertise, conflict of interest, agent apathy,
and  collective  actions  are  real  problems  and  without  their  solutions,  it  would  be  an
unrealistic  expectation  that  they  will  oppose  the  board  of  directors  by  performing  their
stewardship commitments.  The institutional investors, as custodians of others’ funds, do not
like to make the board unhappy through intervention and their investment managers only pay
attention to trading decisions rather than corporate monitoring as owners.1046 
Fourthly, the scope of the Stewardship Code is limited to the extent of institutional investors
that  aims  to  enhance  the  quality  of  engagement  between  institutional  investors  and
1042
 Mark Goyder and Philip Goldenberg, Cadbury: A Testbed for Stewardship’ the Wall Street Journal  
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 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574643993127344938.html   
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 Mark Goyder and Philip Goldenberg, (n.48) 
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 Brian R. Cheffins, “The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel” (2010) the Modern Law Rev. 73(6) 1004 at p.1013 
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 Brian R. Cheffins, (n.53) 1014 
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companies.1047  In existing share-ownership fragmentation of the UK based companies, the
domestic  institutional  investors  without  foreign  institutional  investors  do  not  have  a  big
enough stake to get companies to listen to them on major corporate issues, a presumption of
the Stewardship Code effectiveness arguably harks to a bygone age.1048  
Fifthly, the adequacy of informational flow to the investors and market for their effective
engagement  is  risky  because  of  any  disclosure  of  price  sensitive  information  to  the
market.1049  There is a risk that public disclosure may be beneficial for market competitors
including  public  unlisted  companies  and  private  companies  which  are  not  under  an
equivalent  obligation  to  disclose information  to  the  market.   The  quality  of  institutional
investors’ engagement depends upon the pattern of contact between investment house and
company such as CEO, finance directors, chairman, NEDs.1050  
Sixthly, the performance of investment managers are evaluated and rewarded on the basis of
the short-term index-relative performance,  they concentrate  on the delivery of short-term
return.1051  
Seventhly, the institutional investors engage many investment managers to manage the risks
they construct  their  performance-based portfolio  that  resulted in excessive diversification
with an equity portfolio having thousands of stocks.  
The  Stewardship  Code  neither  addressed  these  issues  nor  explained  the  misguided
interpretation  of  the  fiduciary  duties  of  institutional  investors  and  their  investment
intermediaries.  It is argued that the Stewardship Code extends the monitoring responsibility
relating  to  corporate  performance  and  engagement  with  companies  beyond  investment
managers to major shareholders.  Hence, insurance companies, pension funds, investment
trusts and unit trusts have no responsibility to address the Stewardship Code on a comply or
explain basis in the absence of any regulatory authority like the FSA for supervision of their
fund managers.1052  Simon Wong argued that the FRC passed up an historic opportunity to
1047
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strengthen ISC developed code in which institutions possessed widely disparate conceptions
of, and commitment to stewardship, which has become the Stewardship Code.1053  The focus
of the Code on managing conflicts rather than dealing with conflicts  of interest is a step
backwards  and  so  is  an  acknowledgement  of  institutional  investors’  monitoring
shortcomings.   The  aforesaid  structural  flaws  and  markets  practices  suggested  that  the
Stewardship Code, as a whole in exiting framework, would not have much effect in making
the  institutional  investors  as  active  and  responsible  corporate  monitors  as  well  as  to
encourage self-enforcement  of the Code and publication of a compliance  report  on their
websites.  After that, we are going to examine the next step in UK Corporate Governance
Reform.  It appears that the UK corporate governance reform is improved step by step.
Next step in UK Corporate Governance Reform
On November 29, 2016, Prime Minister Theresa May’s government issued a green paper1054
(the Green Paper) to canvass opinion on proposed reforms to the UK’s corporate governance
framework.  A green paper is a government consultation document that invites feedback
from interested parties on legislative proposals.  While the content of the Paper provides
some guidance as to the government’s current thinking on corporate governance reforms,
there  is  no guarantee  that  any of the proposals  put  forward will  find their  way into the
regulatory framework.  In her introduction to the Green Paper, Theresa May cites a concern
that in recent years, the behaviour of a limited few has damaged the reputation of many, and
states  that  big business must earn and keep the trust  and confidence of their  customers,
employees  and  the  wider  public1055.   The  Secretary  of  State  for  Business,  Energy  and
Industrial  Strategy,  Greg  Clark,  hails  the  UK’s  corporate  governance  regime  as  one  of
Britain’s  biggest  assets  in  competing  in  the  global  economy1056.   Citing  proposals  by
members  of  the  business  community  to  update  and  amend  the  corporate  governance
framework, the Secretary of State states the aim of the Green Paper as framing the discussion
around possible amendments to the governance regime relating to (i) executive remuneration
and incentivisation, (ii) the representation of employees and other stakeholders in company
decision-making,  and  (iii)  enhanced  governance  standards  for  large  private  companies.
 Brian R. Cheffins, (n.53) 1016 
1053
 Simon C.  Y.  Wong,  ‘The UK Stewardship  Code:  A Missed  Opportunity  for  Higher  Standards’ published  in  Responsible
Investors on 13th July 2010, available on http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640897  
1054




 Green Paper, Introduction from the Prime Minister, p. 2
1056
 Green Paper, Foreword from the Secretary of State, p. 4
231
Certain of the proposals develop positions advanced by Mrs May in a speech to launch her
leadership campaign on June 11, 20161057, and put forward more recently in a report issued
by the think tank “High Pay Centre” and authored by the conservative MP Chris Philp1058.  
Under current legislation, quoted companies1059 are required to submit a remuneration policy
to a binding shareholder vote at least every three years.  They are required to prepare an
annual  remuneration  report  that  reports  on  remuneration  paid  or  awarded  during  the
preceding financial year and includes a statement describing how the company intends to
implement  the  current  remuneration  policy  in  the  financial  year  following  the  reporting
period.  The remuneration report is subject to an advisory shareholder vote at the annual
general meeting.  If the vote to approve the remuneration report is not passed, the company
must  re-submit  the remuneration  policy  to  shareholders  for  approval  at  the  next  general
meeting1060.   Companies that have a premium listing on the London Stock Exchange are
subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”)1061 on a comply or explain basis.
The Code contains high-level guidance on the procedure for setting directors’ remuneration
and the role of the remuneration committee1062.  Government research shows that there have
been few instances  of  remuneration  policies  and reports  being  rejected  by  shareholders,
though instances of significant minority opposition are comparatively high1063.  
1057
 Available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/TheresaMayJuly11Speech.pdf
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 Restoring Responsible Ownership – Ending the Ownerless Corporation and Controlling Executive Pay, September 2016, available
at http://highpaycentre.org/files/HPC_42_WEB_amend_-_Restoring_Responsible_Ownership.pdf
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European Economic Area, or are admitted to dealing on either the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ, see section 385 of the
Companies Act 2006
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Shareholder voting rights
Options tabled to enhance shareholder voting rights on executive remuneration include the
following:
 making the executive pay package detailed in the remuneration report or elements of
it, such as variable pay subject to an annual binding vote.  It is unclear under the
Green  Paper  whether  such  approval  would  be  retrospective  or  forward-looking.
Under the proposal, the measure might be applied either to all quoted companies or
alternatively as an escalation mechanism for companies that experience significant
minority opposition to a remuneration report;
 imposing more stringent consequences for companies that lose an advisory vote, for
example,  requiring  any  such  company  to  obtain  75%  approval  for  its  next
remuneration policy;
 requiring or encouraging companies to set an upper limit for aggregate pay in their
remuneration policy, and requiring any pay in excess of such limit to be approved
through a binding shareholder vote;
 requiring  the  remuneration  policy  to  be  put  to  a  binding  shareholder  vote  more
frequently than every three years, or giving shareholders discretion to bring this vote
forward; and
 amending the Code to include more specific guidelines on companies’ engagement
with shareholders on remuneration.
The cited government research shows that to date only six companies have failed to obtain
approval  of  an  annual  remuneration  report  and  there  has  been  only  one  instance  of  a
remuneration  policy  being  rejected  by  shareholders.   By  contrast,  185  companies  have
experienced significant minority opposition to a remuneration report and significant minority
opposition has been recorded in 80 binding shareholder votes on the remuneration policy1064.
In light of these figures, we suggest that to have a tangible impact on shareholder oversight
of remuneration, measures must be triggered by significant minority opposition.  Measures
that increase the scope or frequency of shareholder majority votes risk failing to address
concerns unless coupled with effective measures to increase shareholder engagement.  
Shareholder engagement
A  challenge  in  the  area  of  remuneration  oversight  is  an  apparent  lack  of  shareholder
engagement – an impression borne out by relatively low shareholder participation in votes
on remuneration1065.  The Green Paper acknowledges that as pay is seldom a large part of a




 On average, 28% of shareholders of FTSE100 companies do not participate in remuneration votes, 40% in the case of smaller
quoted companies – see Green Paper paragraph 1.30
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and risk losing a good management  team.  The Green Paper puts forward the following
options:
 mandatory disclosure of fund managers’ voting records, and the extent to which they
have made use of proxy voting or voting advisory services.  It is noted that the UK
Stewardship  Code1066,  directed  at  institutional  investors  and  administered  by  the
Financial  Reporting Council,  already encourages institutional investors to disclose
this information, and that most investors comply with this guidance;
 establishment  of  a  senior  shareholder  committee  to  engage  with  executive
remuneration arrangements.   The Green Paper concedes  that this  risk introducing
complexity into the existing unitary board structure in the UK and moving closer to a
continental model, where oversight functions are structurally separate to executive
functions; and
 introduction  of  measures  to  increase  the  engagement  of  individual  and  retail
shareholders.   The  Green  Paper  notes  that  individual  shareholder  engagement  is
hindered by the fact that most retail shareholders hold their shares through nominee
structures, and that there is little demand on the part of retail investors to make use of
existing rights relating to shareholder votes and pass-back of information by brokers.
The appetite among institutional investors for greater administrative burdens is unlikely to be
great, and, as the Green Paper remarks, any increase in burden on major shareholders risks
discouraging investment in UK companies.  
The role of the remuneration committee
The role and composition of remuneration committees is governed by a number of high-level
principles under the Code, which provides guidance as to a minimum number of directors
that  should  sit  on  it,  managing  conflicts  of  interest,  its  role  in  determining  executive
remuneration and performance targets, and its chairman’s obligations to maintain contact as
required with principal shareholders about remuneration1067.  However, the Green Paper cites
a concern that remuneration committees are not as effective as they could be in overseeing
executive pay arrangements, both because in many cases they are not seen to proactively
engage with shareholders and employees,  and because there is a perception that they are
reluctant to take positions that do not align with the executive team’s expectations.  The
government’s proposals are the following:
1066
 The  UK  Stewardship  Code,  September  2012,  available  at  https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-
governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx
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 The Code, Section D
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 remuneration committees should be required to consult shareholders and employees
in advance of preparing the company’s remuneration policy; and
 to enable remuneration committees to more effectively challenge executives, chairs
of  the remuneration  committee  should be required  to have served for  at  least  12
months on a remuneration committee before taking up the role.  The Code provides
in its general guidelines on the effectiveness of corporate leadership that boards and
their  committees  should  have  the  appropriate  balance  of  skills,  experience,
independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their duties
effectively1068.  
Transparency in executive remuneration
In her speech on June 11, 2016, Mrs May made waves by advocating the introduction of
disclosure of ratios  comparing  CEO pay to pay in  the wider  company workforce.   This
proposal has formed part of discussion around pay reporting in the UK for some time, and
publication of such ratios became mandatory for US public companies for financial years
beginning  on or  after  January  1,  2017.   In  the  UK,  the  proposal  has  been put  forward
respectively by Pension and Investment Research Consultants Limited (PIRC)1069 and the
Trade Union Share Owners1070,  and by conservative MP Chris Philp in a recently issued
report.  The Green Paper acknowledges the value to investors of having access to pay ratios,
when they are presented in the context of the company’s performance during the relevant
year.   However,  it  cautions  that  there is  a risk that  the ratios might  produce misleading
results that could be misconstrued in public discourse.  
The Green Paper invites opinion as to whether existing reporting requirements relating to
performance targets triggering bonus payments and benefits under incentive plans should be
reinforced.  Under legislation, such targets must be reported by quoted companies in their
annual  remuneration  reports.   However,  in  the  opinion  of  the  board,  is  commercially
sensitive is exempt from this requirement1071.  There has been considerable pressure from
investor associations for companies to provide full disclosure of performance targets, and,
where such targets legitimately constitute commercially sensitive information, to commit to
make  subsequent  disclosure1072.   The  Green  Paper  invites  views  on  either  (i)  making
retrospective disclosure of bonus targets within a specified timeframe a mandatory reporting
1068
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requirement or, alternatively, (ii) increasing non-legislative pressure to disclose performance
targets, whether through institutional shareholder guidelines or strengthening existing Code
provisions1073.  The Green Paper notes that investor associations have increasingly expressed
unease with the complexity of existing long-term incentive arrangements1074.  
The Paper touches on mandatory holding periods for shares awarded under an LTIP.  To
address concerns raised by investor associations1075, the Green Paper suggests extending this
period from the current guideline minimum period of three years under the Code to a five-
year minimum.  It is suggested that this requirement be combined with a requirement for
executives to retain shares until they have built up a shareholding equivalent to 2x gross
salary, which mirrors a familiar theme in investor and proxy voting guidelines1076.  
The Green Paper notes that under companies legislation, companies are required to take into
account the interests of different stakeholder groups in their corporate decision-making1077
and must prepare a strategic report detailing the ways in which these obligations have been
met1078.  Citing examples of poor corporate conduct, the government advances the view in
the Green Paper that companies may need to do more to reassure the public that they are
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being run with an eye to the interests of the wider stakeholder community.  The Green Paper
contains  proposals  to  strengthen  the  voice  of  employees,  suppliers,  customers,  pension-
beneficiaries  and  other  parties  with  a  direct  or  close  interest  in  the  performance  of  a
company.   In  her speech on June 11,  2016, Theresa May announced plans  to  introduce
consumer and employee representatives on company boards.  
The government notes that the different measures proposed are not exclusive, and that it is
open  to  views  as  to  the  flexibility  that  should  be  granted  to  companies  in  relation  to
implementation.   It  suggests that,  at  the most flexible end of the spectrum would be the
establishment  of  a  set  of  high-level  expectations,  allowing  bodies  such as  the  Financial
Reporting Council to establish guidelines on how such expectations should be met.  Under
the regime, the strongest corporate governance and reporting requirements apply to public
and/or  quoted companies,  on the basis  that  private  companies  are  subject  to  more close
control  by  their  shareholders.   However,  research  indicates  that  large  businesses  are
increasingly  choosing to  operate  as  private  companies  in  the  UK,  and the  Green  Paper
therefore invites views as to whether large private  companies  should be subject  to more
stringent corporate governance and reporting requirements.  
With  reference  to  recent  practice,  the  Green  Paper  invites  views  on  whether  reporting
requirements imposed on public and listed companies under existing legislation should be
applied on the basis of the size of a business rather than its legal status.  It invites input on
the appropriate level at which a size threshold should be set.  In a final sweep-up section, the
Green Paper invites views more broadly on the current corporate governance framework in
the UK and how it might be improved.  The question focuses in particular on the flexibility
of the comply or explain system, asking whether the regime strikes the right balance between
high standards and low burdens.  The government has stressed that it does not favour any
one or more of the measures proposed and is canvassing opinion.1079  In November 2016, the
Department  for Business,  Energy & Industrial  Strategy (BEIS) issued a  Green Paper  on
Corporate Governance Reform.  The Green Paper states ‘The aim of this Green paper is to
consider  what  changes  might  be appropriate  in  the  corporate  governance  regime to help
ensure that we have an economy that works for everyone’.  It considers three specific areas
of corporate  governance which might be built  on to enhance the UK’s current corporate
governance framework.  These areas are:
- executive pay;
-strengthening the employee, customer, and supplier voice; and
-corporate governance in the UK’s largest privately-held businesses.
1079
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There are 14 Green Paper questions with six relating to executive pay, three to strengthening
the  employee,  customer  and  wider  stakeholder  voice,  and  five  relating  to  corporate
governance in large, privately-held businesses.  The consultation closed on 17 th February
2017 and responses to the consultation will be made available by BEIS around May 2017.
However,  the responses will  be made available  in collated format  and the anonymity of
individual responses will be retained.  
Executive remuneration
In an interesting article by Aime Williams and Madison Marriage ‘Investors back UK drive
to curb executive pay levels’1080 reports that some of the UK’s largest investors have revealed
support for government proposals designed to curb high executive pay in the latest pushback
against the widening wealth gap between bosses and workers.  Turning to the High Pay
Centre, an independent non-party think tank focused on pay at the top of the income scale.  It
is interesting to note that the High Pay Centre joined forces with the Chartered Institute of
Personnel  and  Development  (CIPD)  to  submit  a  joint  response  to  the  Green  paper
consultation, marking the commencement of a formal relationship between the two bodies,
to advocate fairer and more ethical approaches to pay and reward.  Their recommendations
include:
 All publicly listed companies should be required to publish the ratio between the pay
of their CEO and median pay in their organisation.
 All  publicly  listed  companies  should  be  required  to  have  at  least  one  employee
representative on their remuneration committee.
 All publicly listed companies should be required to establish a standalone human
capital  development  sub-committee  chaired  by  the  HR  director  with  the  same
standing as all board sub-committees.
 The  Government  should  set  voluntary  human  capital  reporting  standards  to
encourage all publicly listed organisations to provide better information on how they
invest in, lead, and manage their workforce for the long-term.
Conclusion
Chapter 4 discusses the crises and regulation, the relative importance of internal and external
governance controls, the role of financial regulation, the corporate governance regulation,
the responsibilities of the board, reform monetary policy, the duties of directors, regulatory
regime, incentive structures and legislative response and passage.  The examination follows
with  U.S. Securities  and  Exchange  Commission,  the  Basel  Committee,  Independent
Commission on banking, increasing board effectiveness, shareholder and the Stewardships
code, governance of risk, risk management, internal controls and governance and the next
step in UK Corporate Governance Reform such as shareholder voting rights.  It also explores
1080
 Financial Times, 18/19 February 2017, page 17,www.ft.com/Executive_Pay
238
corporate governance and excessive regulation, shareholder engagement and the role of the
remuneration committee.  It is enlightening to go through the regulation in order to avoid
repeating the same mistakes.  To conclude, this chapter stated corporate law, soft law codes,
and  financial  regulations  have  been  relevant  in  dealing  with  corporate  governance
deficiencies  especially  with  regards  to  excessive  risk-taking  and  risk  and  rewards
(remuneration) matters.






This  chapter  will  conclude  the  thesis,  by summarizing  the most  important  points  of  the
discussion  and  highlighting  the  balance  between  risk,  growth  and  profit  in  the  modern
corporate governance.  It is essential to assess the impact of regulations and litigation of
corporate governance and re-define the modus operandi of changing the culture of financial
regulations through a changed corporate governance approach.  Moreover, it also examines
the recommendations for corporate governance and explore the future developments.
Recommendations for Internal Corporate Governance 
Balance between Risk, Growth and Profit 
This  research  covered  UK  banks  which  failed  during  the  financial  crisis.   One  of  the
observations was that the risk appetite and culture within these banks was inappropriate with
an emphasis on growth and profit only.  Northern Rock failed were that its business model
was based on underestimating risks, liquidity  risk,  and a high risk-reward strategy.   The
aggressive and high-growth-strategy was based on retrieving funding from the wholesale
markets using securities mortgages as collateral, as opposed to the more conservative and
traditional approach.  
The board and its risk committee at Northern Rock had approved the funding strategy.  This
strategy was described from anything between inadequate to reckless in several reviews.1081
The board had reached the wrong conclusion on its  strategy and had done so without  a
backup plan.  The fact that the board set out a course that was the wrong one is in itself not
so problematic provided it understood and took reasonable business risks: every organisation
takes risks.  The point is that the reviews show that the risks taken were high,  certainly
considering the nature of the business Northern Rock was engaged in.  Its business was
1081
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consumer banking, which means it should have defined its risk appetite accordingly.  An
example of risk appetite was the take-over of ABN Amro by the RBS-led consortium.  It was
the wrong price,  the wrong way to pay, at  the wrong time and the wrong deal.1082  The
transaction was completed when the financial crisis had taken the markets in its grip.  The
transaction was financed by short term funding and was based on limited due diligence.  The
case study of HBoS demonstrated that this caused an increase in complexity of the business
model, which led to its collapse.  HBoS mentioned the case of Peter Cumming – only person
found guilty  following the crisis.   The case study of Barclays  showed that  an increased
pursuit of profit and growth, personified by its CEO, Bob Diamond, led to a culture where
moral and ethics were absent.  It can be concluded that there was a culture at board level
within most of the UK banks to engage in strategies carrying a high risk in pursuit of growth
and profit.  Going back to the principles set out by the Basel Committee, it is clear that this
course of action  by the board and senior management,  at  the banks was contrary to  the
following  principles:  ‘Principle  1:  The  board  has  overall  responsibility  for  the  bank,
including approving and overseeing the implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives,
risk  strategy,  corporate  governance  and  corporate  values.   The  board  is  responsible  for
providing  oversight  of  senior  management’.1083  ‘Principle  5:  Under  the  direction  of  the
board, senior management should ensure that the bank’s activities are consistent with the
business strategy, risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the board’.  
Setting out the risk strategy is a responsibility of the board and must be done in harmony
with  its  strategic  objectives.   The  board  would need to  define  a  risk policy  framework.
Within  such  a  framework,  important  strategic  decisions,  including  a  take-over  or  other
growth strategies, can be measured.  The board must ensure that all of the bank’s activities
are monitored and measured against such a framework.  In Northern Rock and HBoS, this
would have meant that if the funding strategy had been based on short term funding, the
board should have set controls.  
Remuneration and Culture 
A  consequence  of  the  pursuit  of  profit  and  growth  is  that  this  was  reflected  in  the
remuneration within banks.  Targets were short-term and based on financials  only.   The
variable part of the remuneration package was by far the largest component and cash based.
This exacerbated the cultural problems within the banks.  The reason for taking high risks is
the of gaining high rewards.  The employees within the bank at all levels would pursue such
a strategy.  The high rewards lead to the question how staff remuneration and their targets
should be linked.  The pressure on return on capital from the new regulation makes it more
important to achieve sufficient returns to keep the bank a viable business.  Financial targets
1082
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might  be most important  to the shareholders,  but the way in which they are achieved is
important to other stakeholders.  
One way of tackling this problem is to set regulatory restrictions on variable pay within UK
banks.  This is done by CRD IV which in this respect differs from Basel III, which it seeks to
implement.  From 1 January 2015, the variable component is capped to the level of the fixed
component for staff captured.  This includes senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in
control functions and anyone else whose salary and risk profile takes them to that level.
Only with sufficient shareholder approval might this ratio be raised to twice the level of the
fixed component.  Equally important are the requirements to include clawback provisions of
variable pay in case of conduct resulting into losses or failing to meet the standards of fitness
and propriety.  These provisions need to have some more teeth.  Firstly, fixed pay levels will
raise as a result of these provisions.1084  This means that the level of remuneration remains
unchanged.  Secondly, if the variable part is reduced the clawback will cover a smaller part
of  the  remuneration.   Thirdly,  awarding  remuneration,  especially  variable  remuneration,
should be linked to targets that measure the conduct and the employee’s standards of fitness
and propriety.   The closest  CRD IV comes to  moving away from financial  performance
targets  is  in  Article  94(1)(a)  where  it  states  that  for  assessing  individual  performance,
financial  and non-financial  criteria  should be taken into account,  and in Article  94(1)(k)
where  it  states  that  all  types  of  current  and  future  risk  shall  influence  the  variable
remuneration.   The mandatory  inclusion  of  risk is  a  good start.   It  forms a balance  for
financial performance targets.  
Board Effectiveness and Senior Management Experience 
The effectiveness of the board is of paramount importance.  In the case study of US, it was
that many of the boards where ineffective,  if only they were composed of sometimes as
many as forty people.  Some of the measures taken to improve the effectiveness of these
boards were: to stimulate reduction in size; the introduction of outside, independent non-
executive  directors;  and  to  introduce  committees  with  responsibility  for  nomination,
remuneration and audit.  Other measures to align the interests of the board with those of the
shareholders include the introduction of option award schemes.  
The deeper reason for the failure at RBS was the lack of effectiveness of board oversight and
challenge.   These failures  of  effectiveness  include:  the failure to  challenge  the focus  on
increasing revenue and assets; the failure to identify the aggregate risk across the businesses;
and the failure  to  challenge  assumptions  underlying the  business  model,  including those
behind the US subprime market and behind the funding market.  This was problematic when
combined with the leadership capability and management style of Fred Goodwin.  It was
concluded that his management style deterred robust challenges from the board.  Similar
problems of an ineffective board emerged from the case study of HBoS.  The board regarded
itself as a beacon of good governance, resulting in complacency rather than detailed scrutiny
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of how the bank was run.  It was combined with a lack of banking knowledge on the board,
which reduced its  effectiveness in challenging any decisions.   The situation  at  RBS and
HBoS confirms the importance of an active board that challenges the decisions taken.  This
is the point highlighted earlier from the US case study.  It emerged from the case studies of
Northern Rock and Barclays.  The effectiveness of the board of banks was one of the areas
covered by the Walker Review.  Instead of amending the Companies Act 2006, the Walker
Review suggests that much can be done within the framework, including ensuring sufficient
knowledge exists within the board.  It is suggested that the FSA, now the FCA, must ensure
that  the  nonexecutive  directors  commit  sufficient  time,  engage  proactively  in  board
discussions and act in line with the risk strategy.  This means that the FCA must monitor the
directors  monitoring  the  senior  management.   Although  the  FCA  under  the  Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 has its approved persons regime and it has a dialogue with
the banks’ boards, it  would seem a stretch to suggest that  this is  sufficient  to ensure an
effective  board.   To  make  the  board  more  effective,  various  measures  have  been
implemented to improve the accountability of the board in case of failure.  
Senior Management Regime
The amendments made by Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 to FSMA 2000, in
particular s64A and s66A, which come into force on 7 March 2016, do have teeth.  The FCA
and PRA have a joint consultation paper out on this Senior Management Regime.  Under
s66A, the FCA can find a senior manager guilty of misconduct contrary to rules of conduct
defined under s64A.  The action that the FCA can take against individuals in these cases is
specified under s66 and include: a fine; publishing a statement of his misconduct; suspend its
approval; and limits or restrict the functions the individual may undertake.  There is a much
greater chance that an offender will be subject to action under these provisions compared
with the regime under s36.  The question is whether such regulatory action may form a
sufficient deterrent which will stimulate the board to operate better  and more effectively.
There are sufficient roles a disgraced bank manager could perform, consider the speaking
circuit or consultancy and advisory roles.  The effectiveness of the board can be increased by
implementing appropriate information control systems.  From the Lloyds case, it was that
divisions underestimated their risk.  In the case of RBS, it was found that the quality of risk
control  and management  information  was lacking.   The problem of  inadequate  risk and
control systems was aggravated by an increasing level of complexity in the activities and
products in which the bank engaged.  In the period leading up to the financial crisis there had
been  an  increase  in  complex  financial  instruments.   As  a  consequence  of  the  capital
requirements  introduced by Basel  II,  there had been a  large growth in the securitisation
market.   This  created  leveraged  products  based on loans  and mortgages,  which  allowed
banks to transfer the risk of losses to the buyers.  It formed part of a trend towards more
complex products and derivatives,  where pay-off structures are leveraged and depend on
some underlying benchmark or security,  such as an exchange rate,  interest  rate  or share
prices.   The  rise  of  these  products  is  not  wrong,  apart  from their  use  to  avoid  capital
constraints.  But what it does mean is that everything in the bank has to be lifted to a level
capable of defining the strategy and monitoring and controlling the risks relating to these
products.  Senior management needs to provide sufficient guidance in its business strategy.  
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Recommendations for External Corporate Governance 
The financial  crisis affected individual  institutions  and reasons that  allowed these trigger
events to be exacerbated into the financial crisis.  These two categories of problems require
different consideration.  The first category stems from decisions taken at individual firms,
even  though  many  banks  had  made  the  same  problematic  decisions.   It  contains
overexposure to the US subprime mortgage market and a poorly construed business model.
The  second  category  relates  to  systemic  risk  in  the  financial  system  and  the  fear  of
contagion.  Several banks had become too-big-too-fail and the inter-connectedness in the
financial system had increased.  This means that if a large bank would fail, it would have
repercussions throughout the system, causing a domino effect amongst other banks.  One of
the responses1085 to the G20, in order to reduce the systemic risk in the financial system was
to address the opaqueness caused by the growth of over-the-counter products.  Although
whether the creation of these CCPs has reduced the systemic risk or concentrated it with
these CCPs is a much-debated question.  It was suggested to strengthen capital and funding
requirements to prevent bank failure.  This is covered by Basel III and, within the EU, by
CRD IV.   In  the  UK,  the  reduction  of  systemic  risk  was  explored  by  the  Independent
Commission on Banking1086.  
Recovery and Resolution 
If deposit holders fear that their savings are no longer secure then this will trigger a run on
the bank.  This was presented in the case study of Northern Rock, which was done under the
Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008.  The step towards allowing an orderly failure of a
bank must  be the safeguarding of  deposits.   This  has  been implemented  by way of  the
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”).  
Another part of resolution regime is that it would allow for a failure whilst minimising its
impact on the economy and without requiring state support.  The Special Resolution Regime
forms part of the Banking Act 2009, goes a long way in achieving this.  It grants sweeping
powers to the regulators, especially to the Bank of England, to intervene and transfer parts
out  of  the  failing  bank  or  to  trigger  a  bail-in.   These  powers  come  with  appropriate
limitations,  linked  to  the  objectives  of  the  powers,  and  with  appropriate  rules  on
compensation of parties affected.  The effectiveness of these new powers will be tested in
case of a future bank failure.  They are an improvement on the situation before the financial
crisis,  when no resolution regime was in place.   Its absence contributed to the problems
around the failures during the crisis, including the capital injection by the government and
the resulting state-ownership.  If one accepts that bank failures will happen, it is important to
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focus  on  drafting  an  appropriate  resolution  regime  as  it  is  to  draft  adequate  capital
requirements.   It  is  of equal importance  that  banks diligently  prepare their  recovery and
resolution plans.  The PRA has issued a statement on how it expects banks to do this, besides
the relevant parts of the rule book and the relevant directives.1087  The PRA expects these
reports to contain a series of options for the bank, depending on the type of stress it is under,
addressing severe capital or liquidity difficulties.  
Fair Treatment of Clients and Customers 
Since the financial crisis, various cases of misconduct by bank employees has been reported.
This  misconduct  relates  to  points  made  previously  when  discussing  internal  corporate
governance, especially in relation to culture, remuneration and the prioritisation of growth
and profit.  Most of these have resulted in heavy fines for the banks and individuals involved,
as well as damage to the sector as a whole.  These failures of bankers’ conduct include the
miss-selling  of  products,  including  PPI  and  interest  rate  swaps,  money  laundering  and
violating international sanctions, rogue traders and market manipulation.  The regulators and
other law enforcement agencies have come down hard on the financial institutions involved,
handing out record fines.  Some of the individuals involved are facing criminal prosecution.  
The Fair and Effective Markets Review conducted a review of the practices  in the fixed
income, currency and commodity markets in wake of the LIBOR and FX scandals.1088  The
report includes observations, including a market structure presenting opportunities for abuse,
failings of internal governance and controls and poorly designed remuneration and incentive
schemes.   The  review  makes  several  recommendations,  including  increased  individual
accountability,  especially  with  front-line  staff;  making  the  market  itself  collectively
responsible for maintaining high standards; and maintaining a credible deterrence for when
standards do slip.1089  The report recommends that the senior management regime, which was
introduced for banks following the crisis, is extended to cover all companies which operate
in these markets.   The point  in  all  scandals  is  that  the people involved,  whether  traders
rigging rates or retail sales staff miss-selling PPI, had a personal financial incentive to do so.
In the case of the traders, the manipulated rates showed their trading positions in a more
favourable light.  This would affect their variable pay at the end of the year.  In the case of a
retail sales network, the targets are set in terms of selling a new product.  It should be noted
that PPI in itself is not a bad product and some people need it.  Selling it to anyone because
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this product needs to be pushed and it is profitable, is not appropriate.  External stakeholders
must be recognised and included in the targets and objectives set to staff.  
The outcome of the scandals has been record fines for the banks involved.  These fines are
part of a settlement with the enforcement agency, which include a discount on the fine and
immunity from criminal prosecution.  The fines are passed on to the shareholders of the bank
as they reduce profit and reduce dividend payments.  The regulator may get worried about
the height of the fine as it could have a negative impact on the capital position of the bank.
This  reflects  the  importance  of  the  important  banks.   Consider  action  brought  against
institutions that were not important.   Companies such as Arthur Andersen, WorldCom or
Enron have all  become insolvent.   In 2002, Arthur Andersen, one of the world’s largest
accounting firms, was found liable in relation to its handling of Enron.  Both WorldCom and
Enron were engulfed in scandals and filed for bankruptcy.  It seems wrong that, because a
bank is deemed too-big-too-fail it should be allowed to escape criminal liability and continue
to operate as normal.  
Ownership 
Shareholders can be rather passive. At Northern Rock, it was not just the directors and the
risk committee  that  had failed.   The board had communicated its  funding strategy to its
shareholders.   It  would appear  that  either  the shareholders  had not  scrutinised  the  plans
themselves, or, if they had, then they had accepted the high risk in return for the promise of a
high reward.  It is also a concern that some of the shareholders were employees.  One would
have expected them to scrutinise the business strategy in great detail as it affects not only
their employment but also their capital.  The employees had to the usual channels available
for employees, an additional way to express their opinion on the strategy as shareholders.
One may point out the rough analogy with Lehman Brothers, where employees had their
pension  and  savings  invested  in  the  firm,  failed  to  scrutinise  the  business  strategy  and
challenge it.  At RBS, the situation was worse.  The shareholders supported the disastrous
take-over of ABN Amro.1090  
One may state that the shareholders have invested their own money and, should things go
wrong, they lose it.  This is what happened with the shareholders of the UK banks that failed.
This is answered by the UK Stewardship Code for institutional investors, one of the aims of
which is to promote the long-term success of companies in such a way that the providers of
capital prosper.1091  The interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders in the banks are
aligned.  It may well be possible that these guidelines, which are operated on a comply or
explain basis, need to be strengthened for investments in financial institutions.  This would
recognise the importance of the stakeholders and the role of banks.  
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Within the UK, the regulator best placed to perform this task is the FCA.  In a response to
the proposals by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, the FCA went out of
its way, not only to outline the tools it had, but to point out its existing focus on supervision
of standards, governance and culture.1092  The FCA’s Director of Enforcement and Market
Oversight, Mark Steward, delivered a speech on culture and governance.1093  The problem is
that although the regulator can draw up rules and standards, which describe the expectations
and the  boundaries,  they  do not  create  a  situation  in  which  good governance  magically
appears.   He  describes  several  things  that  are  needed  to  achieve  this,  the  one  being
knowledge and expertise at senior management level.  
Core governance principles
Most  capital  markets  have  adopted  more  or  less  similar  core  governance  principles  to
safeguard investors’ interests even though they may differ in their choice for the shareholder
or stakeholder models.  Common corporate governance practices tend to focus on corporate
transparency, board compensation policies, management succession planning, protection of
minority  interests,  risks  management,  performance  and  conformance,  and  increasingly
nowadays other stakeholders’ interests.  This study with particular focus of the banking and
finance sector supports the ongoing insights that corporate governance problems surrounding
conflicts  of  interests  still  persist  because  of  the  general  effects  of  board  compensation
structures and incentives, financial gatekeepers’ inadequacies, various limitations of existing
soft  and hard laws, and other reasons.   The study finds that despite additional  rules and
regulations surrounding banking operations, the sector is not spared from the excesses found
in other corporate sectors.  This is worrying as banking and finance exert widespread effects
on  the  entire  economy  due  to  the  nature  of  its  services.   In  the  final  analysis,  whilst
macroeconomic factors are uncontrollable, the banking and finance sector should ensure that
the  more  controllable  corporate  governance  practices  are  held  to  very  high standards  to
minimise  the risks of corporate  misfeasance and malfeasance.   Only then can the sector
deliver sustainable performance free from scandals and the like.  Future legislation should
take  into  account  guiding  principles  such  as  the  following:  avoid  over-regulation  and
unwarranted increase in compliance costs; ensure, only to the extent necessary, legal and
regulatory certainty through firm harmonization measures across the European Union; avoid
placing undue reliance on institutional investors as the sole substitute for good management
and  director  supervision;  avoid  measures  which  would  encourage  the  creation  of  an
inefficient, litigious environment; clarify executive and nonexecutive directors' duties within
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the board and the board committees; avoid placing undue reliance on auditors and actuaries
as solely responsible for detection of accounting and corporate governance irregularities.1094
Maximizing the competitiveness of capital markets is critical to ensuring economic growth,
job creation, low costs of capital, innovation, entrepreneurship and a strong tax base in key
areas of the country.  Regulation and litigation play central roles in protecting investors and
the  efficient  functioning  of  our  capital  markets,  in  light  of  highly  publicized  abuses.
Excessive  regulation,  problematic  implementation  and  unwarranted  litigation  when
occurring simultaneously make capital markets less attractive and less competitive with other
financial  centers  around the  world.   As shareholders  are  able  to  take  more control  over
companies in which they are stakeholders, regulation can be more targeted.1095  
Market competitiveness 
Capital  markets have been the deepest, most liquid financial markets in the world.  As a
result, companies have had access to funding with the lowest cost of capital.  Foreign issuers
have come to public  markets  for the same reasons,  as well  as for the quality  of market
regulation.  Foreign entities did not have viable public market alternatives elsewhere in the
world.  The world is different because there are viable choices.  Where there was once only
one viable market, there are several such markets. Technology provides the possibility of
easily trading anywhere.  Because multiple markets have created choices that never used to
exist, issuers seeking capital are using a cost benefit analysis that focuses on the competitive
differences between markets, including the potential cost of litigation and the complexity of
regulation.   Public  capital  markets  must  compete  for  business  in  a  global  market  place.
Access  to  capital  is  no  longer  a  competitive  advantage.   Modern  technologies  can
significantly  help  members  and  third  parties  to  exercise  their  rights  effectively.   At  a
minimum, company law should enable and encourage as much as possible the use of up-to-
date  information  and  communication  technologies  by  companies  in  their  various
relationships with members and third parties.1096  Business efficiency and competitiveness,
which are crucial components of economic growth and job creation, depend on many factors,
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one of which is a sound framework of company law.1097  Flexibility should be available to
companies as much as possible: where systems are deemed to be equivalent, maximum room
should be left open to the freedom of the parties involved.1098  
The impact of regulations and litigation
A substantial portion of the erosion in markets global and internal competitiveness - and the
only factors over which policymakers have control - relates to insufficiently coordinated,
costly and/or excessive market regulation and enforcement, public and private.  Regulatory
requirements for complying with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act cost companies, on
average,  $4.36 million  in  the  first  year  -  a  stiff  price  for  most  public  companies  and a
significant burden for small ones, particularly first-time market entrants.  Nearly open-ended
responsibility of auditors in complying with Section 404 has made a consolidation-shriveled
profession virtually uninsurable for this work.  
Future Developments 
Addressing the Weaknesses 
It is acknowledged that they are of increased importance in a bank, but they are elements of
corporate  governance.   The  approach  to  tackle  these  weaknesses  should  emerge  from
strengthening  corporate  governance  rather  than  introducing  measures  specific  to  banks.
Given the impact of the financial crisis, it seems reasonable to question whether a corporate
governance code can operate on a comply-or explain basis.  If one wants to address the
weaknesses, such a code needs to be enshrined in legislation, adhered to and monitored.  An
argument holds for board reform, it is a point of corporate governance, which in case of a
bank amplifies.  Instead of focussing on gender quotas, important this might be in itself, it
would be wise to ensure that a board has sufficient knowledge and experience to challenge
senior  management.   In  the  case  of  banks,  the  regulators  need  to  approve  new  board
members  and  these  rules  have  sharpened  up.   In  light  of  the  serious  failings  in  board
effectiveness during the crisis, it is necessary to introduce general guidelines or requirements
on board members.  The cultural problems in banks are difficult to resolve.  Changing the
culture within an organisation or company takes several years.  It appears that the culture of
an industry needs to change.  This is concerning as some of the most effective measures on
remuneration come from the EU, which the UK may well leave in the near future.  
State-ownership 
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The government  created UKFI to deal with its  investments at  arm’s length.   This was a
struggle as it would be difficult for politicians to resist meddling in the day-to-day affairs of
the state-owned banks.  This is understandable when the annual bonus round would come
along and the media headlines would be dominated by payments made in the bailed-out
banks.  However, the meddling has proven undesirable.  The objectives of the politicians are
incompatible with those of the banks and of the regulators.  The politicians want the banks to
lend more to stimulate the UK economy.  
Future Research 
a. Corporate Governance at Banks as a Special Case 
Corporate  governance  at  banks  is  seen  as  a  special  case of  corporate  governance.   The
reasons for doing so are that it includes more regulation and supervision; it has a greater
emphasis on risk management; and it has debt management.  These differences apply to what
constitutes internal and external corporate governance at banks.  Internal governance and
controls at banks may include a good corporate culture,  behaviour and risk management.
External  governance  and  controls  at  banks  will  include  the  regulators.   These  special
elements attract most attention as well as in practice.  It is suggested to have equal regard to
the non-special parts of corporate governance at banks.  It would be useful to investigate
these general, or nonspecial, parts on its own, but also how they interact with and drive the
bank-specific elements.  Future research could focus on general elements not discussed as
part of this research as they did not establish themselves as weaknesses during the crisis, but
they may have done so in other corporate crises.  
b. Comparative Corporate Governance 
The other major comparative element in this research, arises from the fact that much of UK
financial  regulation  is  derived  from  international  reports  and  from  EU  directives  and
regulations.   When  studying  corporate  governance  at  UK  banks,  comparative  problems
emerging from this are unavoidable.   One must consider the context  of the international
reports of how EU law is made.  
The future of corporate governance 
Globalization  and the  multinational  character  of  modern  companies  have  raised  a  lot  of
questions  about  whether  there  is  one  method  that  can  safely  lead  to  the  much-desired
convergence of corporate governance laws.  Differences in terminology and multiplicity in
the  legal  concepts  have  led  the  legislators  to  adopt  a  strategy  of  common  minimum
standards, according to which a limited number of topics are harmonized.  Such a solution
cannot  be characterized  as  successful  and has  been at  the centre  of  criticism as being a
‘fragmentary and compromise solution’.1099 
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Mutual recognition, minimum standards and subsidiarity provide a framework for regulatory
competition, which reduces the scope for strategic regulation and dilemmas.1100  Regulatory
competition can become unstable if mutual recognition is not achieved.  There is always the
fear that regulatory competition will end up leading to a race to the bottom if there is no
framework to control and regulate it.  In the United States, the result has been an ‘uneasy and
fluid allocation of corporate law between the federal government on the one hand and the
individual states on the other’.1101  The open method of coordination has been added to the
agenda.   It  is  a  soft  law  approach  designed  to  encourage  joint  action,  peer  pressure,
benchmarking and indicators.  It bears strong resemblance to self-regulation, improved with
a  combination  of  short,  medium  and  long-term reporting  periods.   The  essence  of  this
approach is the use of centralised regulation to preserve a space for ‘autonomous governance
at lower levels of government’.1102  It deviates from the traditional decision-making process
and supports a model of inter-governmentalism.  It is doubtful whether the open method of
coordination, which has been adopted in the areas of employment and social protection, can
be  introduced  to  company  law.   It  faces  the  same  problem  that  made  self-regulation
ineffective: lack of sanctions and no supervision cannot guarantee conformity and strong
enforcement, because compliance rests upon the discretion of the countries.  The experience
of the SoX with its ‘trans-territorial impact’ showed that fraud and mismanagement have no
particular national identity and that ‘moral standards and value management systems for risk
prevention’ are essential in all countries of the world.1103  The jury may be out as to the long-
term  prospects  for  rival  systems  of  corporate  governance  in  an  increasingly  globalised
economy.  Even if consensus is attained over ‘universal core moral values’1104 that need to be
a part of every company at any cost, the battle against corporate misconduct is not over.  This
happens because these rules and values need to be put into practice, to be followed, and to be
respected by all parties involved.  
The  financial  crisis  confirms  the  importance  of  solid  corporate  regulation  to  the  world
economy, and the need for ethical and effective initiatives.  It is positive that there was no
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attempt to introduce a brand new legislative framework, but the Ministers tried to create a
comprehensive framework, building on existing initiatives, to identify and fill the existing
regulatory  gaps  and  foster  the  broad  international  consensus  needed  for  rapid
implementation.  In the Final Statement, they mentioned among other the strengthening of
business ethics as one of the Framework’s aims.1105  The business world has suffered too
much during the last decades and seems to be determined to avoid the same mistakes that
caused  the  corporate  governance  failures  and  provoked  the  financial  crisis.   Since  the
missing link has been identified,  an attempt will  now be made to evaluate  the future of
corporate governance regulation after  the aforementioned initial  responses.   The wave of
scandals  accelerated  the  procedure  and  helped  in  overcoming  any  second  thoughts  and
reservations.  Such a significant and complicated piece of legislation could not be flawless,
especially in a period when news of successive failures and collapses was in the newspaper
headlines.  The crisis is not directly linked with corporate governance as such, but there are
some common symptoms: failure to exercise proper due diligence, unsound risk management
practices and weak supervision.  Moreover, the causes can be traced back to the pre-crisis
phase,  the tranquillity  period.   During the period of strong global growth and prolonged
stability, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the
risks and failed to keep pace with financial  innovation, or take into account the systemic
ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.1106  Instead in the middle of the crisis, when
circumstances look dire and chunks of the financial  system are falling off, proposals get
radical.  But after each crisis is over, these radical plans are tidied away and what remains is
calls  for better  disclosure, greater transparency independence and risk management.   The
financial crisis drew our attention to an old lesson that we need to revise.  
The field of corporate governance draws from many varying disciplines: law, economics,
ethics, politics, management, and finance.  In this respect, understanding the issues raised by
corporate governance requires familiarity with the concepts, assumptions and terminology of
each  of  these  fields,  plus  a  willingness  to  synthesize  and even transcend them.1107  The
mistakes which have been made can be used as a useful guide and point of reference for the
future, as, following the right direction, they can show the way that leads to a safer, more
dynamic corporate  governance habitat.   The financial  climate  changed significantly  after
Enron and the US Sarbenes-Oxley Act, not only in the United States, but around the world.
The  quality  of  a  company’s  corporate  governance  is  seen  as  vital  to  its  longer-term
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performance.1108  It  is  clear  from the  evidence  that  institutional  investors  are  no  longer
passive, back-seat owners of companies.  They can no longer ignore their responsibilities as
shareholders.  In the UK, the investment institutions have realized that passive shareholding
is  not  the  route  to  shareholder  wealth  maximization.1109  Among  public  and  private
institutions  in  the  corporate  constellation,  only  the  fiduciary  shareholder  has  interests
congruent with modern corporation.  By definition, they are long-term investors and they
want sustainable growth from companies that provide useful goods and services and good
jobs at good wages.1110
Conclusions
To  conclude,  from different  points  of  view,  and  based  on  the  failures  of  the  financial
institutions such as Barings Bank, Allfirst Bank, BCCI, Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock,
WorldCom, Enron as well as Parmalat that are analysed above,  it appears that there was
inadequate corporate governance and as a result, the organizations suffered severe financial
loss and in some cases faced financial collapse.  It appears that the corporate governance
flaws  in  the  Enron/WorldCom  cases  led  to  Sarbanes-Oxley.   However,  it  seems  that
Sarbanes-Oxley in the US does not appear to be able to deter corporate governance flaws in
banking and this is why Dodd-Frank followed.  Besides this, the Companies Act 2006 and
corporate governance codes appear not to work sufficiently well in the UK, and this is why
updated corporate governance codes were launched there.  This thesis focuses on corporate
governance in banking and the thesis focused primarily on problems in the banking industry.
We also discussed the legal implications for directors as well as their duties.  It seems that
the previous reforms measures are not effective and the current reform measures would work
based on evidential support as uncovered by the thesis. 
The thesis uncovered were flawed corporate governance practices in the US and UK banking
sector are concerned, and we illustrated that these were due to poor management, insufficient
monitoring  and poor  supervision,  etc.   The  general  effectiveness  of  financial  regulatory
reforms in the US and UK could be strengthened according to the following findings and
recommendations.   Corporate  governance practices  are weak in the US and UK banking
sector, therefore we are going to suggest how these could be strengthened.  In the first place,
sound corporate governance is reliant on external marketplace commitment and legislation
plus  a  healthy  board  culture  which  safeguards  policies.1111  The  succession of  corporate
scandals  before  the  dawn  of  the  new  millennium  revealed  that  corporate  governance
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structures needed to be improved and reinforced.  Legislation can provide a framework of
operation and a set of basic rules, but modern companies need to undergo a deep change in
their  culture,  in  order  to  stay  away  from  fraudulent  practices  and  unethical  conduct.
Christopher  Stone  examined  the  culture  of  the  corporation  in  1975 and  was  realistic  in
assuming that the dominant orientation of companies will remain toward profit, expansion,
and prestige.1112  His  suggestion was that  we cannot  rest  upon anything firmer  than  the
corporation’s good intentions, but we need to fight the pre-existent corporate cultures, so that
no underlying attitudes remain untouched.  The business environment was not yet ready to
welcome and adopt such far-reaching proposals.  Kydland and Prescott had emphasized the
importance of pondering not only the desirable policy for a given set of circumstances but
also the framework likely to produce the best policy over time.1113  The focus should be in
the long-run, with a view to creating a consistent policy1114  and policy makers should behave
in a systematic way focusing on the achievement of their long-term goals without short-term
deviations.   The  search  for  a  good  policy  rule  should  be  limited  to  a  comparison  of
alternative  policy  rules  in  order  to  select  the  one  with  the  most  attractive  operation
characteristics.1115  The issue of short-termism in corporate objectives had been addressed
and it has been highlighted as one of the most significant factors contributing to excessive
risk-taking.1116  Proposals  were  stressing the importance  of  having management  interests
aligned  with  the  long-term sensible  interests  of  the  companies,  in  an  attempt  to  find  a
common point of reference for everybody’s legitimate expectations.  In this way, excessive
risk-taking could be avoided and there would be incentives for safe, and sound behavior1117,
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as an individual’s performance would be evaluated over time together with the company’s
long-term interests.  The business world was obliged to change its strategy and ethics could
guarantee  a  smooth  transition  into  a  new era  where  doing business  is  based  on values,
principles, long-term perspective and accountability.  An ethical culture can be the missing
link for the future of corporate governance, as well as the key for the successful reform of
the existing regime.  Corporate and personal ethics can become an efficient substitute for
external regulation and internal control within the companies provided that corporate leaders
are effective in implementing the business strategy and ethical vision of their companies.1118  
The thesis has highlight various corporate governance theories, however, the communitarian
approach is a basis for regulation.  The thesis gathers key insights from previous corporate
and financial  crises concerning flawed corporate governance practices (in particular  with
respect to risk-taking and directors’ remuneration) that contributed to the emergence of these
crises.  These developments prompted regulatory responses in the US, UK and elsewhere
including the justification for a more global response.  The examination of these regulatory
responses suggest further/potential areas for strengthening as suggested in the thesis and for
which future research work could be explored.
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